University of Wollongong

Research Online
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection
2017+

University of Wollongong Thesis Collections

2018

German Defeat/Red Victory: Change and Continuity in Western and Russian
Accounts of June-December 1941
David Sutton
University of Wollongong
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1
University of Wollongong
Copyright Warning
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any
copyright material contained on this site.
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised,
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material.
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the
conversion of material into digital or electronic form.
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the University of Wollongong.

Recommended Citation
Sutton, David, German Defeat/Red Victory: Change and Continuity in Western and Russian Accounts of
June-December 1941, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of
Wollongong, 2018. https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1/301

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

School of Humanities and Social Inquiry
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts

German Defeat/Red Victory: Change and Continuity in
Western and Russian Accounts of June-December 1941.

David Sutton

This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of degree
Doctor of Philosophy
from the
University of Wollongong

2018
i

Abstract
The second half of 1941 has become a major focus in the writing of
the history of the Nazi-Soviet War in the English-speaking and
Russian-speaking worlds. For decades, historians outside of the
Soviet Union tended to view 1941 as more of a German defeat
brought about by Hitler’s mistakes and the weather rather than a
Red victory brought about mainly by the resistance of the Soviet
state, army and people. The reverse was true in the Soviet Union
where historians explained the German failure to capture Moscow as
a triumph of Soviet resistance. In more recent years, there is a
trend among Western historians to reframe the Battle of Moscow as
a Red victory, while in Russia the whole question of a Red victory
has been problematised following the collapse of Communism and
the opening of the Soviet archives. This thesis argues that the
strongest trend evident in this literature is the repositioning of the
Soviet state as an active rather than a passive actor in the events
of 1941. While the history of the war is constantly being revised, a
trend towards viewing the saving of Moscow as more of a Red
victory than a German defeat is observable across the sample of
accounts published in English and Russian studied for this thesis.
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND SOURCES
All Russian words have been transliterated using the Library of
Congress ALA-LC Guide. However, in cases where an alternative
spelling is in common usage in English (for instance, ‘Joseph Stalin’
rather than ‘Iosif Stalin’), the more familiar spelling has been used.
Spelling used in original quotes has been kept with the form of
transliteration used in the original text. The same applies for
American spelling of certain words (‘armor’ instead of ‘armour’
etc.). All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
As this is a historiographical work, lengthy summaries of a
particular

historian’s

work

are

at

times

required.

To

avoid

unnecessary clutter, summaries are referenced with a single
footnote containing bibliographical details.
On a number of occasions, multiple editions of the same work have
been employed in the writing of this work. There have been two
causes of this. Firstly, in some cases there has been a need to
utilise two different introductions in an edited work, such as those
by Harrison E. Salisbury and David M. Glantz in different editions of
Zhukov’s memoirs. Secondly, on some occasions after reading and
taking notes on a work, that particular edition has become
unavailable and a new edition has been purchased. For example,
both the 1971 and 1993 editions of Albert Seaton’s The Battle for
Moscow have been used in this work. The content is the same, but
the page numbers differ. To avoid confusion, when the 1993 edition
is cited the year of that version’s publication has always been
included

in

square

brackets.

All

editions

are

listed

in

the

bibliography.
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Introduction
Reflecting upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rapid decline of
the once official version of Soviet history, Richard Overy wrote, in 1998,
that “[t]he history of the Soviet Union is in turmoil. In twenty years’ time
it may be possible at last to write something approaching a definitive
history”.1 Nearly two decades later, it is appropriate to ask whether such
a definitive history is in prospect. It is not clear what standards Overy
would set for a ‘definitive’ history, but presumably it would require that
historical accounts produced in the English-speaking and Russianspeaking worlds are moving into rough alignment. To explore this issue,
this thesis will examine trends in the Western and Russian historiography
around the spectacular initial success and equally spectacular failure of
the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.
In the West, the issue of whether the Wehrmacht could have captured
Moscow and perhaps ended the Soviet-German War successfully in Adolf
Hitler’s favour in 1941 was for decades one of the most vexed questions
of the entire Soviet period.2 During the Cold War, the answer most often
encountered in the literature was that the Germans failed to capture
Moscow because of their own strategic and tactical errors: a “German
defeat”. With the end of the Cold War and the partial opening of the
Soviet archives, new military histories have appeared in the West. Writing
in 2005, the American historian Robert Citino suggested that a new frame
for viewing the Battle of Moscow was needed, arguing that “rather than
the Wehrmacht ‘losing’ it, the Soviet army won it”.3 The question asked in
this thesis is whether viewing 1941 as a “Red victory” is the new, postarchival orthodoxy.

1

Richard Overy, Russia’s War (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1998), p. xiii.
John Taylor, ‘Hitler and Moscow, 1941’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 26, no. 3
(2013), p. 490.
3
Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich
(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005), p. 304.
2

1

In other words, is a paradigm shift under way in which the Soviet state
and Red Army, once written off as little more than punching bags for a
superior German war machine, are widely perceived as the agents of a
major victory in 1941? A second, and related question is whether Englishlanguage and Russian-language histories are moving into broad alignment
in terms of explaining the events of 1941. Since the collapse of Soviet
Communism and the demise of the official Soviet view of the war, a multivoiced contest over history has emerged in the Russian Federation. This
thesis will explore the evolution of that contest in order to understand the
major points of agreement and disagreement between Russian and
Western versions of this crucial moment in the history of the war and
whether a historiographical convergence about 1941 is occurring.
During the Cold War, starkly different Western and Soviet accounts of the
Nazi-Soviet War of 1941-1945 were in play. The war against Nazi
Germany has always been remembered and even named and dated
differently. In the West, the Second World War of 1939-1945 began with
the Nazi invasion – quickly followed by the Soviet invasion – of Poland in
1939. Accounts of victory over the Nazis in the West focused on
significant British and American successes: the Battle of Britain, the
campaigns in North Africa and the Atlantic, and the D-Day landings in
France became the best-known events of the war. The other side of this
emphasis on American and British military achievements was that the
‘Eastern Front’, as the Germans described the fight against the Red Army,
became the “unknown war”,4 which became the apt title of a 1978
documentary series. The documentary, a joint British, U.S. and Soviet
production sympathetic to the Soviet view of the war, was taken off the
air soon after its first showing following the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979.

4

David Stahel, ‘Writing the Nazi-Soviet War’, War in History, vol. 22, no. 2 (2015), p. 236.

2

As Omer Bartov has put it, accounts of the war published in the West
relegated the Eastern Front to the status of an “unclear and baffling
sideshow”. This was in stark contrast to the more “chivalrous battles in
the West and in North Africa, where there had apparently been decent
chaps on both sides, though unfortunately some were led by rather more
unpleasant characters than others”.5 This underestimation of the NaziSoviet War was at odds with the scale of the fighting there. The Soviet
Union suffered 70,000 cities, towns and villages destroyed, along with six
million houses, 98,000 farms, 32,000 factories, 82,000 schools, 43,000
libraries, 6,000 hospitals and many thousands of miles of roads and
railway.6 The most commonly cited figure for total Soviet military and
civilian deaths presently sits at twenty-seven million.7 The tally of Soviet
military deaths has been estimated at between 7.8 and 8.7 million,
roughly a third of the total lives lost by the Soviet Union between 1941
and 1945.8 In the first six months of the war, Red Army losses stood at
four and a half million soldiers.9 By comparison, Britain and the United
States suffered approximately 800,000 dead in the entire war.10 The
Eastern Front cost more lives than all of the other European theatres
combined.11
The scale and importance of the Nazi-Soviet War is also reflected in the
pivotal role played by the Soviet Union in bringing about the Nazi defeat.
Almost three quarters of German military losses in men and materiel
5

Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-1945, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare
(Great Britain: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985), p. xi.
6
Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2006), p. 5.
7
Albert Axell, Russia’s Heroes (London: Constable Publishers, 2001), p. 247; Catherine Merridale,
Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), p.
337; Laurence Rees, ‘What Was the Turning Point of World War II?’, World War II, vol. 25, no. 2
(2010), p. 35; Thomas Earl Porter, ‘Hitler’s Rassenkampf in the East: The Forgotten Genocide of
Soviet POWs’, Nationalities Papers, vol. 37, no. 6 (2009), p. 839.
8
Michael Ellman and S. Maksudov, ‘Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A note’, Europe –
Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 4 (1994), pp. 674-675.
9
G. F. Krivosheev (ed.), Grif Sekretnosti sniat. Poteri Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v voĭnakh, boevykh
deĭstviiakh i voennykh konfliktakh. Statisticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Voennizdat Izdatel’stvo,
1993), p. 141.
10
Rees, ‘What Was the Turning Point of World War II?’, p. 35.
11
Merridale, Ivan’s War, p. 167.

3

occurred on Germany’s Eastern Front.12 By contrast, the British accounted
for five per cent of German casualties, the United States twenty per
cent.13 On the eve of the June 1944 D-Day landings in Normandy, some
seventy per cent of Germany’s military manpower remained tied up on
the Eastern Front, significantly aiding Allied efforts.14 The Red Army was
responsible for destroying more than six hundred enemy divisions, 48,000
enemy tanks, 167,000 guns, and 7,700 enemy aircraft.15
In accounting for the undeserved obscurity of the Soviet war effort in the
West, historians

have noted issues related to Cold War politics,

imbalances in available sources, and national stereotypes.16 With no
access to Soviet archives, Western historians of the Cold War period came
to

rely heavily on German sources, especially the

memoirs

and

testimonies of former German commanders keen to exculpate the
Wehrmacht and preserve German military honour against the accusation
of

war

crimes

in

the

east.17

German

commanders

were

spared

prosecution and were recruited by the United States military to provide
first-hand evidence on the strengths and weaknesses of the Red Army.18
As Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II have described the rationale
for employing the former enemy, “who knew better how to kill Russians
than the men who dispatched 30 million of them?”19
Eventually, around two thousand former German commanders worked for
12

Merridale, Ivan’s War, p. 337; Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, p. 11.
Norman Davies, No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Penguin Books
Ltd, 2006), pp. 25-26.
14
Michael C.C. Adams, The Best War Ever: America and World War II (Baltimore and London: The
John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 47.
15
Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, pp. 10-11; enemy divisions destroyed include Italian, Romanian, Finnish,
Croat, Slovak, Spanish and German divisions.
16
David M. Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and interpretations’, The Journal of
Military History, vol. 62, no. 3 (July, 1998), p. 615; Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II, The
Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 47-50.
17
Citino, German Way of War, p. 292.
18
Smelser and Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front, pp. 64-65; Gregory Liedtke, Enduring the
Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943 (England: Helion & Company
Limited, 2016), pp. xxviii-xxix.
19
Smelser and Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front, p. 249.
13
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the United States military.20 Central to this process was Franz Halder, the
former German general and chief-of-staff whose diary became an
indispensable source for all the histories of 1941. Halder was so influential
within the German Military History Program, conducted by the United
States Army Historical Division, that it was informally known as the
‘Halder Group’.21 By 1954, former Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe
generals and admirals had produced some 2,175 manuscripts for
consumption by the United States military establishment.22
The agenda of the Wehrmacht memoirists was firstly to erase the memory
of German war crimes and to recast the invasion of the Soviet Union as a
flawed but ultimately noble attempt to save Western civilisation from the
greater evil of Soviet Communism.23 Secondly, the generals defended
their own role in the war by claiming that Hitler’s blunders snatched
defeat from the jaws of a certain German victory. Hitler’s incompetence
and poor decisions caused the otherwise invincible German Army to
become bogged down before Moscow, first in the mud of October and
then in the snows of November and December. Or, as Gerd R. Ueberschär
has put it, the German generals:
emphasized both that Germany was engaged in a preventative war
and that Hitler was solely responsible for the failure of the Russian
campaign through his dilettantish interference in the planning and
execution of military operations … This view dominated most of the
memoirs that appeared in subsequent years.24
An early example of the German generals telling their story to a Western
audience was the case made in 1950 for the prestigious American journal
20

Kenneth Macksey, ‘Introduction’, in Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (United States of America:
Da Capo Press, 2002 [1952]), p. viii.
21
Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, pp. xxviii-xxix.
22
Peter G. Tsouras, ‘Introduction’, in Peter G. Tsouras (ed.), Fighting in Hell: The German Ordeal
on the Eastern Front (New York: Presidio Press, 1995), p. 2.
23
Smelser and Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front, pp. 3, 39-46.
24
Gerd R. Ueberschär, ‘The Military Campaign’, in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär,
Hitler’s War in the East: A Critical Assessment. Second Revised Edition (Oxford: Berghahn Books,
2002), p. 74.
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Foreign Affairs by former Vice Admiral Kurt Assmann.25 Assmann argued
that Moscow and not Stalingrad was the turning point of the war in
Europe. Having conducted research among the surviving generals,
Assmann blamed Hitler’s groundless optimism and the Führer’s incredibly
foolish decision to weaken the attack on Moscow in August 1941 for the
eventual failure of blitzkrieg. Assmann noted that a debate over
objectives existed from at least December 1940, and that the question
had not been resolved when the invasion of the Soviet Union began. The
defeat was not the generals’ fault, and it was Hitler’s arrogance that
prevailed over the views of the military professionals. According to
Assmann, “if Hitler was of the opinion that the Russian armed forces,
possibly also the Soviet régime, would collapse under the first heavy
blows, this was a hypothesis which did not enter the calculations of the
General Staff”. The German generals knew that they were up against a
wily Stalin whose “strategic principles” were to use space and time and to
wear down an opponent gradually “by means of offensive and defensive
actions”. When Hitler issued a directive on 21 August 1941 rejecting calls
to focus on the Soviet capital, “the entire eastern campaign was fatally
determined”. Once the opportunity to occupy Moscow in the late summer
was lost, the weather became the major determining factor. Assmann
provided a template for countless subsequent English-language accounts
when he described how:
Now, however, the weather turned on the Germans and threatened
to nullify all their gains. A period of rain and mud, unusually heavy
and protracted for this time of year, made what were bad roads
impassable … Instead of the expected spirited pursuit of a sorely
stricken foe, there was now a crawling advance through mud and
rain against an enemy who was throwing everything he had into the
defence of his capital.26

25

Kurt Assmann, ‘The Battle for Moscow, Turning Point of the War’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 28, no. 2
(1950), pp. 309-326.
26
This paragraph is a summary of Assmann, ‘The Battle for Moscow, Turning Point of the War’,
quotes and information taken from pp. 310-311, 317 (long quote from p. 320).
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The rains of the rasputitsa (‘time of no roads’) wreaked untold havoc on
the ability of the Wehrmacht to manoeuvre and supply, and caused
significant damage to tanks and trucks. It was from this type of reasoning
that the traditional Western story of the weather and Hitler’s blunders
saving Moscow emerged and became widely accepted.27
The narrative pushed by the German generals had the advantage of
simplicity and a clear-cut answer to the question of how this crucial
moment in world history was decided. It also had the advantage of
credible primary sources – the German generals themselves. The German
generals’ version of the Battle of Moscow fitted the already well-ingrained
assumptions of a Western audience used to negative stereotypes about
Russia’s endless hordes of servile, brutish, Asiatic manpower. These
barbarian hordes stood in sharp contrast to the civilised, professional and
supremely capable Germans. As one admittedly extreme advocate of the
position of the Halder school put it, “[t]he evidence supports the historical
generalization that Barbarossa was for the Germans to win or lose. Only a
German mistake of the highest magnitude could thwart victory”.28
According to Citino, more than any other conflict, the Nazi-Soviet War has
been dominated by discussions of how the Germans could have won the
war.29 Thus, “Barbarossa might well be the only war ever in which the

27

Many historians have noted the dominance of the German historiographical school despite some
dissenting voices. See for example Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and
interpretations’, p. 597; David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 12-13; Robert Kirchubel, Operation
Barbarossa: The German Invasion of Soviet Russia (Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2013), p.
354; Citino, The German Way of War, pp. 291-293; Smelser and Davies, The Myth of the Eastern
Front, p. 2; Christer Bergström, Operation Barbarossa: The Largest Campaign in History – Hitler
Against Stalin (Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2016), p. 24; R. D. Hooker, ‘“The World Will Hold Its
Breath”: Reinterpreting Operation Barbarossa’, Parameters, vol. 29, no. 1 (1999), p. 150;
Alexander Hill, The Red Army and the Second World War (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2017), p. 294; Bryan Irven Fugate Jr., Thunder on the Dnepr: the End of the Blitzkrieg Era,
Summer, 1941 (The University of Texas at Austin, Ph.D., 1976 [printed by University Microfilms
International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A., 1985]), p. 257; Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, p.
xxxi.
28
Russel H. S. Stolfi, [Book review] Glantz, David M., ‘Barbarossa: Hitler’s Invasion of Russia
1941’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 66, no. 3 (July, 2002), p. 888.
29
Citino, The German Way of War, p. 268.
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losers wrote the history, rather than the victors”.30 The resistance of the
Soviet state, army and people was factored into the dominant Western
Cold War view, but was always qualified by reference to Hitler’s blunders
and the mud and snow, and was supplemented by gruesome examples of
the inhumane, callous Russian and Soviet indifference to life.31 Many Cold
War accounts likened the German defeat to that of Napoleon’s Grande
Armée,32 an earlier example of a Russian victory whose achievement,
arguably at least, was usurped by images of the French invaders falling
victim to the snows of the Russian steppe.33 The popular perception for
seven decades was, as Gregory Liedtke has put it, that “the military
forces of Germany were not really defeated by the Soviet Red Army on
the battlefield at all”.34 Or, as Alexander Hill has noted, the picture of
“faceless hordes and overwhelming material might overcoming superior
German tactical and operational capabilities, relied heavily on memoirs of
senior German commanders such as Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein
and others”.35
It has to be acknowledged that the Soviet Union was its own worst enemy
when it came to telling the story of 1941-1945. Western accounts of the
Red Army written before the fall of Communism routinely complained
about the lack of Soviet archival sources.36 Soviet accounts varnished the
30

ibid., p. 292.
See, for example, Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Moscow 1941: The Frozen Offensive (Great Britain:
Arms & Armour Press, 1985), pp. 86, 163, 186-187, 196, 275; Klaus Reinhardt, Moscow – The
Turning Point: The Failure of Hitler’s Strategy in the Winter of 1941-42 (Oxford: Berg Publishers
Limited, 1992 [1972]), pp. 86 and 91; Albert Seaton, The Battle for Moscow, 1941-1942 (London:
Rupert Hart-Davis Ltd, 1971), pp. 124 and 167; John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s
War with Germany. Volume 1 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), p. 239; Alexander Werth,
Russia at War, 1941-1945 (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1964), p. 232.
32
See, for example, B. H. Liddell Hart, ‘Why Hitler Invaded Russia – And Failed’, Marine Corps
Gazette, vol. 40, no. 12 (1956), pp. 22-26; Piekalkiewicz, Moscow 1941, pp. 21, 61, 98, 137;
Reinhardt, Moscow – The Turning Point, p. 307; Alfred Turney, Disaster at Moscow: Von Bock’s
Campaigns, 1941-1942 (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1971), p. 28; Assmann, ‘The Battle for
Moscow, Turning Point of the War’, p. 326.
33
This theme is explored in Dominic C. B. Lieven, ‘Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812-14)’,
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring, 2006), pp. 283-308.
34
Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, p. xxi.
35
Hill, The Red Army and the Second World War, p. 1.
36
See, for example, Jesse D. Clarkson, [Book Review] Werth, Alexander, ‘Russia at War 19411945’, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 38, no. 4 (1966), p. 449; Earl F. Ziemke and Magna
Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History,
31
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truth, ignored inconvenient facts, and confused the details of names,
places and situations to suit the official version of events.37 For decades
after the Second World War, the availability of primary German records
about the conflict far exceeded what was available on the Soviet side.38
Western historians were reluctant to trust official Soviet works as credible
historical sources due to their overt propagandistic agenda and the
reluctance of Soviet authorities to reveal the archival sources cited in such
works.39 Summing up the outcome of this secrecy, David M. Glantz, the
foremost American historian of the Soviet German War since the opening
of the Soviet archives, noted that “[h]aving emerged victorious on the
battlefield, the Soviets abandoned the field of historical struggle to their
former Allies and enemies”.40 Or as Nina Tumarkin has put it:
Deliberate distortions of history for political reasons, especially the
history of the Soviet Union, were the trademark of Soviet historical
writing almost since its inception. In particular, the official saga of
the Great Patriotic War was filled with hyperbole and glaring
omissions.41
Much has changed since the opening of the Soviet archives in the late
1980s. Writing in 1998, Glantz summarised the excitement among the
new post-archival generation of historians when he described how:

United States Army, 1987), p. 522; John Erickson, ‘The Soviet Union at War (1941-1945): An
Essay on Sources and Studies’, Soviet Studies, vol. 14, no. 3 (1963), p. 249; Manfred
Messerschmidt, ‘Introduction’, in Horst Boog, Jürgen Forster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, RolfDieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär, Germany and the Second World War: Volume IV. The Attack on
the Soviet Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 7; Truman Smith, ‘Foreword’, in General
Wladyslaw Anders, Hitler’s Defeat in Russia (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. ix;
Bryan I. Fugate, Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Novato,
CA: Presidio Press, 1984), p. xix; Reinhardt, Moscow – The Turning Point, pp. xii-xiii.
37
Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voĭna 1941-1945 godov, osnovnye sobytiia voĭny, tom pervyĭ
(Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 2011), p. 788; this multi-authored collective work covered in
significant detail many aspects of the Great Patriotic War. The Chief of the Editorial Committee for
the whole series was A. Ė. Serdiukov. The Chair of the Editorial Committee responsible for the first
book, the one studied for this thesis, was V. A. Zolotarev. For ease of purpose, this work will
hence be referred to as Zolotarev, VOV (2011) in footnotes.
38
Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East (Lexington, Kentucky: The
University Press of Kentucky, 2011), p. xix.
39
Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, pp. xxiii-xxv.
40
Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and interpretations’, p. 598.
41
Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia
(New York: BasicBooks, 1994), pp. 50-51.
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Already the testing of German materials against Soviet open-source
accounts and the limited existing quantity of Soviet archival materials
has produced a strikingly different picture of the war. When that
comparison and testing can be done in full measure, the results will
be even more significant. In essence, on the eve of the twenty-first
century, we stand not at the end of historiography on the war, but
rather at the threshold of a new beginning.42
Spurred on by this new access to information about the Soviet state and
Red Army, there has been a significant revival of interest in the Eastern
Front and the events of 1941 among Western historians specialising in the
military history of the war.43 To use a military analogy, the accounts of
the German generals have been caught in a pincer movement; the
pincers comprise on the one hand a group of historians investigating the
German side of the war using mainly German archives,44 and another
group of historians primarily concerned with the Soviet side of war who
now have access to Soviet archives.45
As we shall see, the thrust of this new historiography is to push forward
the date at which the Germans lost the war. Instead of an emphasis upon
Stalingrad and Kursk, or the mud and snow of late 1941 as bringing the
Wehrmacht undone, historians writing since the opening of the Soviet
archives are much more likely to argue that the war was lost in the
summer of 1941 when blitzkrieg failed in large measure due to
unexpectedly stiff Soviet resistance. One of the conclusions of this thesis
is that the once dominant voice of the German generals has all but
disappeared from the literature. The view of the German generals has
become a phantom, often invoked in the introductions to recent military
histories of Operation Barbarossa, yet very rarely encountered in the
military histories themselves. On the other hand, it will be argued here
42
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that

the

German

generals

were

remarkably

important

in

the

historiography because their account of 1941 – and the critique of their
account - set the agenda for much of the Western historiography up to
the present day. In other words, historians writing today continue to
attack the German generals’ view as an enduring myth that needs to be
countered, despite the fact that the views under attack have been in the
minority for decades.
During the Cold War, a very different account of the Soviet-German War
predominated

in

the

Soviet

Union,

where

Communist

rule

was

strengthened and, for some, vindicated by the Red victory. The Great
Patriotic War was always dated 1941-1945; the period 1939-1941, when
the Soviet Union assisted Germany in the carving up of Eastern Europe
and launched an invasion of Finland, was justified as defensive and
necessary given the West’s refusal to commit to collective action against
Hitler. The Soviet view of the war represented an official history, which
was only subject to change if there were a change in leader. According to
the Soviet view of the war, the Soviet Union was unique among the
warring states in that its foreign policy had always been aimed at peace,
and it was only the perfidy of Hitler and of the West that led to the
outbreak of war and its horrendous consequences for the people of the
Soviet Union. The Soviet view was an explanation of the Red victory that
stressed the positive role of the Communist Party, the unity of the Soviet
people, and the courage, tenacity and skill of the Red Army. Winston
Churchill declared to the British parliament in 1944 that “the guts of the
German army have been largely torn out by Russian valour and
generalship”.46 This was a prescient summary of the Soviet view of the
war.

46
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The Soviet view of the war was ‘super patriotic’ in nature.47 The Soviet
leadership exploited the Great Patriotic War as proof of the validity of the
Soviet system and closely controlled how its history was recorded.48 The
Great Patriotic War was a time when the regime made some concessions
to the people; limited economic freedoms were introduced, participants
described wartime solidarity between the Communist elite and ordinary
people, the churches were reopened and the persecuted priests given a
brief respite.49 This was the peak of the cult that surrounded the image of
a strong, omniscient leadership embodied in Joseph Stalin. After Stalin’s
death, the regimes of Khrushchëv and especially Brezhnev used the
victory over the Nazis as a core justification for the whole Soviet
system.50 Those growing up in the Soviet Union after the war were told
that the victory in the war confirmed the superiority of Soviet-style
socialism.51 It was also a Russian, and not simply a Soviet triumph. The
wartime experience caused many Russians to identify themselves with the
Soviet Union as if it were their state.52 According to Geoffrey Hosking, the
Great Patriotic War was the only part of official Soviet history when there
truly was substantial recognition of the Russian (Russkiĭ), as distinct from
the multi-national (Rossiĭskiĭ or Communist), nature of the Soviet state.53
The Soviet version of the war was the reverse mirror image of the
account offered by Halder or Assmann. The Red Army’s success in saving
Moscow and turning the tide of the war was not a case of contingency,
but of inevitability. Once the Soviet state, people, and army recovered
47
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from the shock of the cowardly and unprovoked invasion, the superiority
of the Soviet system inevitably determined the outcome. The victory was
never out of the hands of the Soviet people even though it took four long
years to achieve. Soviet resistance, not the weather or Hitler’s errors, was
the decisive factor. Soviet histories portrayed the Red Army as comprising
whole units of heroes selflessly devoted to their motherland and the
Soviet system.
The central tenets of the official Soviet view of the war only came under
serious attack in the Soviet Union during Mikhail Gorbachëv’s glasnost’
era when a ‘revisionist’ critique progressively questioned many of the
time-honoured pillars of Soviet propaganda.54 The most glaring of the
omissions from the Soviet account was the lack of serious discussion of
how the Red Army could have fared so badly in the first five months of
the war. According to Amir Weiner, 22 June “remained one of the longest
enduring taboos in Soviet historiography”.55 Questions also arose as to
whether victory came at too high a price and whether the war was a
victory for Stalin and his totalitarian system, or a defeat for the people of
the Soviet Union.56 Many revisionists viewed 1941 not as a “German
Defeat” or “Red Victory”, but a “Stolen Victory”. In their view, 1941 was a
victory won by the sacrifice of the people despite the wasteful and
incompetent Soviet leadership. This heroic sacrifice was then ‘stolen’ from
the people by the Communist Party, who claimed responsibility for saving
the capital, and then subjected the Soviet population to a brutal
dictatorship no better than the Nazi regime they had expelled.
54
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More recently, the revisionists have themselves come under attack from
the Putin administration, from conservative military historians based in
the Russian Army, and from a phalanx of ‘private historians’, some of
whom view Stalin as having been the key to the Red victory. Teddy J.
Uldricks has described this anti-revisionism as the “national-patriotic
school”; for convenience, this historikerstreit in Russia will be described
as

a

battle

between

revisionists

and

national-patriots.57

Putin-era

national-patriotic historians agree with earlier Soviet accounts that the
war revealed the superior capacity of the Soviet state when it came to
waging a total war: 1941 was a “Red Victory”. It was the Red Army, not
Hitler’s mistakes or the weather, which saved Moscow. This new patriotic
literature has up until now received little scholarly attention in the West
and one of the aims of this thesis is to enhance knowledge about what is
arguably the new dominant paradigm in Russia. Given that the earlier
established orthodoxies are clearly undergoing challenges both in the
West and in Russia, it is timely to investigate the trajectories of the
debate over 1941 and whether an intersection of Western and Russian
accounts is now in prospect.
1941 and its revival
The importance attached to 1941 has waxed and waned over the years.
During the war, Western politicians, generals and even cartoonists were
in no doubt as to the importance of the fact that Moscow did not fall to
the German invaders.58 Soon after Operation Barbarossa began, there
was a widespread expectation that the Soviet state would follow the
example of France and collapse in a matter of weeks.59 The Wehrmacht
57
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advanced nearly one thousand kilometres into Soviet territory and
captured an area the size of Britain, France, Spain and Italy combined.60
For Britain and the United States, the unexpected survival of the Soviet
state was the ‘miracle’ of Moscow, a reversal of fortunes for the Germans
that fortuitously opened the door to an Allied victory.
On the other hand, there was no emphatic winner. The Germans failed to
capture Moscow but lived to fight another day and launch a successful
summer offensive in summer 1942. The Red Army drove the German
Army back from Moscow but failed to make further headway, and the
capital remained under threat for another eighteen months. Thus it was a
matter of interpretation as to how to rate its importance compared to
later battles. During the Cold War, English-speaking historians and Soviet
accounts were mostly in agreement that the turning point came about
half way through the war: Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943 and
Kursk in the summer of 1943 were widely acknowledged as the battles
when the war was won and lost. John Erickson summed up this view
when he included the Battle of Moscow in a volume entitled The Road to
Stalingrad. The implication was that the Battle of Moscow was a precursor
to the major event that was the Battle of Stalingrad, not the major event
itself. Writing in 2007, Andrew Nagorski expressed his regret that:
The battle of Moscow is now largely forgotten. Historians have paid
far more attention both to the Battles of Stalingrad and the Kursk
salient, which represented clear-cut victories over Hitler’s forces, and
to the searing human drama of the siege of Leningrad.61
Nagorski may well have been correct in asserting that Stalingrad is rated
more of a turning point than Moscow, but the situation, at least in the
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academic Western literature, appears to be changing.62 While his method
was far from scientific, Laurence Rees recently surveyed twenty leading
Western historians for their opinion as to the turning point of the Second
World War. Stalingrad was still the most popular answer with six - Richard
Overy, Max Hastings, Antony Beevor, Robert Dallek and William Hitchcock
- nominations. The year 1941 with five nominations came a close second.
David

Reynolds

nominated

Hitler’s

decision

to

launch

Operation

Barbarossa, Andrew Roberts nominated the mud of October; Richard
Evans and Ian Kershaw nominated the German defeat at Moscow in
December; Rees himself nominated Stalin’s decision to remain in Moscow
on 16 October as having changed the course of the war.63 It is worth
nothing that, even if they disagreed about the exact date, twelve out of
twenty of Rees’s experts nominated the turning point as having occurred
somewhere on the Eastern Front, not in Western Europe or the Pacific.
Geoffrey Megargee noted what may be a looming sea change among the
historians when he wrote that:
Stalingrad may have been the emotional turning point of the war, but
the Germans’ best chance for victory disappeared in the snows in
front of Moscow, if not earlier.64
As we shall see, the main issue for Western historians has changed from
how the Germans could have won the war to whether the Germans ever
stood any realistic chance of victory at all. If the war was indeed lost in
1941, at what point in the year was it lost, and why? It is now quite
common to find the claim that the war was already lost for the Germans
as early as the summer of 1941, only weeks into the invasion. 65 How
widespread is that view? Does that mean that the image of the “snows in
62
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front of Moscow” has now become more a description of the scenery than,
as it was once for many readers of this literature, a credible explanation
of Germany’s defeat? If historians – or the “orthodoxy” among the
historians – are changing their views, why has that change occurred?
From the Soviet perspective too, the Battle for Moscow for many years
took second place to the battles of Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin. Stalin
had no incentive to draw attention to the miscalculations of the Soviet
leadership or to explain the massive losses of 1941. Moscow did not
become a ‘gorod-geroĭ’ (‘hero city’) until 1965, twelve years after Stalin’s
death and long after Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa.66
Post-Stalin Soviet accounts did not dwell on the massive defeats at the
borders except to claim that they were examples of steadfast resistance
by the Red Army. Moscow did become more important over the years
and, in 1967, the Communist Party celebration of the fiftieth anniversary
of the October Revolution was the occasion for declaring that the Battle of
Moscow was indeed a “turning point of the war”.67 In the heavily edited
Soviet-era version of Georgiĭ Zhukov’s memoirs that appeared in the late
1960s, Zhukov described the Battle for Moscow as his principal memory
of the war:
When I am asked what I remember most of all of the past war, I
always answer: The Battle for Moscow. A quarter of a century has
passed, but these historic events and battles still remain in my
memory. Under hectic, almost catastrophically complicated and
difficult conditions our troops were tempered, matured, accumulated
experience and, once the absolutely essential minimum of arms were
in their hands, moved from retreat and defensive manoeuver to a
powerful offensive. Our grateful descendants will never forget the
difficult and heroic sacrifices of the Soviet people and the military
achievements of the Soviet armed forces in that period. The Battle
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for Moscow laid the firm foundations for the ensuing defeat of Nazi
Germany.68
Apart from the typical patriotic rhetoric and hyperbole, the message here
is that Moscow was the ‘firm foundation’. Soviet accounts made it clear
however that much fighting remained before a final Red victory was
assured. As we shall see, in the present historical battle in Russia
between revisionists and national-patriots, Moscow and the events of
1941 now take pride of place.
Paradigms and paradigm shifts
The terms ‘paradigm’ and ‘paradigm shift’ were proposed by Thomas
Kuhn to describe major changes in the state of knowledge about a
particular object of study. In 1962, Kuhn suggested that the production of
what is accepted as scientific knowledge is often dominated by a
paradigm. This paradigm rests upon generally accepted assumptions
regarding theory, methodology and relevant areas of research: the “entire
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the
members of a given community”.69 Kuhn postulated that progress in
science is typically driven by paradigm shifts – “scientific revolutions” caused not by new discoveries that discredit previous assumptions, but by
processes within the scientific profession that “generate a shift in
perspective”.70 Kuhn’s ideas are roughly analogous to Michel Foucault’s
contention that ‘discourses’ about knowledge are often shaped by political
and social factors and not simply scholarly debate over the evidence. 71
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Kuhn wrote with the sciences in mind, but his insights have often been
applied to the study of shifting historical perspectives. Sheila Fitzpatrick,
the leading “revisionist” historian of the Stalin era, has used Kuhn’s model
to describe and explain the changes that occurred in the historiography of
the Stalin era from the 1970s to the present. She noted that the term
‘paradigm shift’ is over-used in the humanities to describe mere changes
in intellectual fashion. Nonetheless:
Kuhn’s model is still useful, if only for reminding us of the power of
reigning orthodoxies at any given time in determining what questions
should be asked, how they should be answered, and what constitutes
the relevant field of information.72
For Fitzpatrick, a “paradigm shift” occurred in studies of the Soviet Union
in the 1970s. Dissatisfied with the “top-down” totalitarian model of
scholarship that had dominated traditional Sovietology, a new generation
of historians, often with a background in social history, began to revise
how power structures in the Soviet Union were understood.73 This change
came as a result of the more broad influence of social history that
affected history in general in the 1970s and, specific to the case of Soviet
studies, the influence of the Cold War. The ‘New Left’ movement of the
early 1970s, driven by increasing opposition to the Vietnam War, began
to question the traditional view of the Soviet Union as unequivocally ‘bad’
and solely responsible for the Cold War.74 In other words, the revisionist
critique was fuelled by a new generation of historians seeking to
understand Soviet history through a different lens to those of the ‘Cold
War warriors’ that had dominated the profession up to that point. Thus,
the ‘revisionist’ challenge of the 1970s represented a Kuhnian paradigm
shift: change was driven not by a sudden influx of new source material,
but a shift in perspective from those within the historical profession.
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Paradigms are situated within a broader political and social context that
shapes the conventional way of looking at issues. Just as the term
‘totalitarianism’ provided the convenient cover-all for most academics and
laymen to describe the readily observable features of the Soviet political
system,

the

German

generals

provided

a

convenient

and

simple

explanation of how the Germans lost the Battle of Moscow: the Germans
were going well until the conspired forces of the weather and Hitler’s
incompetence sabotaged their seemingly inevitable victory at the very
gates of the Soviet capital. This part of the paradigm went virtually
unquestioned for seventy years. Jack Radey and Charles Sharp have
recently observed that historians did not question the role of the weather
because it was seemingly so well established in the literature.75 The
impact of the mud and snow became an assumption that went untested
by those working within the dominant paradigm laid down by the former
German generals.
As Kuhn pointed out, paradigms are subject to change, but a change in
the direction of the historiography cannot be assumed as meaning a
simple one-directional line towards the ‘truth’. Trends in the literature
may reflect broader political and social change, fashion in historical
explanations as well as the availability (or not) of new sources, which in
any case are always subject to interpretation and reinterpretation. As
Catherine Merridale has noted:
Archives … are necessary to meet the current challenge, but they are
not the essence of it. The fundamental issue now is not new
information, but the possibility of new sets of questions.76
In other words, archival information does not speak for itself but is
deployed by historians within an interpretative framework. Influencing
75
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this interpretative framework might be factors such as changing fashions
in a historical field and broader societal changes such as those described
by Fitzpatrick. A change in perspective among historians does not
necessarily mean that one group of historians have been proved right and
another group proved wrong. Historians working within a dominant
paradigm may become prisoners of a “groupthink” that shuts out other
ideas. Historians who are marginalised within a paradigm at one point in
time may well find that they are part of the dominant paradigm at
another point in time. It would be naïve to think that historical questions
are definitively resolved in the light of new information or that the ‘truth
with a capital T’ inevitably emerges out of historical debates. The question
here is not whether 1941 was in fact a Red victory, but the extent to
which historians writing in the English and Russian languages now
consider 1941 to be a Red victory.
Whether a paradigm is in place or not depends upon the perspective of a
presumably significant majority of those working on a particular issue. In
the case of 1941, different sub groups of historians and writers working
on the issue can be identified. One division is between historians primarily
studying the German or Soviet sides of the war. A second division is
between geographic regions, notably North America, Britain and Ireland,
Germany and Russia. What will be argued in this thesis is that a new
historiography about 1941, widely shared by authors working across the
globe and studying both the German and Soviet wars, has emerged since
the opening of the Soviet archives.
As for why such an alignment of previously disparate voices has occurred,
there are several plausible explanations. It might be thought, for example
that the Russian and Western historiography would gradually converge
because the end of Communism opened up the Soviet archives and led to
large-scale

collaboration

between

Western

and

Russian

researchers/historians. It will be argued here that while the new sources
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of information and collaborations are important, they were not the main
drivers of the new alignment. Rather what mattered most was the fact
that in both the West and in Russia, distinct historiographies or paradigms
emerged that dominated for much of the Cold War era: under the
influence of broader changes in the political and intellectual contexts,
these paradigms came under challenge. As we shall see, historians in the
West still see themselves as slaying the beast that was the German
generals’ view of the war. In Russia, revisionists and national-patriots are
at war over whether to modify or entirely jettison the Soviet view of the
war. It is serendipity rather than inevitability that accounts for the
present alignment around the “Red victory” at Moscow in 1941.
Victories and Pyrrhic victories
The title of the thesis seeks to contrast the terms “Red Victory” and
“German Defeat”. But what exactly do those terms mean? It should be
noted at the outset that the terms ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ are contested and
slippery to apply in practice. For military historians, the concept of
‘victory’ in war has long been a topic of controversy.77 According to
William Martel, the term ’victory’ is “such an immensely powerful,
suggestive, and absolute term” that it has to be used “with great
caution”.78 Martel also cautions that, “all judgements about victory are
inherently subjective”. Just as importantly, victory “is not and cannot be a
value-neutral concept, and is not separable from political and ideological
forces in society”.79 Or as Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney
have put it, it is open to interpretation as to whether an event is
perceived as a victory or a defeat.80
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Victory has been defined as “reducing substantially the enemy’s warmaking potential”, forcing the enemy into “withdrawal, retreat, laying
down arms or surrender”, achieving this “quickly and efficiently”, and
doing so “with absolute minimum collateral damage to civilians and their
infrastructures”.81 In the case of 1941, the Red Army had done much of
the “withdrawal, retreat, laying down arms, or surrender” but arguably it
was the German Army that was in greater danger of collapse in December
1941. Because the Germans won so many battles but ultimately failed to
achieve their goals and because the Red Army lost so many battles but
ultimately did achieve its goals, the unexpected outcome has fuelled
interpretation and reinterpretation of victory and defeat in 1941.
It is in this connection that the term ‘Pyrrhic’, or hollow, victory is much
used in discussions of both the German Army and the Red Army in 1941.
To this day, a debate continues around the extent to which the successes
of the Wehrmacht at Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev and Viaz’ma-Briansk in the
summer and autumn of 1941 were ‘real’ victories that were subsequently
undone by Hitler’s mistakes, or Pyrrhic victories because the German
Army needed to win the war quickly or it would not win at all. German
losses in 1941 were many times lower than the Red Army’s, but their
capacity to replenish the losses was, according to most but not all
historians, much less.82 The idea of seeing the German war as a Pyrrhic
victory is perhaps best summed up in the title of a chapter in Chris
Bellamy’s Absolute War: ‘Winning oneself to death’.83
Some Western historians have gone so far as to cast doubt on whether, at
the end of the day, there was any victory achieved in the entire NaziSoviet War. Richard Raack in the 1990s, for example, argued that the war
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“finished with a hollow Soviet victory”.84 For Earl F. Ziemke, this was “a
no-holds-barred contest between two totalitarian powers, which both
sides lost”.85 Similarly, many Russian historians writing after the collapse
of the Soviet Union saw the war as a missed opportunity to rid Russia of
Stalin and Communism.86 However, if the war was such a ‘missed
opportunity’, it is difficult to know what an acceptable level of loss would
be if this were indeed a war of “annihilation”.87
For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that an important military
outcome did occur in December 1941; the thesis revolves around
understanding how historians in the West and in Russia have tried to
explain that outcome. To give greater focus to the question of whether
the historiography is moving in the direction of describing 1941 as a ‘Red
victory’ rather than a ‘German defeat’, this thesis will assess historians in
terms of four outstanding issues identified by Glantz in his classic
discussion of the historiography.88 The first area of controversy identified
by Glantz was “the question of wartime leadership and the analogous
issue of who was responsible for military defeat - Hitler or his generals”.89
The German generals were of the view that Hitler lost the war by, among
other poor decisions, delaying the attack on Moscow in August 1941. In
other words, Operations Barbarossa and Typhoon were brilliant military
successes brought undone by political interference.
In the early Cold War, many historians in the West came to share the
view that a consequence of Hitler’s amateurish decision-making was that,
84
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in the months that followed, the mud, snow and the vastness of Russia’s
physical and human resources joined forces to defeat the otherwise
invincible German Army. Such a view of the events of 1941 would not
qualify as a Red victory if the author considers that Hitler had made a
poor strategic choice that he did not need to make. However, if the
historian was of the opinion that Hitler’s decision to slow the advance on
Moscow was forced upon the German dictator by unexpectedly stiff Soviet
resistance leaving him with no choice but, for example, to protect his
exposed flanks, that potentially would qualify as a Red victory.
The second controversy identified by Glantz was “testing and either
validating or refuting the earlier stereotypical German view of the Red
Army”.90 While German diarists and memoirists often praised the
stubborn resistance of the Red Army, the implication of what they wrote
was that the Soviet military and people were incapable of thwarting the
invasion of the Wehrmacht.91 In other words, the Germans had to lose
the war and the Soviet regime could not win it because the Red Army was
all brawn and no brains. As we shall see, one of the strong trends
observed here is growing recognition of the capacity of the Soviet state
and a correspondingly less stereotypic view of the Red Army as a
primitive horde whose only motivation was fear of its own leaders. In
other words, historians are increasingly likely to recognise that, at the
very least, the Soviet state, army, and people were capable of defending
themselves from the German occupation of their capital. The Soviet
capacity to act, and recognition of the impact of those actions on the part
of historians, would suggest an acknowledgement of Soviet agency in the
events of 1941.

90

ibid.
See, for example, Erhard Raus, ‘Russian Combat Methods in World War II’, in Tsouras (ed.),
Fighting in Hell, p. 17; Günther Blumentritt, ‘Moscow’, in Seymour Freidin and William Richardson
(eds), The Fatal Decisions (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1956), p. 38; Guderian, Panzer Leader,
pp. 151, 244, 253.

91

25

The third controversy identified by Glantz concerned “responsibility for the
war in the first place and the associated question of the combat readiness
of the Red Army in June 1941”.92 Here Glantz specifically referred to the
Icebreaker controversy: the dispute, which has dominated discussion of
the war in Russia since the 1990s, over whether Stalin was planning to
attack Hitler. According to Viktor Suvorov (real name Vladimir Rezun), the
German invasion of the Soviet Union was a pre-emptive strike, just as
Hitler had claimed in 1941. If it were true, this would make it more
difficult to claim any sort of Red ‘victory’ in 1941 given that the aim of the
war was not survival in the face of a surprise attack but territorial
conquest in Europe. For historians who embraced the Icebreaker thesis,
1941 could only be described as the mutual defeat of the two contenders
or even as Hitler’s succesful defence of his Nazi state from Communist
aggression.
Fourthly, Glantz pointed out that a debate raged “over the human cost
exacted by the war on the Red Army and the civilian population of the
Soviet Union”.93 This is an especially contentious issue in Russia. Stalin
admitted to only seven million losses in the war, a figure that rose to
twenty million in the Nikita Khrushchëv era and twenty-two million in the
Leonid Brezhnev era. Gorbachëv put the figure at nearly twenty-seven
million and some historians in Russia today put the figure at closer to
forty-six million.94 There is a bitter debate in Russia over whether Hitler’s
surprise invasion or Stalin’s brutal methods were the cause of the high
Red Army losses.95 Viewed in these terms, the question arises as to
whether the German Army was stopped simply by Stalin’s ruthless
deployment of an inexhaustible supply of cannon fodder, a perspective
that might sit somewhere between a “Red victory” and “German defeat”.
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The following criteria will therefore be used for determining whether the
historian belongs in the ‘Red victory’ camp even if they make no explicit
claim of that type. Firstly, the historian would need to be of the view that
the goal in 1941 was a defensive one, that is, to defeat the German
invaders. Secondly, the Soviet state, army and people have to be
described as active forces in the war and not simply as helpless victims in
the first weeks and months. Thirdly, the measures taken by the Soviet
state, army and people need to be described as rational and effective and
not simply as the brutal reaction of a regime willing to expend the lives of
its enormous population in a futile battle. Fourthly, the historian needs to
be of the view that there was considerable solidarity in Soviet society and
not simply an army of servile hordes forced to fight by a totalitarian
regime.
Sources
Writing in 1977, Martin van Creveld speculated that there were already
“many thousands” of books written on the topic of “Hitler’s Russian
adventure”.96 This means that any attempt to explore the changing
historiography of even a small part of “Hitler’s Russian adventure” is a
daunting challenge. The aim here is to examine the much smaller
category of books that might be described as the expert military history
about 1941 and the Battle for Moscow. Even so, it cannot be claimed that
the accounts of the war examined here represent an exhaustive list of
every account of the military history of 1941. However, it is claimed that
the historians discussed comprise a significant sample of historians who
are prominent in bibliographies in the era in which they appeared and are
representative of the dominant trends in the literature. Table I lists the
historians considered for the Western perspective on 1941.
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Historian
PRE 1991 AUTHORS
Basil Liddell Hart (b.
1895 – d. 1970)
Wlayslaw Anders (b.
1892 – d. 1970)
E. Lederrey
Ronald Seth (b. 1911 –
d. 1985)

Paul Carell (b. 1911 –
d. 1997)
Alexander Werth (b.
1901 – d. 1969)
Alan Clark (b. 1928 –
d. 1999)
Earl F. Ziemke (b.
1922- d. 2007)

Affiliation

Contribution to the
study

British military;
military writer and
historian
Polish military

The German Generals
Talk (1948); The Other
Side of the Hill (1948)
Hitler’s Defeat in
Russia (1953)
Germany’s defeat in
the East (1955)
The Battle for Moscow
(1964)

Swiss Army; Federal
Polytechnic School
Professor of Literature,
University of Tallinn;
sexologist; British
Military (Special
Operations)
German military
(Allgemeine-SS)
Journalist
Politician

Barbarossa (1965)

U.S. Marines;
University of Georgia.

Stalingrad to Berlin
(1968); Moscow to
Stalingrad (1987 – coauthored with Magna
Bauer); The Red Army
1918-1941 (2004)
Moscow to Stalingrad
(1987 – co-authored
with Earl F. Ziemke)
The Defense of Moscow
(1970)

Magna Bauer (d. 1981)

U.S. Army Center of
Military History

Geoffrey Jukes (b.
1928)

Oxford University; UK
Ministry of Defence;
Australian National
University
U.S. Military

Alfred Turney
Albert Seaton (b.
1921)

British military

John Keegan (b. 1934
– d. 2012)

Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst; Princeton
University; Vassar
College.
German military;
NATO; Ph.D. from
University of Freiburg

Klaus Reinhardt (b.
1941)

Hitler’s War on Russia
(1964)
Russia at War (1964)

Disaster at Moscow
(1971)
The Battle for Moscow,
1941-42 (1971); The
Russo-German War
1941-45 (1971)
Barbarossa (1971);
The Second World War
(1989)
Moscow – The Turning
Point (1972)
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John Erickson (b. 1929
– d. 2002)
Matthew Cooper (b.
1952)
Horst Boog (b. 1928 –
d. 2016)

Edinburgh University

Gerd R. Ueberschär (b.
1943)

German Federal
Military Archives and
University in Freiburg

Jürgen Forster (b.
1940)

University of Freiburg

Joachim Hoffmann (b.
1930 – d. 2002)

German Armed Forces
Military History
Research Office

Ernst Klink (b. 1923 –
d. 1993)

German Armed Forces
Military History
Research Office

Independent
writer/researcher
German Armed Forces
Military History
Research Office

The Road to Stalingrad
(1975)
The German Army,
1933-1945 (1978)
Germany and the
Second World War
(1984 – co-authored
with Gerd R.
Ueberschär, Jürgen
Forster, Joachim
Hoffmann, Ernst Klink
and Rolf-Dieter Müller)
Germany and the
Second World War
(1984 – co-authored
with Horst Boog,
Jürgen Forster,
Joachim Hoffmann,
Ernst Klink and RolfDieter Müller); ‘The
Military Campaign’, in
Hitler’s War in the East
(2002 - co-authored
with Rolf-Dieter
Müller).
Germany and the
Second World War
(1984 – co-authored
with Horst Boog, Gerd
R. Ueberschär, Joachim
Hoffmann, Ernst Klink
and Rolf-Dieter Müller)
Germany and the
Second World War
(1984 – co-authored
with Horst Boog, Gerd
R. Ueberschär, Jürgen
Forster, Ernst Klink and
Rolf-Dieter Müller)
Germany and the
Second World War
(1984 – co-authored
with Horst Boog, Gerd
R. Ueberschär, Jürgen
Forster, Joachim
Hoffmann and RolfDieter Müller)
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Rolf-Dieter Müller (b.
1948)

German Armed Forces
Military History
Research Office

Bryan Fugate

University of Texas.

Janusz Piekaliewicz (b.
1925 – d. 1988)

Polish resistance;
independent researcher
and writer
Librarian; independent Assault on Moscow
researcher and writer
1941 (1986)

Werner Haupt

POST 1991 AUTHORS
Russell H. S. Stolfi (b.
U.S. Naval
1932-d. 2012)
Postgraduate School;
Colonel in U.S. Marine
Corps Reserve
Walter S. Dunn Jr (b.
University of Wisconsin
1928)
David M. Glantz (b.
Virginia Military
1942)
Institute; University of
North Carolina; U.S.
Army Command and
General Staff College;
Defense Language
Institute; Institute for
Russian and Eastern
European Studies;
Military College of
South Carolina;
founder and former
director of U.S. Army’s
Foreign Military Studies
Office; United States
Army (ret.).
Jonathan House (b.
U.S. Army Command
1950)
and General Staff
College; Colonel of

Germany and the
Second World War
(1984 – co-authored
with Horst Boog, Gerd
R. Ueberschär, Jürgen
Forster, Joachim
Hoffmann and Ernst
Klink)
Thunder on the Dnepr
(1976 Ph.D. thesis,
printed 1985);
Operation Barbarossa
(1984); Thunder on
the Dnepr (1997 – coauthored with Lev
Dvoretsky)
Moscow 1941 (1985)

Hitler’s Panzers East
(1992)
Hitler’s Nemesis (1994)
When Titans Clashed
(1995 – co-authored
with Jonathan House);
Stumbling Colossus
(1998); Barbarossa
(2001); Colossus
Reborn (2005);
Barbarossa Derailed
(2012)

When Titans Clashed
(1995 – co-authored
with David M. Glantz)
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Lev Dvoretsky
Richard Overy (b.
1947)
Evan Mawdsley (b.
1945)
Geoffrey Roberts (b.
1952)
Rodric Braithwaite (b.
1932)
Robert Forczyk

Geoffrey P. Megargee
(b. 1959)
Andrew Nagorski (b.
1947)
Chris Bellamy (b.
1955)
David Stahel (b. 1975)

Michael Jones

military intelligence
(ret.).
Amscort International
University of Exeter;
British Academy;
King’s College.
University of Glasgow
University College Cork
Former diplomat;
writer and researcher
U.S. Army Reserves
(ret.); Ph.D.
International Relations
(University of
Maryland).
Ohio State University;
United States
Holocaust Memorial
Museum.
Journalist; EastWest
Institute
Royal Artillery (ret.);
Journalist; Cranfield
University
Humboldt University of
Berlin; University of
New South Wales.

Stephen G. Fritz (b.
1958)
Niklas Zetterling (b.
1963)

Ph.D. Bristol
University; Writer and
consultant
East Tennessee State
University
Swedish Defense
College

Anders Frankson

Newspaper editor

Thunder on the Dnepr
(1997 – co-authored
with Bryan Fugate)
Russia’s War (1998)
Thunder in the East
(1995 and 2016);
December 1941 (2011)
Stalin’s Wars (2006)
Moscow 1941 (2006)
Moscow 1941 (2006)

Inside Hitler’s High
Command (2000); War
of Annihilation (2006)
The Greatest Battle
(2007)
Absolute War (2008)
Operation Barbarossa
and Germany’s Defeat
in the East (2009);
Operation Typhoon
(2013); The Battle for
Moscow (2015)
The Retreat (2009)
Ostkrieg (2011)
The Drive on Moscow
1941 (2012 – coauthored with Anders
Frankson)
The Drive on Moscow
1941 (2012 – coauthored with Niklas
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Jack Radey (b. c.1946)

Charles Sharp

Christer Bergström (b.
1958)
Robert Kirchubel
Craig W. H. Luther
Christian Hartmann (b.
1959)

Frank Ellis
Gregory Liedtke
Alexander Hill

Pre 1991
Post 1991
Table I

Zetterling)
The Defense of Moscow
1941 (2012 – coauthored with Charles
Sharp)
U.S. Military; writer
The Defense of Moscow
and researcher
1941 (2012 – coauthored with Jack
Radey)
Independent writer and Operation Barbarossa
researcher
1941 (2016)
California Army
Operation Barbarossa
National Guard; writer
(2013)
and researcher
Former Fulbright
Barbarossa Unleashed
Scholar and U.S. Air
(2013)
Force historian (ret.)
Institute of
Operation Barbarossa
Contemporary History
(2013)
(Munich); Military
Academy of the
German Armed Forces
Special Air Service
Barbarossa 1941
(ret.); Leeds University (2015)
(ret.)
Royal Military College
Enduring the Whirlwind
of Canada
(2016)
University of Calgary
The Red Army and the
Second World War
(2016)
Game developer;
writer and researcher

Academic
affiliation (in
history)

Former
military

11/25 (44%)
12/27 (44.5%)

5/25 (20%)
2/27 (7%)

Former
military and
academic
affiliation in
history
3/25 (12%)
5/27 (18.5%)

Other

6/25 (24%)
8/27 (30%)

The two criteria for making the list are that they have made a contribution
to the study of 1941 recognised in the footnotes of other writers and that
they have conducted, or at least claim to have conducted, original
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research on the issue of 1941. A noticeable trend that can be seen in
Table I is that, with two exceptions, they are all males resident in the
West with varying backgrounds ranging across academia, the military,
foreign affairs and diplomacy and popular military history. Authors can be
difficult to describe if simple labels like “American historian” are used.
Nagorski, a veteran journalist and author, wrote one of the first postarchival accounts of the Battle of Moscow and might best be described as
an “American journalist”. Yet he was born in Scotland to Polish parents
and studied both in Krakow and in Massachusetts while his father served
with the American Foreign Service. In this study, the aim is not to
pinpoint why a particular historian has chosen to take the position they
have in terms of their backgrounds or stated political views, even though
such considerations might indeed be very relevant in understanding an
individual author’s views. Rather, a paradigm exists because a majority of
practitioners consider a particular way of looking at an issue normal,
mainstream, standard or orthodox. What will be established here for the
West at least is that it was once “orthodox” to see 1941 as a case of a
missed opportunity for the Wehrmacht and that such a view is no longer
the majority view among the experts on this issue.
In the second half of the thesis, attention will turn to the Soviet and
Russian historiography around 1941 in order to compare with its Western
counterpart. Works published in Russian in the Soviet Union or the
Russian Federation have been consulted in order to understand the Soviet
view of the war, the Gorbachëv-era rejection of the previously official
Soviet view of the war, and the patriotic revival of the Putin era. It should
be noted that it is not always easy to distinguish between a ‘Western’ and
‘Russian’ historian given that there is a category of native Russianspeaking historians who have published in the West and have exercised a
major influence. Suvorov, for instance, is an especially interesting
phenomenon of this type because he was brought up in the Soviet Union,
trained and worked in Soviet intelligence, wrote his historical accounts
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while living in the United Kingdom and has had his greatest influence
among historians and commentators in the Russian Federation. In other
words, it depends on context as to whether native Russians writing in
English since the end of the Cold War are considered part of the
“Western” canon on 1941.
An important qualification is that this thesis is not primarily concerned
with popular representations of the war on the Eastern Front in fiction,
films or games, a topic that has been covered elsewhere.97 The object of
study here is probably best described as “military history” meaning expert
historical accounts of why the military events of 1941 developed the way
that they did. Of course, the historian in question might well reject the
label of military history, which is sometimes viewed as a proxy for an
obsession

with

violence

and

weapons.

Erickson,

arguably

the

quintessential military historian given his unmatched knowledge of the
detailed working of the armies of the Eastern Front, insisted that he was
engaged in “social history”.98 “Military history” is the term used here but
all that is meant by it is that the historian is attempting to explain the
military events of 1941 with reference to political and military strategy,
and the issues of command, control, morale and tactics that impact upon
an army’s performance.
It should also be noted that a striking feature of the literature about the
Soviet-German War is the degree to which it has attracted writers whose
training is an area outside of the discipline of history. 99 Experts with
backgrounds in the military, intelligence, journalism and diplomacy have
all made contributions to the historiography both in the West and in
Russia. The author’s lack of a Ph.D. in the discipline of history was not
used to exclude any account that was frequently cited by other expert
accounts. Rather, the criterion used was the historian or account’s
97
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prominence in the bibliographies of what were widely acknowledged as
the major histories of the era. The exception here is the most recent
literature about 1941, which is not yet prominent in bibliographies; here
the decision was made to consider as much of the expert military history
published in the last decade and dealing with 1941 as could be found
again with the qualification that the expert or his account was taken
seriously by others working in this field.
The structure
Chapter One outlines the issues and controversies that surround the June
to December period of 1941. It notes the events that have come under
close scrutiny in subsequent historical literature, and identifies those
events

that

have

formed

the

most

enduring

areas

of

historical

controversy.
Chapter Two is an account of the development of the view of former
German generals into a “dominant paradigm”. It argues that there are
two interlocking premises of the paradigm developed by former Nazi
commanders such as Franz Halder, Heinz Guderian, Fedor von Bock,
Günther Blumentritt, Erhard Raus and Erich von Manstein. The first is the
credibility of the German generals as sources in the absence of credible
Soviet sources. The second is a stereotypical view of the Red Army, which
suggested that the Soviet state could not have resisted effectively if Hitler
had made better decisions.
Chapter

Three

shows

how

the

classic

Western

military

histories

exemplified by Basil Liddell Hart, Albert Seaton, and Earl F. Ziemke led
the way in prioritising the German generals as their principal sources.
These historians described a professional and superior German army
against which the Soviet state and Red Army were clearly no match. It
was the Germans who were the active players in these accounts. The
German defeat was caused by Hitler’s mistakes, the weather, and Stalin’s
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good fortune in having the endless cannon fodder of the Red Army, in
that order. Beyond the classic accounts, the accounts of authors such as
Ronald Seth, Paul Carell, Alan Clark, Alfred Turney, Werner Haupt,
Matthew Cooper, Janusz Piekalkiewicz and John Keegan added gripping
detail to the German invasion and humanised the German soldier to the
detriment of his Red Army counterpart. The impression to be gained from
this literature was that the Wehrmacht was a uniquely professional and
effective military force for which the Red Army was no match. The
Wehrmacht’s main opponents were firstly incompetent political leadership
and secondly Russia’s geography and weather; not the Red Army.
Chapter Four looks at the decline of the influence of the German generals
during the second half of the Cold War. From the 1970s, the trend in the
military histories of 1941 was to describe the German invasion as a
foolhardy enterprise hamstrung by the limited German resources and the
unique challenges of Russian geography and weather. The challenge to
the view of the German generals was fuelled by new sources of
information and a changing Cold War context. The result was that by the
end of the Cold War, the German invasion was widely viewed as a
“mission impossible”. However, Hitler, and Russia’s geography and
weather figured more prominently than Soviet resistance in explaining the
outcome of the Battle of Moscow.
Chapter Five shows that a new historiography or paradigm in relation to
the events of 1941 has emerged that is sceptical of the account of the
German generals and much more likely to rate Soviet resistance as more
important to the outcome than Hitler’s mistakes or the weather. The
opening of the Soviet archives in the late 1980s gave the proponents of
the Soviet resistance thesis vast new sources of information, which were
thoroughly mined to build a much more credible “Soviet resistance”
thesis. This attack on the older historiography was led for the first time by
American historians, most notably by David M. Glantz and Roger R.
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Reese. This last wave of new information overturned older stereotypes in
ways that damaged the paradigm established by the Halder School. What
is “new” about the “new historiography” is that for the first time a broad
consensus has emerged between those studying the Soviet and German
sides of the war and between historians on both sides of the Atlantic
about how 1941 is to be explained.
Chapter Six looks at the ‘responsibility for the war’ issue. If the
Icebreaker thesis were to be widely accepted, the standard of what would
constitute a ‘Red victory’ would necessarily change. Yet the Western
literature has mostly rejected the Icebreaker thesis. Moreover, a tendency
has emerged to reject the view of Stalin as gullible fool in regard to Hitler.
A trend in the historiography around the success of the surprise attack is
to picture Stalin as an active player in the start of the war, even if he
were not planning his own attack in 1941.
Chapter Seven looks at the Soviet view of the war from the Cold War. It
argues that the official Soviet view of the war was based upon the three
pillars of an unjustified and surprise attack, the solidarity of the Soviet
state, army and people, and the activity of the Red Army in fighting back
successfully against the odds. Despite minor fluctuations, such as the
depiction of the role of key figures such as Stalin and Zhukov produced
during Khrushchëv’s ‘thaw’, the central tenets of the official Soviet view
remained steadfast until Gorbachëv’s reforms in the mid-1980s. The
works consulted include standard Soviet accounts and official histories.100
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Chapter Eight focuses on the Russian-language revisionist critique of the
dominant and official Soviet view of the war. The revisionist critique
began in the works of a number of Soviet dissidents prior to perestroika,
but did not begin in earnest until Gorbachëv’s reforms. For the first time,
historians such as Dmitri Volkogonov, V. A. Nevezhin, Boris Sokolov, Mark
Solonin, and Vladimir Beshanov called into question the Soviet view of
1941. The revisionists turned attention to the massive defeats of 1941
and questioned Stalin’s intentions, the competence of Soviet leaders such
as Zhukov, the solidarity of Soviet society and whether Moscow would
have fallen had Hitler followed the advice of his generals. It is argued that
the revisionist account of 1941 was clearly moving in a different direction
to the new post-archival Western historiography about 1941.
Chapter Nine looks at the substantial and growing pushback against the
revisionists that is developing in Putin’s Russia. Uldricks has described
how “a national-patriotic school of Russian historiography has emerged in
recent years”.101 Members of this school seek to answer and counter the
revisionist account of the Great Patriotic War, which they claim is
diminishing Russia’s status as a great power, endangering Russia’s
borders, and acting as a fifth column for hostile Western powers by
undermining

Russia’s

self-belief.

This

patriotic

literature

comprises

individuals connected to the Putin administration and its military
establishment as well as ‘private historians’ who espouse the patriotic
line. While critical of Stalin and unashamedly biased in its patriotism, this
literature has clearly embraced a “Soviet resistance” explanation for the
outcome of the Battle of Moscow.
The Conclusion argues that Citino’s claim that 1941 was a Red victory
rather than a German defeat has more traction now than at any time in
the past. For the first time in the historiography around 1941, what might
101
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be described as a new paradigm has emerged that stresses Soviet agency
rather than German mistakes or Russia’s geography and the weather as
the answer to the puzzle of 1941. As we shall see, a “Soviet resistance”
answer is now widely shared among Western historians looking at 1941
from the perspective of both the Soviet and German wars. While by no
means the only voice on the subject in Putin’s Russia, the “patriotic”
Russian accounts of the last two decades argue a case that has much in
common with the new Western historiography.
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Chapter One: Issues and Controversies
There is no one convenient overarching term to describe all of the military
events of 1941. The events under study go by various names and cover
different periods. On 22 June 1941, the Germans launched Operation
Barbarossa, a three-pronged attack that spanned the entire Soviet
frontier, with the aim of destroying the Red Army as close to the Soviet
border as possible. Operation Typhoon, which was launched three months
after Barbarossa on 30 September, aimed to take the German Army
around and beyond Moscow to a line that would run from the Arctic Ocean
to the Caspian Sea. For Soviet writers, the Battle of Moscow began with
the launch of Operation Typhoon in September 1941 and came to an end
in April 1942 when the front stabilised between one hundred and two
hundred kilometres west of Moscow. There are many accounts of the war
that are entitled ‘Operation Barbarossa’ or ‘the Battle of Moscow’ that
cover a far longer timeframe than the specific operation that the title
refers to. It would be fair to say that the period June-December 1941 is
often discussed as a discrete period. This is when the German Army
initially advanced at a great rate but then failed to achieve not only the
capture of Moscow but also its principal strategic goal of the destruction of
the Red Army.102 The first six months of the war is the timeframe under
examination in this thesis.
Almost everything about the events of 1941, including the relative
importance of the Battle of Moscow, is a matter of controversy in the
literature. In recent years, the one issue that seemed to be more or less
settled – Hitler’s responsibility for the war - has become a lively
discussion once more. Historians have now begun to reinvestigate how
committed the Soviet Union or Britain really was to anti-Hitler ‘collective
security’, whether the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 made
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Stalin co-responsible for the war, what plans the leaders of the German
and Red Armies had for waging war, why Stalin refused to believe that an
attack was imminent, and above all, whether Stalin was planning to
attack Hitler in 1941.103
What is clear is that Operation Barbarossa began in the early hours of 22
June 1941. In the largest invasion in military history, four million German
and allied troops,104 625,000 horses, 600,000 motor vehicles,* 3,350
tanks and 7,184 artillery pieces poured into Soviet territory.105 The
invading forces were divided into three Army Groups. The largest force,
Field Marshal Fedor von Bock’s Army Group Centre, was to advance from
the Soviet-German border in occupied Poland across the River Bug in the
direction of Moscow. Notably, the Soviet capital itself was never
designated as the principal goal of the invasion. Bock was tasked with the
capture of the key cities of Brest, Minsk and Smolensk and to enact huge
encirclements of Soviet troop formations to ensure that the Red Army
would not live to fight another day.106
To achieve his task, Bock had at the start of Operation Barbarossa three
infantry armies (the 2nd, 4th and 9th), and two armoured groups (Panzer
Groups 2 and 3), each with the equivalent strength of an army. Including
its reserves, Army Group Centre amounted to some 1,200,000 soldiers
and airmen, at the time the largest military force under the command of a
single officer in recorded military history.107 By the evening of 23 June,
the German 3rd Panzer Group had outflanked the Soviet 3rd Army and
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reached Vilnius.108 Despite Red Army counter-attacks, on 26 June, the
Germans completed a huge encirclement of Soviet troops at Bialystok.109
On 28 June, Bock captured Minsk.110 Two days later, encirclements of
Soviet troops west of Minsk culminated not just in the loss of the bulk of
3rd, 10th, 4th and 13th Armies of the Red Army’s West Front, but of
Belorussia as a whole.111
Within eighteen days of the beginning of the invasion, Bock’s Army Group
Centre had advanced some six hundred kilometres, seized all of
Belorussia, killed or captured 341,073 Soviet soldiers, wounded a further
417,790, and caused the loss of 4,799 tanks and 9,427 Soviet guns and
mortars.112 By the end of June 1941, the German Army appeared to be on
track to accomplish a victory as stunning and quick as had been achieved
in France, confirming British and American predictions made before the
invasion.113 German military commanders too were supremely confident.
Chief of Staff Halder relayed to his diary the hubris of the German
command at this time when he judged that the war had been won in two
weeks.114
The forces of the Red Army positioned on the border on the eve of the
invasion were comparable in size to the German invaders: 170 divisions
and four million men.115 Soviet forces were divided into five Fronts, each
smaller than a German Army Group though comparable in function.
Facing Bock’s Army Group Centre was the Western Front commanded by
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General Dmitriĭ Pavlov whose task was made immeasurably harder by the
fact that the Kremlin issued orders to reach full combat readiness only
one hour before the invasion began, and even then troops were instructed
not to respond to any German provocations.116 According to Hastings, the
first weeks of Operation Barbarossa should be remembered as “some of
the greatest victories in the annals of war”.117 Or, as a Russian account
has put it, the loss of 300,000 soldiers of the West Front under Pavlov’s
command dead or taken prisoner in June 1941 was a catastrophe that
could only be compared to the defeats of the Kiev Rus’ princes in 1223
and the defeat of the tsarist General Aleksandr Samsonov in East Prussia
in 1914.118
Stalin’s conviction that war could be avoided in 1941 was one of many
miscalculations of the Soviet political and military leadership that
facilitated the rapid advance of the German Army. While it is now known
that the Soviet air force was not completely taken out on the first day of
the war, German superiority in the air was crucial to the early victories of
the Wehrmacht.119 Decades later, Zhukov and Aleksandr Vasilevskiĭ, key
Soviet military planners in 1941, would admit that they had completely
underestimated how quickly and effectively the German armour would
penetrate the frontiers and take the battle deep into Soviet territory. The
Red Army’s leaders had expected a frontier war that would last three
weeks before overwhelming Soviet counter-attacks would crush the
enemy.120 In the first twenty days of war, the Red Army lost over 750,000
soldiers, including nearly 600,000 killed. This was twelve times the
German tally of 64,000 casualties, including a mere 13,000 killed. The
loss of life was accompanied by the loss of nearly twelve thousand Soviet
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tanks, nineteen thousand artillery pieces, more than a million firearms
and nearly four thousand combat aircraft.121
In May 1941, Stalin, de facto leader of the Communist Party and
government since the mid-1920s, formally took on the role of the official
head of government. The German invasion saw the emergence of two
new committees: the GKO (Gosudarstvennyĭ Komitet Oborony - State
Defence Committee) and the Stavka. The GKO consisted of members of
the Politburo and dealt with wider aspects of military, political and
economic strategy.122 The Stavka was a purely military body, its chief
members being high-ranking Soviet military figures such as the Minister
for Defence, Chief of the General Staff and commanders of various fronts.
Crucially, both of these committees were headed by Stalin who, like
Hitler, now had to apply his political skills to the business of running the
machinery of war. Stalin responded to the invasion by creating new
command structures, moving commanders from post to post, mobilising
new forces for the front, ordering counter-attacks, and demanding that
the Soviet people resist the invasion in every way possible. West Front
commander Pavlov was executed, along with a number of other senior
Soviet commanders, for “criminal behaviour in the face of the enemy”.123
Arguably, the only clear success for the Soviet state in the first month of
fighting was that a massive and ultimately successful evacuation of
essential factories and war industries to the Urals and western Siberia got
under way.
After conquering Belorussia, Army Group Centre moved westwards with
the aim of encircling and destroying what was left of the Red Army. The
Smolensk engagement – which involved some 900,000 German and 1.2
million Soviet troops – signalled the transfer of the fighting to Russia
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itself.124 The Soviet authorities raised new armies to halt the German
advance, but to no avail. Despite desperate fighting, Smolensk, the
‘gateway to Moscow’, fell on 16 July.125 German forces encircled the Red
Army’s 16th, 19th and 20th Armies.126 The Smolensk encirclement
resulted in the loss of a further 300,000 Soviet troops dead or taken
prisoner. Soviet counter-attacks from the east facilitated the escape of
100,000 troops from the cauldron.127 Guderian recalled that Hoth closed
the pocket east of Smolensk on 26 July.128 Bock issued an order
proclaiming the victory on 5 August.129
Meanwhile, Army Group North had moved quickly through the Baltic
States to besiege Leningrad while Army Group South moved less quickly
across Ukraine towards Kiev. One reason that Army Group South met
sterner resistance in Ukraine was that it was in the south that the Red
Army had placed its largest and best-equipped forces. Stalin, wrongly,
expected the main German attack to target Ukraine.
Andrei V. Grinëv’s 2016 study of German war diaries has noted that the
German commanders criticised Red Army leadership but acknowledged
the capacity of Red Army soldiers to fight.130 Guderian recorded in his
memoirs that, on 1 July 1941, “the enemy continued, as always, to resist
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stubbornly.

His

battle

technique,

particularly

his

camouflage,

was

excellent”.131 Days later, when preparing to cross the Dnepr River,
Guderian noted strong Soviet bridgeheads at Rogachëv, Mogilëv and
Orsha, with reinforcements soon to arrive.132 On 13 July, Bock reported
that Soviet counter-attacks between Vitebsk and Orsha showed that his
opponents were “far from throwing in the towel and [that] the numerous
reports that the enemy was in retreat appear premature”.133 On the same
day, Guderian noted heavy counter-attacks.134 The most celebrated of
these victories took place in August 1941. The Germans took the town of
El’nia on 19 July.135 Soon after taking control of the Reserve Front on 30
July, Zhukov went onto the offensive and retook the town after twenty-six
days of heavy fighting.136 On 12 August, Bock noted in his diary that “[i]f
the Russians don’t soon collapse somewhere”, then there could be no
victory before winter.137 Thus, the question that has generated much
controversy in recent years was whether these early successes were
Pyrrhic victories for the Germans. The German plan was to destroy the
Red Army in six weeks. As Evan Mawdsley has put it, this was “the
Barbarossa fallacy – that the Red Army would be destroyed on the
frontier”.138
It was in late July that the question of the objectives of Operation
Barbarossa re-emerged. From its very inception, Operation Barbarossa
was plagued by disagreement over how much importance should be
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attached to the capture of Moscow.139 Hitler never prioritised the Soviet
capital but did prioritise securing the economic resources of Ukraine and
southern Russia.140 The Red Army’s massive South-West Front defending
Ukraine offered far stiffer resistance than the West Front and threatened
the southern flank of Army Group Centre as it marched east. By far the
most contentious of Hitler’s wartime decisions was the diversion of forces
from Army Group Centre in August and September 1941. Notably, Hoth’s
3rd Panzer Group was to assist in operations near Leningrad, while
Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group was to assist in the envelopment of Kiev to
the south.141 Whether the Kiev diversion fatally delayed the German
advance on Moscow was and remains a major point of contention.
Guderian later described how he pleaded with Hitler in August 1941 to
press on for Moscow:
Moscow was the great Russian road, rail and communications centre:
it was the political solar plexus; it was an important industrial area;
and its capture would not only have an enormous psychological effect
on the Russian people but on the whole of the rest of the world as
well.142
The Germans took Kiev on 19 September, and a week later ended the
battle with the taking of a further 665,000 Soviet prisoners of war.143
Hitler, evidently still pleased with the course of events, described Kiev as
“the greatest battle in the history of the world”.144
Much ink has been spilled over the wisdom of Hitler’s decision to halt
Army Group Centre and divert its forces. Western accounts written before
the opening of Soviet archives were usually in agreement with the
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German generals that the Kiev diversion seriously harmed Germany’s
chances of capturing the capital.145 Despite the undeniable successes at
Kiev, the delay crucially led the Germans down a path first to the crippling
mud, then to the Russian winter. The accounts that presented Hitler’s
delay in attacking Moscow as an unmitigated disaster in retrospect appear
based on a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument: Hitler delayed the
assault, Moscow was not taken, ergo, Hitler’s delay cost the Germans
Moscow. These accounts tend to dismiss the issue of whether, without
destroying the largest concentration of Red Army forces at Kiev, Bock
would have faced a deadly threat to his increasingly over extended
southern flank as he raced towards Moscow.146
The view propagated by the former German generals and adopted by
many in the West is that Moscow would have fallen had this strategic
‘blunder’ not been made. Hill, who has written the most recent account of
the Nazi-Soviet War considered for this thesis, noted that in 2017 “debate
still rages over whether taking Moscow in the late summer as promoted
by the likes of Halder would have brought about Soviet collapse”.147 The
German generals’ contention that they could have won the war in 1941
has certainly figured prominently in the general works of major Englishlanguage military historians from the 1970s until the present day. In
1989, John Keegan quoted Guderian’s assessment of the delay as a
“nineteen-day interregnum”, and added that it “may well have spared
Stalin defeat in 1941”.148 Richard Overy concluded that the Kiev diversion
“possibly saved the Soviet capital”.149 P. M. H. Bell described the delay as
“one of the might-have-beens of Barbarossa”, in which Hitler “may well
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have lost the Germans their best chance of taking the capital”.150 Beevor
stressed that Hitler did not have the support of his professional military
commanders, but instead was a prisoner to his “instinct” and a
“superstitious avoidance of Napoleon’s footsteps”.151 Hastings noted that
the delay before Moscow gifted the Red Army crucial time needed to build
up the defences necessary.152 However, as we shall see, it is a view that
is facing increasing scepticism in modern Western literature and was
never widely accepted in the Soviet Union or later in the Russian
Federation.
It was only after the capture of Kiev that the German focus returned to
Army Group Centre. Operation Typhoon never actually stipulated that the
intention was to take Moscow, only to encircle troops at Viaz'ma and
Briansk.153 Operation Typhoon began on 30 September when Guderian’s
2nd Panzer Army and Weichs’ 2nd Army attacked the Red Army’s Briansk
Front to the south-east of Moscow.154 The main German assault then
followed on 2 October with attacks on the Red Army’s Western and
Reserve Fronts. This six-hundred-kilometre wide assault was one of the
largest German operations of the Second World War.155 The second phase
of Operation Typhoon was the subsequent chasing of escaping Soviet
forces and eventual assault on Moscow.156 In October, the Germans
advanced successfully and once more encircled and destroyed the main
Red Army resistance.
Soviet accounts could not use Hitler’s perfidy as the excuse for being
caught off balance once more. Instead it was claimed that the Germans
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now outnumbered the Red Army, which, in the Moscow direction could
only muster 1.2 million soldiers.157 As for the numbers involved in
Operation Typhoon, Klaus Reinhardt cited the total German forces of
Army Group Centre at the beginning of October 1941 as 1,929,406.158
There is some disagreement about the exact size of the opposing forces.
Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson, for instance, stated in 2012 that
the German forces positioned west of Moscow (from Ostashkov in the
north to Vorosba in the south) amounted to only 1.25 million men, 1,050
tanks and over 10,000 guns and mortars.159 That the Red Army was
stretched thin at Moscow is beyond doubt.
On 7 October, as the Germans advanced towards Moscow, Hitler ordered
Bock not to accept any form of surrender.160 Hitler supposedly intended to
destroy the city, leaving nothing behind but an enormous artificial lake. 161
After breaching the Soviet lines, German forces met on 14 October and
completed enormous encirclements of Soviet forces at Viaz’ma and
Briansk. The closure of these pockets resulted in the deaths of some
332,000 Red Army soldiers and the taking of 668,000 prisoners of war.
German casualties totalled 48,000.162 Blumentritt later described the
Viaz’ma encirclement as the greatest double envelopment in history: “a
modern Cannae – on a greater scale”.163 On 12 October organised
resistance in the Briansk pocket ended as the German 13th Corps took
Kaluga. In the next two days, the 3rd Panzer Army captured both Rzhev
and Kalinin, albeit amid heavy fighting. In the remaining days of October
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1941, Army Group Centre would also take Mozhaĭsk and Volokolamsk,
and cross the Zusha River at Mtsensk.164
On 1 October 1941 Bock’s diary recorded its first mention of a factor in
the Battle for Moscow that would become a matter of fierce historical
argument: the mud. The modest entry noted that on the southern wing of
Guderian’s forces, the 25th (Motorized) Division was under heavy attack
from Soviet tanks. Bock noted that the division only managed to escape
after, “abandoning the vehicles of an entire regiment, which were stuck in
the mud”.165 Six days later, Halder too recorded his first mention of the
adverse weather, also noting 2nd Panzer Group’s movement being
affected by the mud.166 Bock and Halder were describing the early stages
of the infamous Russian rasputitsa or ‘time of no roads’, in which
autumnal rains and melting sleet turn the vast steppes into seas of thick
mud. This period, which began in earnest in mid-October 1941, made
movement of troops and supplies extremely difficult for both armies.167
Or, as Bock recorded in his diary, “[t]he Russians are impeding us far less
than the wet and mud!”.168 Whether the weather was as bad or as
influential as Bock claimed became an enduring argument in Soviet,
Western, and modern Russian literature.169
The Great Patriotic War’s most celebrated commander, Zhukov, assumed
control of the combined Reserve and Western Front on 10 October 1941.
Zhukov had to find whatever reserves he could to place in front of the
Soviet capital.170 Nonetheless, the threat of the loss of Moscow loomed
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large for the rattled Soviet government and its battered Red Army.
Foreign embassies, Soviet government departments and even Lenin’s
body were evacuated from the capital.171 In mid-October, disorder set in.
Known as the ‘Moscow Panic’ of 16 October, wide scale looting and revolt
had to be suppressed by intervention from Soviet government forces in
order to prevent chaos from prevailing.172 By 19 October, a state of siege
and martial law was declared in an effort to bring order to the city.173
Order was re-established and the civilian population prepared to defend
the capital alongside the Red Army.
For many contemporary observers and historians, Stalin’s decision to stay
in Moscow on 16 October 1941 was crucial to stiffening the Soviet resolve
to hold the capital.174 The ideological response of the Soviet state to the
German invasion has also been described as a turning point in the war.
On the eve of the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution,
Stalin delivered his most famous speech in the underground shelter of the
Maiakovskiĭ metro station. Stalin’s speech invoked patriotic themes of
Russian greatness, xenophobia, and resistance in the face of the enemy:
The enslaved peoples of Europe under the yoke of the German
invaders are looking to you as their liberators … Be worthy of this
great mission! The war you are waging is a war of liberation, a just
war. Let the manly images of our great ancestors - Alexander
Nevsky, Dimitri Donskoi, Kusma Minin, Dmitri Pozharsky, Alexander
Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov – inspire you in this war! Let the victorious
banner of the great Lenin fly over your heads! Utter destruction to
the German invaders! Death to the German armies of occupation!
Long live our glorious motherland, her freedom and her
independence! Under the banner of Lenin – onward to victory!175
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Geoffrey Roberts has noted that Stalin’s speeches of 6 and 7 November
reinforced in a masterly fashion the now familiar message that Stalin was
a “nationalist”, “state builder”, and “protector”.176 Stalin cleverly used the
Communist Party as a base of operations, but replaced Communist
rhetoric with patriotism as a basis for rallying the Soviet people; this
“may well have made the difference between victory and defeat” at
Moscow.177 The speech accelerated the tendency, already noticeable in
the 1930s, to emphasise the Russian character of the Soviet state and its
mission to save civilisation.178 There were more practical concessions to
the people, including greater toleration of the Orthodox Church. 179 The 7
November parade through Red Square saw Red Army troops march under
Stalin’s gaze straight from the square to the front, an act of bravado
designed to impress the local population and the Soviet Union’s foreign
allies.180 The arrival from the Soviet Union’s far east of some eight to ten
rifle divisions, ‘Siberians’ as they were often referred to in German
sources, one thousand tanks and one thousand aircraft in October and
November 1941 bolstered the stretched Red Army.181 The reinforcements
take on extra significance when one considers Bock’s statement, recorded
in Halder’s diary on 22 November, that the Battle for Moscow was similar
to “the Battle of the Marne, where the last battalion that could be thrown
in turned the balance”.182
Bock recorded in his diary on 11 November 1941 that the temperature fell
to minus eleven degrees centigrade.183 The low temperatures would cause
great discomfort to ill-prepared German soldiers. On the other hand, the
Germans were able to renew their assault on Moscow on 17 November as
176
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frost hardened the previously impassable seas of mud. It was in this
second phase of Operation Typhoon that Moscow was to be encircled and
occupied. Colonel General Hans Georg Reinhardt’s 3rd and Colonel
General Erich Hoepner’s 4th Panzer Armies were to form a northern
pincer in order to destroy Major General Konstantin Rokossovskiĭ’s newly
reformed 16th Army. From here, they were to form a bridgehead over the
Moskva-Volga Canal and advance towards Moscow itself.184 To the south,
Guderian’s forces, which formed the southern pincer, were to capture Tula
then advance to Kolomna. As the pincers advanced, Field Marshal Günther
von Kluge’s 4th Army was to hold up Zhukov’s movements by attacking
along the River Nara.185 The Germans planned to swiftly take Tula in
order to form a southern pincer with which to encircle the capital.186 That
Tula did not fall to Guderian’s relatively weak 3rd Panzer Division, which
was pitted against an array of Soviet units, including the 156th NKVD
Regiment, the Tula Workers’ Militia Regiment, the 732nd Anti-aircraft
Regiment, elements of the 32nd Tank Brigade and the 447th Corps
Artillery Regiment, was hailed in Soviet-era accounts as a crucial moment
in the war.187 David Stahel has described the failed German attack on
Tula as “in many ways the last whirlwind of Army Group Centre’s
Typhoon”.188
In late November, the Germans came as close to Moscow as they ever
would, with the advance troops and tanks of Hoepner’s Fourth Panzer
Army and units of the Fourth Infantry Army penetrating as far as Tushino,
a suburb on the outskirts of Moscow on 29 November.189 On 1 December
a motorised patrol of the 62nd Panzer Pioneer Battalion breached the Red
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Army’s defence line at Khimki only nineteen miles from the Kremlin.190
Under heavy pressure, the overstretched Germans pulled back from this
high water mark on 5 December.191 Meanwhile, to the south, a Red Army
counter-attack drove the advance units of Army Group South out of
Rostov-on-Don on 29 November, a foretaste of the Red Army’s
capabilities in urban warfare that would be in evidence at Stalingrad a
year later.192
The Soviet authorities began to prepare for a major counter-attack to
drive

the

Germans

from

Moscow

as

early

as

the

beginning

of

November.193 The Stavka successfully organised the deployment of seven
new armies for the defence and counter-attack before Moscow, all at a
time when Hitler was publicly proclaiming that the Soviet Union could no
longer offer any more resistance.194 With more and more reinforcements
arriving throughout December, the Soviet forces taking part in the
counter-attack at Moscow constituted some forty-one per cent of the
entire Red Army.195 The Red Army launched its celebrated counteroffensive on 5 December 1941. Ivan Konev’s 31st Army attacked across
the River Volga south of Kalinin,196 and the 29th Army assaulted from
Kalinin’s north; both armies penetrated deep into the now defending
German 9th Army.197 The following day, Zhukov’s Western Front,
bolstered by the newly formed 1st Shock Army, 10th Army and 20th
Army, launched its major counter-offensive against all three of the
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German panzer armies.198 Although not decisive enough to win the war
for the Soviet Union, the December 1941 counter-attack did save the
capital.
Ernst Klink noted that as the Red Army began to counter-attack, Bock
began to search for answers as to how Army Group Centre found itself in
this situation. He noted that Bock concluded that it was the mud that had
been the cause of all the problems: “In his analysis, however, Bock
carefully avoided addressing the question of his own share of the blame
for the disaster, and that of the chief of the Army General Staff”. 199 When
Hitler called off the assault on Moscow on 8 December in his Directive 39,
he blamed “the surprisingly early severe winter weather”.200 Hitler now
ordered his armies to stand and fight, much to the consternation of his
generals. Hitler also replaced commanders in an effort to stiffen German
resolve.
The Soviet counter-attack phase involved a final historical controversy
surrounding the Battle for Moscow; the wisdom of Hitler’s decision to
order his men to hold firm in the face of Soviet assault rather than push
back to a more easily defended winter line until the spring allowed greater
ease of action. After the war, former German commanders were to lament
Hitler’s decision to order the Haltbefehl.201 According to Halder, the lives
of many Wehrmacht troops could have been saved had a proper
withdrawal been allowed.202 For others, however, the decision was not
Hitler’s to make due to the force and dominance of the Soviet counterstroke: “Hitler could force the German troops to stand fast and die, but he
could no more stop the Soviet advance than King Canute could prevent
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the tides from coming in”.203 Others contend that Hitler’s order was
ultimately beneficial for the German Army as his tough decision in
ordering his troops to hold fast avoided a disastrous rout as experienced
by Napoleon’s Grande Armée in 1812.204 According to Ziemke, even
Hitler’s harshest critics would later concede that the German Army may
have disintegrated had it been ordered to conduct a retreat lacking
equipment and winter clothing.205
The Battle for Moscow also resulted in a significant reshuffle of the
command of the German armed forces from which Hitler ultimately
emerged as supreme commander. As Citino has noted, Hitler’s selfappointed ascendency to the rank of Commander-in-Chief of the Army
brought an end to the German military tradition of independence for
German commanders, a tradition that dated back to the seventeenth
century.206 The Battle for Moscow saw the replacement (either through
dismissal or illness) of many key German commanders, including Bock,
Guderian, Hoepner and Walther von Brauchitsch, to be replaced at the top
by,

as

Mawdsley

has

put

it,

a

“military

amateur

of

fanatical

temperament”.207
Viewed in these terms, the Battle of Moscow is certainly a candidate for
‘turning point of the war’. Yet even though the German Army would never
again threaten Moscow, it was able to launch a second successful
offensive in the spring and summer of 1942 that culminated in the Battle
of Stalingrad. For many historians in the West, Stalingrad was the turning
point of the war. There was, however, one influential group that always
insisted that the war was won and lost in 1941. This was the German
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generals whose memoirs, diaries and self-justifications appeared in great
quantities during the first two decades of the Cold War.
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Chapter Two: The ‘Halder School’
In the absence of Soviet archival material and reliable Soviet histories,
the main sources available to Western historians of the Cold War era were
official Soviet histories, German archives, and the diaries/memoirs of
retired German generals and soldiers. Unlike their heavily propagandistic
Soviet counterparts, the German memoirs and diaries appeared authentic
and authoritative to Western historians.208 It also helped too that
historians from the English-speaking world wrote most of the histories of
the post-war period and they generally found less of a significant
language barrier with German sources.209 Hew Strachan has noted that
Liddell Hart and other English-speaking historians of the early Cold War
era interviewed the German generals after the war and became the
“midwives in the translation of their memoirs into English”.210 Or, as Craig
Luther has put it, the views of the German generals “conveyed to British
military historian Liddell Hart in the late 1940s … successfully made their
way into the mainstream of western historiography”.211
Central to the emergence of the dominant German historiographical
school was former German commander Halder, who worked for the
American military and for fifteen years headed the ‘Operational History
(German) Section’, known informally as the ‘Halder group’. 212 The
establishment of this section by the United States military was originally
intended to document the German perspective on the war, specifically as
it related to American operations. However, with the onset of the Cold
War, focus soon shifted eastwards to the Soviet war and Soviet tactics.213
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Halder was a prolific writer and commentator on the war and has been
documented

as

an

influence

upon

the

writings

of

other

former

commanders.214 Halder enthusiastically took up his post-war role in the
United States, his staff at one point including twelve lieutenant generals,
four major generals, nine brigadier generals, nine colonels, and four
lieutenant colonels.215 So successful was Halder in presenting a version of
the war amenable to the United States in the Cold War, that he was
awarded the ‘Meritorious Civilian Service Award’ in 1961, making him the
only German general to be decorated by both Hitler and an American
president.216 Those cultivated by Halder included fellow Eastern Front
veterans Gotthard Heinrici, Günther Blumentritt, Heinz Guderian, Albert
Kesselring, Hasso von Manteuffel, Oskar Munzel, Erhard Raus, Hans von
Greiffenberg, Lothar Rendulic, Georg Küchler, Geyr von Schweppenburg
and Adolf Heusinger. Halder handpicked these former soldiers, and many
would go on to write books and memoirs that ingrained the German view
of the war into popular Western understanding.217 The ‘Halder group’
produced over 2,500 manuscripts relating to the Nazi-Soviet War. These
documents, though initially not available to the general public, received a
warm reception by a United States military keen to find out everything it
could about its new adversary. When the manuscripts did become
available in the 1960s, their status as official United States Military
publications gave them an air of legitimacy that their Soviet counterparts
could not match in the West.218
When this group was being formed, the intention on the part of the
former commanders to preserve the honour of the Wehrmacht was clear.
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When asked if he would like to participate in writing history while in
American

custody,

Guderian

consulted

the

most

senior

German

commander at hand, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, as to whether it
would be wise to contribute. In the secretly recorded conversation, Leeb
blessed Guderian’s participation, but added that he would “have to
consider [his] answers a bit carefully…so that [he said] nothing which
might embarrass the Fatherland”.219 Halder openly claimed that his goal
was to continue the fight against Bolshevism.220 The Halder group
disseminated ideas about the Nazi-Soviet War designed to rehabilitate the
reputation of the German command and Wehrmacht alike.221 War crimes
became the responsibility of the fanatical Nazi elite, not the average
Wehrmacht soldier. Halder was able to mix, “truth, half truth, myth, and
lies to establish the wisdom and innocence of the German military – and
thus himself”.222 Through stressing the innocence of the Wehrmacht, the
Halder group created the enduring myth of the German military’s ‘lost
cause’ in the fight against the existential threat to European civilisation
that was Soviet Communism.223
This version of the war not only emphasised the United States’ role in
defeating European Fascism, but also helped to strengthen ties between
the United States and the new West German state in the fight against
Communism.224 Chief Historian for Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe,
Colonel W.S. Nye noted that when the history-writing program began,
German contributors were all prisoners of war working voluntarily for the
United States. For the German generals it was a remarkably favourable
turn of events. Even when they joined the Allied payroll, they were
motivated “mainly by professional interest and by the desire to promote
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western solidarity and mutual defense”.225 Liedtke has described the
Halder group and its reception in the West as an, “historiographical
perfect storm”, in which a:
large number of German accounts, produced in the context of the
Cold War, complacently accepted by eager Western audiences, and
largely left unchallenged by competing narratives, practically ensured
the dominance of the German perspective.226
Works aimed at a more general readership accompanied the official
manuscripts produced for the United States Military. Halder’s influential
Hitler as War Lord, published in 1949, stressed Hitler’s central and
meddling role to the Nazi war effort and his responsibility for the defeat at
Moscow. Halder sarcastically referred to Hitler as “[t]his ‘great military
leader’”:
… [who] knew full well that he lacked the equipment for solving
problems of generalship. He made up for it by a sublime faith in the
infallibility of his intelligence, which enabled him to look down on all
forms of expert knowledge as though from a superior level, and by a
conviction that as a result of his service in the First World War, he
himself was possessed of abundant military experience. Many selfassured pronouncements of his bear witness to this.227
For Halder, the dilettantish Hitler was wrong most of the time in big and
small matters. Prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union,
discussion of Moscow as an important objective was quickly shut down,
and “evoked a strangely violent reaction from Hitler which cast a glaring
light on his unspoken thoughts”.228 During the campaign, Hitler similarly
ignored advice to target Moscow, and instead pressed for a million men
from Army Group Centre to wheel north for Leningrad:
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It was an idea which did not derive from Hitler’s military thinking, but
from his political fanaticism which had set itself on the destruction of
Leningrad. The Supreme Commander Hitler subordinated himself
without question to the fanatical Politician.229
Hitler’s unshakeable belief that the campaign would last only six to eight
weeks ensured that any discussion of winter provisions received a “curt
refusal”. Halder noted that Hitler’s unwillingness to heed the advice of his
tank commanders before Kiev in August 1941 led to overworked and
broken tanks being unsuccessfully deployed before Moscow months later.
The effect of wear on the tanks was exacerbated by the onset of the
Russian winter, which “entered the fray as a powerful ally of the Russian
before the objective of the operation had been reached”. As the Red Army
counter-attacked before Moscow in December 1941, Hitler’s refusal to
countenance an orderly withdrawal led to “heavy losses in men and
material which could, without the slightest doubt, have been avoided”. On
Hitler replacing Brauchitsch with himself as head of the German military
in December 1941, Halder noted that, “the Army was deliberately
deprived of its head and rightful representative” and that this move was
“[t]he decisive step on the road to ruin”.230
Halder’s diary was first published in the early 1960s,231 and indicated the
racial stereotyping and hubris that was typical of many German politicians
and soldiers of the period. Halder wrote on 3 July 1941 that the Red Army
contained “hordes of Mongols” and, on 5 July, that the war was already
won.232 These two observations were clearly linked in Halder’s mind.
Halder, like most of the German diarists and memoirists, had to
acknowledge that his respect for the Red Army grew over time. Halder
noted

“stubborn

and

skilfully

directed”

Soviet

resistance

and

an

229
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unwillingness to surrender. On the other hand it was not the ability of the
Red Army that posed the real threat to the German advance:
Despite our extraordinary performance, we shall not be able to
totally destroy the enemy this year. Given the vastness of this
country and the inexhaustibleness of the people, we cannot be totally
certain of success.233
To “the vastness of this country and the inexhaustibleness of the people”,
Halder added severe weather conditions affecting German supply, as well
as troop movements.234 Only on one occasion did Halder concede that
severe climactic conditions might have hindered the Red Army too; it was
the Germans, though, who suffered more.235
Bock’s war diary was just as effective as Halder’s in promoting this
version of the war. Bock died in 1945 after his car was strafed by a British
aircraft, so his diary cannot be considered as a direct attempt to influence
history as can be seen in the memoirs of his colleagues. However, a
version of Bock’s diary exists in which the author, cognisant of the role his
diary would have in later histories, made adjustments to the text as the
war came to a close. The version studied here was kept by Bock’s stepson

and

purportedly

contains

no

“dubious

‘improvements’

or

‘corrections’”.236 Nonetheless, sources such as this always need to be
considered for self-censorship and the author’s intentions, and the diary is
an invaluable source for assessing German attitudes during the conflict.
Bock noted first the mud and its effects on roads, supply and troop
movements, “[t]he Russians are impeding us far less than the wet and
mud!”237 Later, it was the freezing temperatures:
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The engines of the tanks are beginning to fail as a result of the drop
in temperatures to 15 to 20 degrees below freezing. Large numbers
of trucks have broken down on the deeply-rutted, now hard frozen
roads.238
Describing the Battle of Viaz’ma, Bock’s diary offered the usual qualified
acknowledgement of Red Army resistance: “[a]s a result of the fighting
there and the awful road conditions, Guderian has not yet been able to
continue to the northeast – a success for the Russians, whose
stubbornness paid off”. The next day, Bock noted limited progress for the
4th Army on account of “bottomless roads and stiffening resistance”. Bock
also noted the importance of newly arrived ‘Siberian’ units whose
existence was previously unknown to Germany’s military planners. Yet the
‘Siberians’ were only able to force the 4th Army onto the defensive in
October because the German artillery was trapped on muddy roads.
Inevitably, the impression given in Bock’s diary was that the Germans
were up against an inferior Red Army that was saved by the weather.
In summing up the German defeat in the December counter-attack, Bock
explained how his under-supplied and exhausted men faced “an opponent
who has gone over to the counterattack by ruthlessly employing his
inexhaustible masses of people”. According to Bock “[t]he breakthrough
against the 2nd Army is due less to the employment of powerful forces by
the Russians than it is to a breakdown by our totally exhausted troops”.
On 7 December, Bock summarised his view as to the three main causes of
the German predicament: the autumn muddy period, the failure of the
railroads to withstand the Russian winter, and an “[u]nderestimation of
the enemy’s ability to resist and his reserves of men and material”.239
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Bock’s point was that the Soviet Union’s capacity to replenish its forces
and its stubborn resistance would have been irrelevant were it not for the
weather and the failure of German logistics brought on by Hitler’s
blunders. Hitler emerges from Bock’s diary as out of touch with the
realities of the front, ordering troop movements that would “involve
unnecessary lateral movements over frightful roads, and open one hole in
order to plug another”.240 Bock complained on numerous occasions that
his superiors did not seem to comprehend the dire state of his force.241
Hitler was prone to irrational decisions based on misleading information
being fed to him.242 When ordered to hold his ground in the face of the
Red Army’s December counteroffensive through mass deployment of
reserves, Bock recorded that, “I could only report that I have no reserves
left”.243 Bock’s diary reveals the tendency of the German generals to only
offer acknowledgement of Soviet military strength with some type of
qualification. It also reveals the tendency to look for the failures of
Operation Barbarossa in external factors: namely, Hitler and the weather
mattered more than their opponents.
According to Smelser and Davies, the most influential of the German
generals who chose not to work directly for the Americans was Erich von
Manstein.244 For his supporters, Manstein embodied Prussian military
professionalism, consummate battlefield skill and was an outstanding
example of the ‘clean Wehrmacht’. In Lost Victories (1958), Manstein was
at great pains to ensure that Hitler’s blunders overwhelmingly accounted
for the German loss.245 Manstein, like Halder, noted Hitler’s ability to
recite from memory a veritable avalanche of facts and figures should the
need arise to divert attention away from an issue he did not wish to
240
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discuss.

An

amateur

surrounded

by

military

professionals,

Hitler

dissembled rather than argued his case. 246
Guderian’s Panzer Leader, a bestseller in Germany in 1953, emphasised
the Führer’s indecision and friction between Hitler and his commanders.247
Guderian noted that early in the campaign, on 14 July 1941, Hitler and
members of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres - German Army High
Command) were already organising occupation forces for the “inevitable”
defeat of the Soviet Union, and that “[s]uch trains of thought take a man
far from reality”. Guderian fumed about Hitler’s mistaken belief that the
campaign in the east would be swift and that he subsequently did not
order enough winter provisions for German troops; Hitler’s decisions
reflected “baseless optimism”. When German commanders met at Borisov
on 27 July 1941, Hitler displayed a preference for German forces to focus
on comprehensive small-scale encirclements in order to bleed the Red
Army dry. According to Guderian, Hitler’s convictions were based on his
mistaken belief that the main objectives of Operation Barbarossa had
already been achieved in the destruction of the Red Army at the Dnepr
and Dvina rivers. For Guderian, Hitler was “living in a world of fantasy”. 248
In sum, the consequences of Hitler’s poor decision making were that:
Only he who saw the endless expanse of Russian snow during this
winter of our misery and felt the icy wind that blew across it, burying
in snow every object in its path: who drove for hour after hour
through no-man’s-land only at last to find too thin shelter with
insufficiently clothed, half-starved men: and who also saw by
contrast the well-fed, warmly clad and fresh Siberians, fully equipped
for winter fighting: only a man who knew all that can truly judge the
events which now occurred.249
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Clearly, the ‘Siberians’ mattered to the outcome of the contest, but only
because Hitler’s mistakes had put the Germans in an impossible situation.
In the aptly titled 1956 account, The Fatal Decisions, Blumentritt, who
served as Chief-of-Staff of Army Group Centre’s 4th Army, joined the
growing chorus blaming Hitler for the disaster that befell the Wehrmacht
in December 1941. For Blumentritt, the decision to invade the Soviet
Union was a mistake, and when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa,
“he swung round the helm and steered the German ship of state straight
for the rocks of disaster … With the taking of this fatal decision the war
was lost for Germany”. Furthermore, indecision as to what the main
objectives of the campaign should have been led to friction between the
German leaders and subsequent disaster. Blumentritt’s assessment of the
role of the weather was often tied in with his criticism of Hitler,
particularly the inadequate preparation for winter. The mud affected
German troop movements and supplies, and the final assault on Moscow
“ground to a halt in the ice and snow”.250
Erhard Raus, commander of the 6th Panzer Division during Operations
Barbarossa and Typhoon, reached similar conclusions to other German
commanders in his assessment of the Battle for Moscow. Mother Nature
suddenly erected a “protective wall” around Moscow with mud and cold.251
It was a type of mud of which the German Army previously had “no
conception”.252 Raus described the climate as the Soviet Union’s greatest
ally.253 To be fair, Red Army resistance is mentioned, but mostly in the
same breath as the weather. For example, describing the outcome of the
Battle for Moscow, Raus summed up the view of the German generals:
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“The numerical superiority of the Russians, aided by climactic conditions,
saved Moscow and turned the tide of battle. Hitler neither expected nor
planned for a winter war”.254 For good measure, Raus made it clear that
the German cause was noble; what was required was “indomitable will to
prevent the Russian Moloch from devouring the world”.255
German generals often skilfully interwove Hitler’s misjudgements and
Soviet resistance into their narrative of a German defeat. Gotthard
Heinrici was a corps and army commander during the invasion of Russia
whose diary is often cited as one of the most even-handed and perceptive
accounts written by a German general.256 At the top of Heinrici’s list of
seven factors leading to the failure of Operation Barbarossa was Hitler’s
underestimation of “the inner stability of the Bolshevik system”, which
proved to be “tenacious and consolidated”.257 This stability rested on the
fact that the urge to defend ‘Mother Russia’ was greater than their
“rejection of the Communist dictatorship”. It did not help the German
cause that the appalling deeds of the occupiers alienated the populations
of the Baltic States and Ukraine. Heinrici’s second and third factors were
the surprising economic and military capability of the Red Army. A fourth
factor was the Kiev diversion. The fifth factor was the inability of the
German infantry to keep pace with the panzers. The sixth factor was the
nature of Russia’s strategic depth and the seventh factor comprised the
weather and the terrain. Nonetheless, argued Heinrici, this was still a war
that the Germans might have won if different decisions had been made.
Heinrici concluded that the war could have been won had the German
advance not slowed to the degree that it did in July and August.258
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The diaries and memoirs of former Nazi commanders laid the foundations
of the ‘German historiographical school’, the term used by Glantz, which
would come to dominate Western histories of the war for decades.259 The
works stressed that German victory could have been achieved had Hitler
and the weather not intervened. The German generals acknowledged that
the Red Army offered resistance, that the numbers of Red Army soldiers
came as a surprise, and that the Red Army improved over time. But the
point of view espoused by the former German commanders was that the
Red Army was not sufficiently capable to win had it not been for Hitler’s
errors. It is a view in which the historical agency is held almost
exclusively in German hands.
What is striking to the modern reader is the degree to which the German
generals embraced racial/ethnic stereotypes both in their diaries and their
post-war writings. Nazi ideology stereotyped Slavs as lower-level humans
incapable of sophisticated undertakings such as mounting a successful
defence against German attack.260 In Mein Kampf, Hitler referred to the
“analphabetic Russian”,261 claimed that the intellectual classes of Russia
were in fact a small nucleus of ethnic Germans in Russian territory, and
that Russian state building came from this Germanic route.262 According
to the Nazi worldview, Russia was not only backwards, but the Bolshevik
seizure of power in 1917 had placed it under the leadership of a Jewish
conspiracy.263 There is overwhelming evidence that the racial view of the
Nazi political leadership overlapped with the racial worldview widely
shared among Germany’s military leaders.264 As the historian Luther has
put it, the “average German soldier, and even more so his commander
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embraced the official National Socialist view of Soviet Russia as a pariah
nation, dominated by Jews, and signifying an existential threat”.265
As Merridale has noted, Western observers of Russian soldiers considered
that the raw material to make an excellent army was certainly present
because Russians were tough, uncomplaining and unusually brave.266 On
the other hand, the Russians lacked the intelligence, organisation and
sophistication of the armies of Western Europe. According to Smelser and
Davies, German generals admired “the toughness of the ordinary Russian
soldier” but assumed that the Russian was incapable of “complicated
large-scale operations”.267 Soviet resistance was the passive element in
this story of German triumph and tragic defeat. The Germans described a
“barbaric Russian soldier – crude, animal-like, backward, bestial, childlike
and cruel”.268 As Wolfram Wette has pointed out, the German generals
knew little about Russia and relied instead on stereotyping of the
apparently Asiatic, servile and backward eastern Slavs who would be no
match for the Wehrmacht.269
In writing their accounts, the German generals were part of a centuriesold Western tradition of writing about Russia. It was not until the
sixteenth century that Western visitors began to make concerted efforts
to describe and understand Russia and the Russians. Marshall T. Poe has
noted that from the beginning Western reports of Russia and Russian
culture were, “ignorant of Russian ways, biased against Russian manners,
fooled by Russian stagecraft, or misled by their own self-serving desire to
create a Russian antipode to the ‘civilized’ nations of Europe”.270 Russia,
which was cut off from the Renaissance during the Mongol period and
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relegated to the periphery during the Enlightenment, was perceived in the
West to be an inferior ‘other’.271 The foundational work that was most
influential in shaping European views about Russia was Sigismund von
Herberstein’s Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii (1549), the earliest
European work to describe Russia in considerable detail.272
Herberstein was not quite sure what was cause and what was effect in
terms

of

explaining

the

apparently

tyrannical

nature

of

Russia’s

government, noting that “it is a matter of doubt whether the brutality of
the people has made the prince a tyrant, or whether the people
themselves have become thus brutal and cruel through the tyranny of
their prince”.273 Herberstein accounted for Russian military success
according to a formula often used in the centuries to follow:
When they are about to go into an engagement, they place more
reliance in their numbers, and the amount of forces with which they
may be able to encounter the enemy, than in the strength of their
soldiers, or any degree of discipline in their army.274
Western readers were fed a similar diet of Russian stereotypes over the
centuries that followed. Count Phillipe-Paul de Ségur in his memoirs of
Napoleon’s campaign in Russia noted of the Russian commander Mikhail
Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov that, “[h]is slow, vindictive, and crafty
nature was characteristic of the Tartar”.275 Following the Battle of
Borodino, Ségur suggested that the ability of Russian soldiers to blindly
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follow orders, no matter how suicidal, was the result of their simple
nature:
One thing is certain, they endured pain better than the French. Not
that they suffered more courageously, but that they suffered less; for
they are less sensitive in both body and mind, as a result of living in
a more primitive civilization and having their constitutions hardened
by a harsh climate.276
In the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War,
Russia suffered major defeats that seemingly confirmed the fact that
Russia’s only assets were size and numbers. In an effort to rally British
support for the Crimean War, the British press emphasised the assumed
inferiority of the Russian soldier, his barbarity, and lack of respect for the
rules of war.277 It was an idea that resonated even when Russia was a
British ally. Alfred Knox, a British attaché to Russia during the First World
War noted in his memoirs that, “the ineffectiveness and lack of mobility of
the army arose more from want of modern equipment and from inherent
national characteristics than from merely bad leadership and insufficient
training”.278 Knox listed Russia’s national characteristics as a lack of
initiative, laziness, and an unwillingness to perform duties unless
constantly supervised.279 In 1904, Carl Joubert described the typical
Russian soldier as:
heavy and dull and slow. He has no initiative whatsoever; he is not
encouraged to have any, nor would he dare to possess such a
dangerous commodity … he is … perfectly indifferent as to whether
he lives or dies for his country and the Tsar.280
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In summary, the soldiers of the Russian Army were often praised as a
tough and a deadly adversary.281 Their style of warfare was, however,
primitive, and unlikely to stand up to a modern, professional force, as
Russia’s defeats in the Crimean War, Russo-Japanese War and the First
World War had shown.
The German generals were heirs to the tradition that began with
Herberstein. Shortly before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in
1941, Blumentritt summed up the strengths and weaknesses of the
coming adversary:
The history of all Russian wars illustrates that the Russian as a
fighter, illiterate and half-Asian, thinks and feels differently.
Therefore, he is not affected by inclement weather, is very easily
satisfied, can withstand the sight of blood and casualties.282
In another observation, Blumentritt remarked upon the herd-like and
servile nature of the Russian:
Eastern man is very different from his Western counterpart. He has a
much greater capacity for enduring hardship, and this passivity
induces a high degree of equanimity towards life and death. In the
East the importance of the individual is not stressed to the same
extent as in the West. Great losses are accepted almost with
indifference. Eastern man does not possess much initiative; he is
accustomed to take orders, to being led.283
As a result, the “highly civilised” Western European is at a disadvantage
to the Red Army soldier “who lives so much closer to nature”.284 On the
other hand, the German soldier would prevail because the Red Army’s
junior commanders were “mechanical, have no initiative and are quite
inflexible”. As for the senior commanders, they were “hesitant, distrustful
281
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and unimaginative”.285 It was not just the crushing victory over France
that gave the Germans confidence. Blumentritt noted in May 1941 that in
the First World War, a German division was more than a match for two or
three Russian divisions:
Today the numerical proportion is very much in our favour. Our
troops are superior to the Russians in their experience of war, their
training and their weapons; our commanders are also far superior, as
are our organisation and preparation.286
Blumentritt expected tough battles for the first “8-14 days” but thereafter
“we shall not fail to win”.287
According to former German general Friedrich von Mellenthin, the
“Russian soldier does not think independently and does not control his
actions, but acts depending on his mood, completely incomprehensible for
the

resident

of

the

West”.288

This

explained

the

unpredictable

performance of the Red Army:
It is not possible to tell in advance what a Russian will do: as a rule,
he dashes from one extremity to another. His nature is as unusual
and complex as this huge and strange country itself. It is difficult to
imagine the limits of his patience and endurance; he is unusually
brave and courageous though nevertheless at times shows
cowardice. There have been cases when the Russian units, which
selflessly repelled all the German attacks, unexpectedly fled before
small assault groups. Sometimes the Russian infantry battalions fell
into confusion after the first shots, while on another day, the same
division fought with fanatical steadfastness.289
The United States’ military produced a pamphlet for American troops
written by former Wehrmacht commander Raus that described the
Russian soldier in similar terms:
285

Blumentritt in Reinhardt, Moscow – The Turning Point, p. 9.
ibid.
287
ibid., pp. 9-10.
288
F. W. Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), pp. 355–356.
289
ibid., pp. 292-293.
286

75

The characteristics of this semi-Asiatic are strange and contradictory
... The key to his odd behavior can be found in the native character
of the Russian soldier who, as a fighter, possesses neither the
judgement nor the ability to think independently. The Russian is
subject to moods, which to a westerner are incomprehensible; he
acts by instinct. As a soldier, the Russian is primitive and
unassuming, innately brave but morosely passive when in a
group...He endures cold and heat, hunger and thirst, dampness and
mud, sickness and vermin, with equanimity. Because of his simple
and primitive nature, all sorts of hardships bring him but few
emotional reactions.290
Of course, the brutality of the Russian had certain military advantages.
The pamphlet noted that characteristics such as primitiveness and
servility made the Russian a “superior soldier who, under the direction of
understanding leadership, becomes a dangerous opponent”.291 However,
such recognition of the potential martial ability of the Russian is soon
qualified:
It would be a serious error to underestimate the Russian soldier,
even though he does not quite fit the pattern of modern warfare and
the educated fighting man. The strength of the Western soldier is
conscious action, controlled by his own mind. Neither this action on
his own mind, nor the consciousness which accompanies the action,
is part of the mental make-up of the Russian.292
In this context, Stalin was indeed fortunate that he had so much cannon
fodder given the self-evident superiority of the Wehrmacht when it came
to military operations. The accounts of the German generals assumed the
superiority of the Nazi war machine over its Soviet rival and stereotyped
the Slavs as backward. Germany’s failure to defeat Stalin’s backward,
‘Asiatic’, ramshackle regime therefore represented a puzzle. The outcome
of the Battle of Moscow could only be understood when external factors –
Hitler’s blunders and freakish bad luck in terms of the weather – are
290
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added to the explanation. As we shall see in the next chapter, the
influence of the German generals on the English-language historiography
in the first half of the Cold War was profound.
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Chapter Three: Cold War Western Accounts of 1941
To what extent did the Western accounts of 1941 written during the Cold
War endorse the view of the German generals that theirs was a brilliant
military campaign brought undone by Hitler’s mistakes, the mud and
snow, and Stalin’s ruthless use of cannon fodder? The argument of this
chapter is that such a paradigm did indeed dominate the English-language
military histories until the 1970s. The reader of this literature learned that
Hitler’s errors were an important factor in condemning an otherwise
invincible German Army to an unwinnable war in the mud and snow
against a barbarian foe.293 It was not the case that Western historians
during the Cold War were so naïve that they accepted at face value the
claims of the generals that the dead Hitler was responsible for everything
that went wrong during the war. From the 1970s, blame was often spread
more widely to the poor planning not just of Hitler but also his senior
commanders. What was clear, however, was that it was German error,
not Soviet military prowess, which saved Moscow.
This dominant paradigm was supported by a number of interlocking
assumptions. Firstly, the generals themselves published prodigiously with
the

backing

of

the

American

and

British

political

and

military

establishment. Secondly, the three leading Western historians specialising
on the Wehrmacht during this period – Liddell Hart, Seaton and Ziemke –
relied heavily on German sources and agreed with the German generals
that this was a German defeat and most definitely not a Red victory.
Thirdly, key assumptions built into the paradigm such as the importance
of the weather and the incapacity of the Red Army were taken as givens
rather than investigated in a critical way. Finally, the counter-narrative
that Soviet resistance mattered a great deal to the outcome of the Battle
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of Moscow was marginalised because of the perception that such a view
relied on dubious Soviet sources.
In 1948, Liddell Hart, the leading British military analyst of his era,
published two very influential works: The Other Side of the Hill and
German Generals Talk.294 For these works, Liddell Hart noted that he held
conversations with various retired German generals about the war in
order to undertake his research.295 In an attempt to record the attitudes
of the central players “before memories had begun to fade or become
increasingly

coloured

by

after-thoughts”,

Liddell

Hart

conducted

interviews with former commanders such as Halder, Paul Ludwig Ewalt
von Kleist, Gerd von Rundstedt, Heinrici and Blumentritt.296 The generals
interviewed, however, had already had some ‘after-thoughts’ about the
war. On one occasion, upon hearing that they were to be visited by Liddell
Hart, the senior generals reportedly went into a huddle to discuss what
line they were going to take in the coming discussion.297 The generals
were conscious of their reputation, preserving the honour of the
Wehrmacht in the face of war crimes, and the need to rebuild the
professional German military in a new democratic state.298
Liddell Hart was fond of the German military tradition, and referred to the
German generals of the Second World War as “the best-finished product
of their profession – anywhere”.299 He accepted the idea of the German
generals that a hesitant Hitler had thrown away his opportunity to win the
war by suspending the advance on Moscow by instead shoring up his
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flanks in the north and south.300 Of all Hitler’s mistakes, the Kiev
diversion was “the most fatal decision of the whole campaign”.301 Liddell
Hart noted that the Viaz’ma and Briansk encirclements were significant
victories for the Wehrmacht, but that “it was the end of October before
[Red Army soldiers] were rounded up, and by that time winter had set in,
with the result that the exploitation of victory was bogged in the mud on
the way to Moscow”.302 In Liddell Hart’s heavily German-sourced account,
the Germans were almost too successful; masses of Red Army troops had
to be “rounded up”.303 Paradoxically, the Red Army did their greatest
harm to the German war effort by surrendering en masse, holding up the
Germans, and bringing the weather into play.
Liddell Hart stressed that Hitler’s victories against France and Norway,
gained despite the reservations of his professional military advisers,
convinced the Führer that their opinion mattered little against his own. To
be fair, Liddell Hart did note that to attribute all German failures to Hitler
and all German successes to the General Staff is misleading, and that
despite his obvious shortcomings, Hitler was at times a brilliant strategist:
he understood the psychological side of warfare, showed prescience in his
manoeuvres in Norway and France, and knew that pre-war bloodless
conquests would help to weaken resistance when war finally came. While
there is no doubt that a number of strategic decisions taken by Hitler
throughout the war brought his military ‘genius’ into question, it must be
remembered that history has recorded as a military amateur and a fool
the same man that on the eve of war appeared to many to be a “gigantic
figure, combining the strategy of a Napoleon with the cunning of a
Machiavelli and the fanatical fervour of a Mahomet”. It was only with
hindsight after the German defeat that “he was regarded as a blundering
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amateur in the military field, whose crazy orders and crass ignorance had
been the Allies’ greatest asset”.
Nonetheless, Liddell Hart accepted the basic thesis espoused by the
German generals. The problem for Germany, Liddell Hart continued, was
that when the German generals were to estimate later situations more
correctly, Hitler’s “defects became more potent than his gifts, and the
debit balance accumulated to the point of bankruptcy”. Once the decision
to attack the Soviet Union had been made, Hitler’s decisions on a
strategic, operational and even tactical level led to the unnecessary
disaster

before

Moscow.304

As

Liedtke

has

put

it,

Liddell

Hart’s

broadcasting of the views of the German generals in his works,
“inoculated the Anglo-American public against contrary views”.305
In 1953, the famed Polish general Lieutenant General Wladyslaw Anders,
who had fought on various occasions against Imperial Germany, the Third
Reich and the Soviet Union, authored an English-language account of
Hitler’s defeat that reinforced the message of Liddell Hart’s post-war
works.306 In a foreword, retired United States Colonel Truman Smith
exalted Anders as “about as impartial a writer on this controversial
subject as it is possible to find anywhere in this troubled and divided
world”.307 Anders’ account relied heavily on the works of former German
generals - only two sources listed in the source list were Russian
language308 - and reflected the view that it was Hitler’s blunders that
hamstrung the plans of the professional military men and doomed
Germany to failure in 1941. Anders provided four main reasons why
Germany lost the Nazi-Soviet War: first and foremost, Hitler’s military
blunders; secondly, Hitler’s political and moral blunders; thirdly, the
304
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material and moral support provided to the Soviet cause by the Western
Allies; and fourthly, Anglo-American bombing of Germany.309 Soviet
resistance is notably absent from the list.
Specifically for Moscow, Anders argued that the Wehrmacht failed
because of the disagreement between Hitler and his generals. Hitler,
focussing on economics, wanted to seize Leningrad and Ukraine above all
other targets. The generals, following Carl von Clausewitz’s view that an
enemy needed to be militarily destroyed, advocated the Soviet forces
west of Moscow and eventually the capital. Anders described the German
advances of the early campaign as being virtually unopposed until Hitler
inexplicably delayed the assault in order to divert forces to Kiev. For
Anders, this was the turning point of the year. Hitler was stubborn in his
refusal to listen to his professional generals, and when the assault on
Moscow resumed, it became stuck in the mud, and then the cold:
what was bound to happen finally occurred: the German offensive
petered out. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that it froze,
because it was not so much the Russian resistance – strong as it was
– which ultimately immobilized the Germans, as the Russian winter,
which began three weeks earlier than usual.310
Notably, Colonel Smith wrote of Anders’ thesis: “This opinion, I believe,
most professional soldiers share today”.311
Colonel E. Lederrey’s 1955 work for the British War Office made it clear in
the title that it was not an account of Red victory, but, Germany’s Defeat
in the East.312 In a note on sources, the author stated that he had at his
disposal all the important monographs and periodicals available at the
Federal Military Library at Berne that had been published in Germany,
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Britain, the United States, France, Italy and Switzerland. In addition, he
had communiqués from the Soviet General Staff, articles from Krasnaia
Zvezda, “some brochures published on the other side of the Iron Curtain,
and the accounts of soldiers, who managed to escape from beyond it”. He
also conducted interviews with former German, Hungarian and Romanian
soldiers of the campaign, and found his discussions with Halder to be
“especially valuable”. The list of principal sources provided lists twentyfour German works (penned by former generals and others), eighteen
non-German (non-Russian language) accounts, and three Soviet works.
According to the introduction, Halder himself welcomed the account as
“impartial, objective and profound”.313
The work, which covers the entire Nazi-Soviet War, was a self-described
attempt “to establish, on the one hand, the reasons why the Germans
themselves contributed to their own defeat, and, on the other, to discover
the circumstances which permitted the Russian recovery”.314 Lederrey
described Stalin as a devious schemer, “heir to the imperialist dreams of
the Tsars”, who had greedily signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, “under
the very noses of the Allied nations”.315 Hitler appears as a professional
general’s worst nightmare:
When he was some hundreds of kilometres from the front, he settled
tactical problems on the map, problems which fell within the
exclusive competence of local commanders … The instinct of the
adventurer (‘Wegelagerer’) impelled him to snap up any opportunity
which might lead cheaply to quick results. But, when it was a
question of a long term matter or of an important action, he
hesitated, shilly-shallied and found empty excuses to put off
indefinitely the decisions which his military advisers begged him to
take … His intuition, which he believed to be infallible, inspired him to
improvise without bothering about the limits of the possible. It was
his wishes alone that counted. His ruthless will was ignorant of
patience. In critical situations he feverishly issued detailed
313
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commands which possessed no rhyme or reason, and he did so
behind the backs of the responsible commanders.316
Specific to 1941, Lederrey painted a picture of the professional German
military at odds with the dilettante Hitler. Errors in strategy plagued
Operation Barbarossa from the very beginning, and in taking on the
Soviet Union Hitler ignored his own advice about always choosing enemies
who were certain to be defeated. Soviet resistance played a part: Zhukov
was the man who prevented Hitler from “achieving his desire,” and
German generals were astonished and impressed by the “endurance and
fanatic resistance of their opponents”. Lederrey presented Red Army
resistance as putting an end to the myth of the invincibility of the
Wehrmacht, but it was presented more as putting the final nail in the
coffin of a German Army already brought to its knees by Hitler’s
blunders.317
The overriding thesis of the work was that Germany was the active agent
in bringing about its own defeat. The Hitler-Halder crisis, Hitler’s fanatical
and fantastical orders from the Wolfsschanze, made without heed to the
realities of the front, and finally the weather ensured Operations
Barbarossa and Typhoon were failures.318 The Kiev delay allowed the
Soviets time to build up defences, bring fresh troops from Siberia, and
wait for their best weapon – winter:
[Hitler] did not contemplate that his sword would turn out to be too
short an instrument in Russia, [and] that the Red Armies… would
retreat before him until their ally, winter, entered the lists.319
Ultimately, although the weather was decisive, its devastating effect was
brought about by Hitler’s strategic errors more than any other factor.
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Of all the works surveyed, no historian placed more emphasis on the role
of Hitler’s blunders and the weather than Seaton.320 Seaton was, as one
reviewer put it, “the foremost authority on the Soviet-German conflict”.321
Seaton clearly had his biases. While the Wehrmacht soldiers were referred
to as depoliticised “Germans” rather than “Nazis”, Red Army soldiers were
“the enemy” or simply “Bolsheviks”.322 Seaton listed in his introduction
works to which he made “constant reference”; all of them are German
sources.323 There were approximately one hundred works in Seaton’s
select bibliography: fifty-nine of these works were originally published in
Germany, and former Nazi commanders penned ten of them; twenty-six
were Soviet in origin, and five of those were by former Soviet
commanders.
For Seaton, the weather was hugely significant for the outcome of the
Battle for Moscow. The delays of August meant that the serious fighting
would take place during the rasputitsa. Seaton framed the decision to
launch the attack on Moscow late in September as nearly insane, noting
that when the attack did begin “the idea was so unpredictable and erratic”
that the Red Army’s Stavka could hardly be blamed for not expecting it.324
For Seaton, Hitler had been too successful for his own good. Seaton
argued that Hitler’s victory over France and Poland convinced him of the
invincible superiority of the German Army and soldier, “[d]runk with
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success, however, Hitler was far removed from such sober reflections …
The victory over France was in fact Hitler’s undoing”.325
After describing the relentless rain, Seaton noted that, “the rain and thaw
on 19 October had brought [35 Infantry Division] … to a standstill”. When
his discussion turned from the rasputitsa to the winter campaign, Seaton
declared that “[t]he cold was a far more terrible foe than the Russians”.
Ultimately, though, “[m]ud not snow saved the capital”. Guderian’s
attempt to take Tula was thwarted because “wheeled motor vehicles could
not move and the trickle of petrol and diesel supply suddenly ceased;
tracked vehicles eventually became stranded for lack of fuel”. Infantry
“advancing at snail’s pace” overtook the Germans’ famed mechanised
units.326
Seaton happily conceded that extreme weather conditions affected both
sides in the conflict, but also noted that “[a]ny conditions which inhibit
movement must favour the defence”.327 Seaton dismissed out of hand
“Soviet historians … scoffing at what they describe as German excuses,
[who] maintain that von Bock was halted by the valour and skill of the
Red Army”.328 In the first two weeks of Operation Typhoon, the
“unhindered” Wehrmacht was able to destroy at least 700,000 Soviet
troops with relatively few casualties and that, “with another three weeks
of dry and clear weather would have been in Moscow. No Russian could
have stopped it”.329 Seaton conceded that it “would be entirely wrong to
attribute the German failure solely to the weather or misfortune”,
nonetheless, the “offensive had been mounted too late in the year at a
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season when the weather was due to break up”.330 According to Seaton, a
secondary cause was “the lack of understanding of the effects on mobile
operations of the weather and the ground”.331 Finally, the German army
lacked the resources to achieve its goals, but this factor was evidently
less important than the first and second causes – both linked to the
weather – noted above.332
Seaton suggested that the task was beyond Germany’s resources and it
was Hitler’s fault for not understanding this fact. Obviously if the Soviet
Union had collapsed as quickly as France had done, Hitler’s poor strategy
would not have mattered. Looking at the Battle of Moscow from the
Soviet side of the war, Seaton concluded that the Soviet Union’s “success
in halting the German invasion” was due:
in the first place to the accident of geography, to the vastness of the
Soviet Union, to its undeveloped road and wide gauge railway
system, to the vagaries of its climate and the bitterness of its winter.
The second most important factor was probably Stalin’s brutal
determination as a war leader and the third the resistance put up by
the Red Army during this first year of war.333
It is not that Seaton never mentioned the resistance of the Red Army, but
that Hitler’s blunders, the inherent difficulties of invading Russia, and the
weather are prioritised above the resistance of the Red Army in explaining
the outcome of the Battle for Moscow.334
Ziemke, the American historian who was Seaton’s main rival as the
preeminent Western expert on the Wehrmacht during the 1970s and
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1980s, shared Seaton’s view that Hitler’s decisions and the mud mattered
a great deal. Writing in 1968, Ziemke described how:
Army Group Centre jumped off on 2 October and within a week had
broken open the Soviet front west of Moscow and formed two
massive encirclements. The victory then appeared so near … Then at
the end of the first week in October, in the Army Group Center and
Army Group North areas, it began to rain. Relentlessly through the
rest of the month and into early November, rain, snow, and alternate
freezing and thawing turned the roads into oozing ribbons of mud.335
For Ziemke, German leadership was a contest between Hitler’s rigidity
and “the military professionals’ principles, flexibility, and mobility”.336
Ziemke and Magna Bauer’s Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East
(1987) relied on what they described as a “flood” of new memoirs, Soviet
war histories and articles.337 Nonetheless, the overall conclusion was the
same as Ziemke’s earlier work. Hitler made crucial mistakes, most
notably the Kiev delay.338 Soviet resistance played its part, albeit
intertwined with the role of the mud, snow, and Hitler’s strategic
blunders.339 Describing the Germans’ first encounter with the rasputitsa,
Ziemke, in his work co-authored with Magna Bauer, described how
“[b]ecause of the weather, the Russians, for almost the first time in the
war, were able to meet their enemy on nearly equal terms”.340
Like Seaton, Ziemke’s work described Soviet resistance, but its main
feature was Stalin’s sacrifice of his superior manpower resources. To be
fair, Red Army resistance mattered more as the campaign wore on.
Describing the December counter-attack, Ziemke and Bauer opined, “the
weather was the least of the troubles that faced Army Group Centre”.341
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Ziemke was happy to concede that the Red Army fought well at times, but
did not credit Soviet martial ability as the main factor in Germany’s
defeat. Instead, Stalin was fortunate that geography, the weather, and,
above all, Soviet superiority in manpower conspired to stop the German
invaders. In his account of the Red Army written after the Cold War,
Ziemke described how the Soviet Union was only able to stay in the fight
thanks to “the awesome coercive power of a totalitarian state to generate
‘reserves’, a euphemism for ‘cannon fodder’”.342 According to Ziemke, by
4 December 1941, the “confirmed Soviet military dead” for 22 June to 18
November was a remarkable 6,155,500, twenty-one times the American
total for the whole war.343 While there was no German victory at Moscow,
there was no Red victory either because, in the end, “both sides lost”.344
Certainly, Ziemke saw little Soviet agency and even less Red victory.
This view of Hitler snatching defeat from the jaws of victory became a
recurring theme of more popular accounts written for a general audience
that began to emerge in the 1960s. In the popular imagination, the
military history of 1941 was firmly associated with the mud and snow,
and the diabolical problems that arose mainly because of Hitler’s
incompetence. Writing the first specific English-language account of the
Battle of Moscow, Ronald Seth, an intelligence operative in the Second
World War who later became a best-selling author, was deeply critical of
Hitler. Seth noted that all Hitler’s generals agreed that he had doomed
them to the one thing they had always tried to avoid, a winter campaign
in Russia.345 Seth quoted Blumentritt as offering the reflection that:
Hitler, if not his generals, seems to have had a poorer memory of the
past, and in particular of Moltke’s dictum, uttered in 1864, ‘An
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operation must be based not on the weather but on the season’;
autumn was beginning, winter would soon come.346
According to Seth, Hitler’s decisions demonstrated his “ridiculous lack of
military understanding”.347
The theme of Hitler as military amateur dominates in account after
account from the middle period of the Cold War. In his 1970 book, Alfred
Turney mined Bock’s diaries and concluded that Bock struggled heroically
against the weather and stiff Soviet resistance but he could not overcome
the damage done by Hitler’s amateurish decision making. Turney
concluded that the indecision in August 1941 “may have lost Germany the
war”.348 Keegan, for many years one of the preeminent British military
historians, wrote an account of Operation Barbarossa in 1971 that
described Hitler’s “incipient tinkering” in strategic matters,349 and stressed
the colossal error of Hitler’s Kiev decision.350 Writing in 1978, Matthew
Cooper noted that Operation Typhoon was doomed as soon as Hitler, an
amateur who dominated his politically inept generals, condemned the
German Army to fight in the autumn mud.351 Writing in 1985, Januscz
Piekalkiewicz concluded that because of Hitler’s indecision, “[t]he advance
on the Soviet capital was delayed so long that the Blitzkrieg literally got
stuck in the mud”.352 For Piekalkiewicz, the delay of August 1941 provided
Stalin with two months with which to reinforce his defences around
Moscow.353 Just as important was the fact that the victory at Kiev had the
unfortunate effect of increasing Hitler’s sense of his own strategic
infallibility.354
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Hitler’s mistakes forced the Germans to fight a winter campaign that
might otherwise have been avoided. Keegan described how advancing
German troops could see the Kremlin in their field lenses; “[t]he Russian
winter in all its cruelty, unknown and unimaginable to a Westerner, was
now beginning to bite”.355 Seth noted that even when tanks were able to
move in the cold, the freezing temperatures numbed the men in both
body and mind.356 Haupt described the cold, ice, frost and snow as
“‘Problem Nr. 1’ for the German command staffs”.357 We learn from
Piekalkiewicz that: “the mud proved to be Stalin’s most effective ally”;358
from Turney that by October 11 the weather “was creating a graver
problem for Bock’s forces than were the Russians themselves”;359 and
from Werner Haupt that “a new enemy more dangerous than the ‘Red
Army’ had appeared – the mud!”.360 Seth stated that when the autumn
rains began to fall, “Zhukov and the Stavka were already becoming
conscious of a new ally standing at their shoulder”.361 Carell emphasised
the effects of “General Mud” on the German defeat before Moscow.362
Haupt

similarly

described

the

mud

as

Zhukov’s

greatest

ally.363

Piekalkiewicz, in comparing the Battle for Moscow to Borodino, claimed
that the Napoleonic battle was the first great artillery battle of history, but
that the Germans of 1941 faced an entirely different foe, the rain. 364 For
Turney, the Battle of Moscow became the Battle of Mud:
On 9 October, after a short respite of good weather, the Russian
countryside was again blanketed by rain, sleet, and snow. And again
Bock’s military machine bogged down. German soldiers shivered in
the freezing temperatures and worked with almost superhuman effort
355
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to maintain the momentum of the attack. They used horses,
machines, and sheer human strength in an attempt to extract their
vehicles from the Russian mud. But despite all they could do, the
forces of nature proved to be superior.365
The Russian winter that followed the rasputitsa delivered the final blow.
Cooper stressed the ‘dual blow’ dealt to the Germans by the weather;
when the renewed German offensive on Moscow was launched in midOctober, “[t]his time it was not the rain that paralysed the attack; it was
the tremendous drop in temperature”.366 Piekalkiewicz noted that Soviet
resistance only became stronger as the temperature dropped. 367 When he
did concede that there was at times tough resistance from the Soviet
defenders, the weather was decisive:
The Russian winter here was of a severity previously unknown to the
Germans. The night lasted from three in the afternoon until ten in
the morning. Temperatures fell to -20 degrees regularly; and soon,
from November 27, temperatures of -30 and even -40 degrees were
recorded. The German Army was unable to cope with such weather.
Tanks, automatic weapons, and radio sets failed to function because
of inadequate frost protection.368
It would be difficult to avoid the conclusion from reading these accounts
that the mud and the cold mattered more than Red Army resistance. It
was also clear in these accounts that this was a war between soldiers
from different civilizations. The mud, and later the snow, provided a
backdrop on which intentionally or not, painted a picture of a war
between a recognisably human German soldier and the faceless hordes
that Stalin threw into the battle without counting the cost. The accounts
of the impact of the weather created the impression that the Germans
suffered defeat because they were more ‘human’ or less animal-like than
their Soviet opponent. There were countless dramatic accounts of the
experience of the German soldier freezing to death miles from home that
365
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seemed to imply that the Wehrmacht soldier was as much the victim of
the war as the unfortunate citizens under occupation. Assmann offered a
vivid description of an offensive frozen in ice and snow:
For almost three months, in ice and snow, in almost unbelievably
cold weather, without adequate winter clothing and with most
difficult supply conditions, the German forces in the East had to fend
off Russian attacks.369
The contest was uneven, according to Assmann, because “the Russians
were accustomed to the cold weather and better outfitted for it”. 370One of
the many photographs of German soldiers in Piekalkiewicz’s Moscow
1941: The Frozen Offensive is the image of a young Wehrmacht soldier
reading his mail. The photo is captioned: “A short interval in the fighting
near Tula: A German gunner takes the opportunity to read a letter from
home far away”.371 The reader is reminded that, politics aside, the
German troops were humans after all; they cared about and were cared
for by loved ones on the home front. In Haupt’s account, German soldiers
appear

tired and

hungry,372

stoic and brave,373

louse-ridden and

determined.374 Haupt’s German soldiers were relentless but seriously
hampered by the relentless mud of the rasputitsa:
The regiments, battalions, and companies marched man behind man,
wordlessly advancing step by step. They plodded through the mud
and the bogs. Uniforms were drenched from marching through water
and mud, food – when it was issued – was eaten silently in mud
puddles at the edge of the march-routes; but they continued to
advance.375
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Seth described in graphic detail how German soldiers lost toes, limbs and
genitals to frostbite.376 James Lucas described miserable and freezing
Wehrmacht troops waiting for their meagre potato soup, only to find it
had frozen while being delivered to them.377 Turney too had the frozen
soup, adding the dramatic flourish that as the forlorn German troops
received their frozen meals, they “hoped for better days to come”.378
When describing the Soviet counter-attack of December 1941, Seaton
described the fate of German soldiers who could not retreat fast enough:
Their lips were cracked and faces frost-bitten, their legs numbed and
without feeling; one by one men sat or dropped down to await death
because they could go no further; no reasoning could make them
continue. Some begged to be shot or shot themselves. Most had to
be left to await their end by freezing or Russian bayonet. Many of
those who survived were permanent mental or physical wrecks.379
Or as Haupt put it:
The wounded and the soldiers suffering from frostbite could no longer
be provided with first aid. Many of the latter fell exhausted into the
snow, where they were either slain by the Russian cavalry or expired
after a few minutes because their blood had turned to ice.380
In Seaton’s account, the German soldier was up against a truly barbaric
foe. The German sick and wounded, as well the as medical staff treating
them “were often butchered by the oncoming enemy. For the Bolshevik
knew no pity”. The blinding and torture of prisoners was, according to
Seaton, commonplace. Seaton described Soviet soldiers counter-attacking
“hurrahing and screaming like animals”; the professional German soldiers
fought skilfully but were outnumbered by “hordes of Red Army soldiers”.
Seaton’s account of the Soviet recapture of Maloiaroslavets on New Year’s
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Eve in 1941 contained a striking description of Soviet soldiers, whom
Seaton, as a historian from Canada who later served in the British
military, curiously described as “the enemy”:
In a temperature of minus 40 degrees centigrade, in the glare of
burning houses, there was close hand to hand fighting of the fiercest
and most brutal kind. There was no quarter. Many of the enemy
troops, fortified with vodka, massacred the German wounded or flung
them out of the upper windows, the drunken hordes roaming around
the suburbs of the town hurrahing and screaming, and killing
everyone in their path.
Seaton’s depiction of drunken, animal-like Soviet hordes massacring
helpless Germans is consistent with the traditional negative Western
stereotype of Russia and Russian soldiers: “There was no alternative to
kill or die and this was reflected in the desperate resistance put up by the
Red Army men”.381
On occasions there were descriptions of the plight of wounded Soviet
soldiers, but they are usually described differently to their German
counterparts. Lucas quoted a German soldier who, observing the suffering
of Red Army soldiers, was astonished that:
Among the prisoners waiting to be ferried back across the river were
wounded, many of whom had been badly burnt by flame-throwers …
Their faces had no longer any recognisable human features but were
simply swollen lumps of meat … Not one of them was moaning as
they sat there on the grass ... Why did they not moan?... some of
our soldiers brought out barrels of margarine and loaves of Russian
bread… The man without a jaw swayed as he stood up; the man with
the five bullet wounds raised himself by his good arm … and those
with burned faces ran … but this was not all; a half dozen men who
had been lying on the ground also went forwards pressing back into
their bodies with their left hands the intestines which had burst
through the gaping wounds in their stomach wall. Their right hands
were extended in gestures of supplication … as they moved down
381
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each left behind a broad smear of blood upon the grass…and not one
of them cried … none moaned … they were all dumb, as dumb as the
poorest of God’s creatures.382
This passage is reminiscent of Ségur’s descriptions of the Russians
suffering in silence at Borodino in 1812. The Red Army soldiers were
capable of suffering, but there was little suggestion that they were
capable of winning the greatest war in history.
In looking at the English-language histories of 1941 published between
1945 and the mid-1970s, there was a close correlation between what the
German generals argued and what the ‘classic’ texts of Liddell Hart,
Seaton and Ziemke described. Liddell Hart, Seaton, and Ziemke had a
deep respect not for the Nazi regime, but for the Wehrmacht’s
achievements on the battlefield and the credibility of the subsequent
testimony of the German generals.
The Cold War context played a significant part in boosting the case of the
German generals. According to Citino, the “Western (or English-speaking)
identification with the Wehrmacht in the war on the Eastern Front” was a
result of Cold War politics:
it is a phenomenon that has lasted to the present day. A strange
view of the war in the east arose, focusing almost exclusively on the
German point of view and asking repeatedly how the German army
could have won.383
Hitler was a convenient villain both for the generals and for Western
writers operating within the Cold War orthodoxy that the Soviet Union
was responsible for the lost peace after 1945. The story that the generals
told gave little credit to the new Cold War enemy for the victory over the
Nazis. Readers of this literature would have learned that even by Russian
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standards, the extraordinary rasputitsa and then the especially harsh
winter stopped the Germans, who otherwise had little to fear from a
Soviet state whose only military assets were the size of the Eurasian
landmass and hordes of primitive fighters.
Important assumptions like the severity of the weather went largely
untested.384 While the accounts of the mud and snow humanised the
Wehrmacht, stereotypes about Stalin’s endless hordes dehumanised the
Soviet ‘other’. According to Stahel, the German generals’ view that
Hitler’s Kiev decision was the main key to German defeat enjoyed
popularity in the West because to consider the counterfactual, that if
Hitler had not interfered the Germans would certainly have taken Moscow,
is a simple answer to a complex problem.385 It was especially useful for
the former German commanders who ensured that their own complicity in
the running of the war was diminished in the historiography.386 According
to Liedtke the war on the Eastern Front was poorly understood in North
America and Western Europe because of a Western historiography that
has fetishized all things related to the military of the Third Reich and
incorporated “a host of interminable fallacies that even decades of
scholarship appear unable to overcome”.387
On the other hand, there is a good case for thinking that the reason that
the German generals’ account of 1941 became the mainstay of the
references of all the histories of that era is that the alternative source of
information, that is, Soviet sources, was so problematic. Writing in 1972,
Reinhardt, no friend of the generals’ historiography, noted that, “works
written

on

this

subject

in

German

have

generally

given

scant

consideration to the measures taken by the Soviet leadership”.388 As for
why that was so, Reinhardt wrote that “the historical trustworthiness of
384
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Russian accounts of events cannot be ranked as highly as that of German
ones”.389 The only ‘Soviet’ archives available at all to foreigners were
those beyond the control of the Soviet state such as the Trotsky archives
at Harvard and the Smolensk Archive captured by the Germans and
housed in the United States after the war.390
Historians in the West had no way of independently checking archival
material referenced in Soviet works and the assumption was that the
material presented was designed to offer a pro-Soviet narrative.391 In
1953 former U.S. Colonel Truman Smith summed up Western reluctance
to believe Soviet sources by commenting that the official histories could
“well challenge the tales of Baron Munchhausen for imagination and
improbability”.392 As Cyril Falls commented in his introduction to a 1956
collection of memoirs of the war by retired Wehrmacht commanders,
“[s]ince the Second World War most of the best unofficial military
literature on the subject has come from German officers”.393 In 1963,
Erickson, who would become Britain’s foremost expert on the Red Army,
noted that due to the imbalance of sources, many in the West had no
alternative but to write the history of the war from the German
perspective.394 In 1966, the American historian Jesse D. Clarkson agreed
that, “though much of the story can be documented from Western
sources, the inaccessibility of the Soviet archives makes a definitive
account of the diplomatic and military history of Russia’s part in the war
impossible”.395 Ziemke noted in 1968 that, “virtually no significant Soviet
documents relating to military operations in World War II have been
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made available”.396 The result of this was that Western historians
considered official Soviet sources too tainted to be taken seriously. The
memoirs of former German generals played a big part in filling the void.
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Chapter Four: Paradigm in Transition
Almost every recent account concerning the events of 1941 has noted the
spell cast by the German generals over the literature about that year. It is
certainly possible that, as Citino has suggested, the Cold War context
fostered an admiration among military historians for the Wehrmacht, an
imaginary surrogate of the West in its war against the Soviet Union. What
this chapter will show is that the spell once cast by the German generals
was already under attack long before the Cold War ended. The challenge
to the German generals began with a broad questioning of their accounts
that began to emerge in the 1960s. While new accounts by the generals
had mostly dried up by the 1970s, military historians conducting primary
research began to rely more and more on archival materials, especially
materials that became available in Germany from the 1960s. The
historians conducting this archival research mostly chose to tell a different
story to that of the generals.
The “revising” of the view of the German generals in part reflected the
fact that historians writing more than a decade after the collapse of
Nazism inevitably began to develop new perspectives on the German
defeat. As Donald Kagan has noted:
In a sense, all historians are revisionists, for unless they merely tell
the same old story in different words, each tries to make some
contribution that changes our understanding of the past.397
According to Kagan, the term ‘revisionism’ first came into use when
historians in the 1920s questioned Germany’s guilt in causing the First
World War. Other ‘revisionisms’, more relevant to this thesis would follow.
By the 1960s, American historians such as William Appleman Williams and
Gar Alperovitz were revising the “orthodox” historiography of the Cold
War, arguing that Stalin and the Soviet Union had been unfairly cast in
397
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the role of villain in starting the Cold War.398 According to this ‘revisionist’
viewpoint, the origins of the Cold War were more complicated than was
traditionally assumed, and the Soviet state had acted rationally in its deep
suspicion of American intentions as the war against Hitler and Japan came
to an end.399 Cold War revisionism coincided with a new emphasis on
social history that was inspired by the “liberation” movements of the era –
feminism, civil rights, and subaltern histories. In the case of Soviet
studies, Fitzpatrick led the way in arguing for a “revision” of the topdown, Stalin-dominated, totalitarian model of understanding the Stalin
era.400 The prominence of these “revisionisms” may help to explain why
the German generals found fewer and fewer supporters in the second half
of the Cold War. In this context, the accounts of the German generals
became problematic relics of an earlier era of the Cold War in the eyes of
a new generation of academic historians, especially those writing in West
Germany.
Referencing Seaton’s Battle of Moscow (1971) and The German Army
(1982), John Taylor has noted that Seaton was the last major historian to
argue that the Germans would have captured Moscow were it not for
Hitler’s errors.401 This may be a slight exaggeration because a handful of
specialist writers and many popular accounts still contend that Germany
could have or should have won were it not for Hitler’s mistakes.402 On the
other hand, as we shall see, Taylor was right that the idea that the
Germans would have won the war if only Hitler pulled the right strategic
levers largely disappeared from the specialist literature from the 1970s.
This did not, however, mean that those historians writing from the
perspective of the German side of the war now embraced a “Red victory”
398
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explanation of the Battle of Moscow. Instead, the Battle of Moscow
became a “mission impossible” because German military planners – and
not just Hitler – failed to take into account Soviet geography, the
consequent logistical challenges, and the resistance offered by the Soviet
state and Red Army. Soviet resistance, however, was only very rarely
described as the most important factor in the German defeat.
Early revisions
It was not necessary to be sympathetic to the ‘Soviet view of the war’ or
even Soviet politics in order to suspect the German generals of bias in
their history writing. Alan Clark, later a British Conservative politician and
self-taught military historian, in 1965 produced the first account of
Operation Barbarossa that attempted to debunk the conventional wisdom
established by Liddell Hart.403 Clark noted that only those who denounced
the Kiev diversion wrote the post-war memoirs; “those who were against
the centre thrust are all dead. Keitel, Jodl, Kluge, Hitler himself ... had no
time to publish justificatory memoirs”.404 The fact that the Germans had
failed to realise that the Red Army could lose two million soldiers and
replace them suggested to Clark that this was more an impossible task
than a “lost victory” for the Wehrmacht.405 As Clark told the story, the
Red Army turned the conventional wisdom about German superiority on
its head:
The speed and depth of a panzer thrust, the tireless ubiquity of the
Luftwaffe, above all the brilliant coordination of all arms had given
the Germans an aura of invincibility that had not been enjoyed by an

403

Alan Clark wrote a controversial critique of the professional British military “donkeys” in the
First World War, before later becoming a Conservative member of the British parliament and junior
minister in Margaret Thatcher’s cabinet. Alan Clark, The Donkeys (London: Hutchinson & Co.
(Publishers) Ltd, 1961): Clark argued that the common British soldiers, or ‘lions’, were
murderously led to their death by unthinking, high-ranking commanding ‘donkeys’ in 1915. See for
example, pp. 19-20.
404
Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945 (London: Hutchinson & Co.
Ltd., 1965), p. 77.
405
ibid., p. 34.

102

army since the time of Napoleon. Yet the Russians seemed as
ignorant of this as they were of the rules of the military text-book.406
Clark’s

version

of

Red

Army

resistance

still

relied

on

traditional

stereotypes: “Like some prehistoric monster caught in a net the Red Army
struggled desperately and, as reflex gradually activated the remoter parts
of the body, with mounting effect”. According to Clark, Typhoon failed
because of “the impact of the weather, in terms of its effect upon morale
and on the efficient working of equipment, was already greater than
expected; far from waning, Russian resistance had intensified”. It was
“under the double impact of the blizzards, and the ubiquity of the Russian
attack” that Army Group Centre ground to a halt. Whereas Seaton rated
Red Army resistance as the least important factor in slowing the
Germans, Clark suggested that, while the weather was crucial, Red Army
resistance was almost as important.407
Another example of this questioning of the generals in the early 1960s
was Carell’s 1964 Hitler’s War on Russia. Carell (real name Paul Schmidt)
was a former lieutenant colonel in the Allgemeine SS, best-selling author
in Germany and the United States, and notorious denialist of Wehrmacht
and SS war crimes.408 In Hitler’s War on Russia (1964), which relied
heavily on the accounts of the former German commanders, Carell
mocked the Soviet view of the war for its insistence that Soviet victory
was assured by the superiority of Communism, and asked, “[h]ow then do
they explain the victorious German advance right up to the very gates of
Moscow? How do they explain the fact that even Stalin’s Government
expected to lose the capital?”. Like the German generals, Carell also
argued that 1941 was the decisive year of the Nazi-Soviet War,
specifically the German failure before Moscow.
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Carell’s work for the most part presented Hitler as the amateur at odds
with the professionals. Carell described how after the fighting at
Smolensk:
No general, no officer, no rank-and-file trooper in the Eastern Front
had any doubts about the further course of operations… Moscow, of
course - Moscow, the heart and brain of the Soviet Empire… when
the great victory seemed within arm’s reach, when all the world was
waiting for the order, ‘Panzers forward! Destination Kremlin!’ Hitler
suddenly scotched these plans.
When Hitler finally gave the order that Leningrad and Ukraine were to be
prioritised over Moscow, “[t]he generals had listened in amazement. They
had shaken their heads”.
On the other hand, Carell was an unlikely harbinger of the new
historiography that will be described in Chapter Five. Amidst his dramatic
descriptions of the long-suffering generals at odds with Hitler, Carell
hinted that blame did not rest solely on Hitler’s shoulders. He argued that
the key to Soviet victory was its manpower potential, and the successful
mobilisation of the vast Soviet population to meet the needs of total war.
For Carell, the weather and the use of crack troops from the Far East
played a decisive part in the Battle for Moscow, but these factors were too
over-stated in the literature. ‘General winter’ and the ‘Siberians’ were the
most obvious explanatory factors, and thus dominated the discourse, but
Soviet victory instead came from a fundamental German miscalculation of
the effort required to achieve victory:
The ‘miracle of Moscow,’ as the Soviets call the turn of the tide
outside their capital, was due to a simple fact which was anything but
a miracle - a fact that can be summed up in very few words. There
were too few soldiers, too few weapons, too little foresight on the
part of the German High Command … Adolf Hitler and the key figures
of his General Staff had underestimated their opponent, in particular
his resources of manpower and the performance and morale of his
troops. They had believed that even their greatly debilitated armies
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would be strong enough to deal him his coup de grâce. That was the
fundamental error.
Importantly, in this assessment the miscalculation was not Hitler’s alone.
Carell similarly deviated from the view of the Halder group in his
assessment of Hitler’s decision to divert Army Group Centre away from
Moscow and instead focus on Kiev. Carell argued that the importance of
the Kiev decision had in fact been overplayed in accounts of the war up to
that point:
It has been fashionable to describe Hitler’s turning away from
Moscow as the key error of the summer campaign. This view cannot
be proved wrong, but the author does not believe that Hitler’s
decision to turn towards Kiev, with the time lost in consequence, was
the sole cause of the subsequent disaster before Moscow. Upon
objective consideration Hitler’s decision seems, in many respects,
justified and reasonable.
For Carell, pushing straight for Moscow would have exposed Bock’s flanks,
and allowed the Red Army to apply its every increasing armour and
manpower strength to severely weaken German forces. Carell argued that
regardless

of

whether

Hitler’s

decision

was

indeed

“justified

and

reasonable”, Germany was already too far into Soviet territory for any
move to be decisive:
If the idea of a Blitzkrieg against the heart of the Soviet Union was
dropped altogether and the enemy given time to recover, then surely
the campaign and probably the whole war was lost. Seen in this light,
Hitler’s decision represented an admission that Yelnya-Smolensk had
broken the impetus of the German Blitzkrieg.409
Carell’s questioning of Kiev as an inexplicable and unmitigated disaster
wrought on Germany by Hitler’s foolishness was at odds with the view
espoused by the Halder school. As noted above, however, his work was
409
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for the most part one that heavily criticised Hitler for his wartime
leadership, and one that depicted the Red Army as faceless hordes at
odds with the human and war crime-free Wehrmacht.
It was a measure of the changing historiographical trend that Liddell Hart
himself offered a final, more nuanced view in his 1970 History of the
Second World War. Liddell Hart maintained his emphasis on Hitler’s Kiev
diversion, the weather and the backwardness of Soviet roads as pivotal in
the outcome of 1941. The delay caused by indecision between Hitler and
his generals in August, “was an amazing level of mental haziness on the
topmost level of the German Command”. In the end however, Liddell Hart
concluded that the Germans had chosen a uniquely challenging task:
As it was, Russia owed her survival more to her continued
primitiveness than to all the technical development achieved since
the Soviet revolution. That reflection applies not only to the
toughness of her people and soldiers – their capacity to endure
hardships and carry on under shortages that would have been
paralysing to Western peoples and Western armies. A greater asset
still was the primitiveness of the Russian roads. Most of them were
no better than sandy tracks. The way that they dissolved into
bottomless mud, when it rained, did more to check the German
invasion than all the Red Army’s heroic sacrifices. If the Soviet
regime had given Russia a road system comparable to that of
Western countries, she would have been overrun almost as quickly
as France.
Liddell Hart now conceded that from the very outset, German progress
was stunted by, “extremely tough resistance by the Russians. The
Germans usually out-manoeuvred their opponents but they could not
outfight them”. Furthermore, and in a blow to the Kiev delay argument,
Liddell Hart stressed that, “[t]he issue in Russia depended less on
strategy and tactics than on space, logistics, and mechanics”. In this
telling, it was not simply Hitler’s foolishness that cost the Germans an
otherwise certain victory, it was a combination of flawed strategy, the
climate, tough Soviet resistance, and the hardships in movement and
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logistics brought about by these factors, that cost Germany victory in
1941.410
Arguably the most serious blow to the German generals and the
contingency of Hitler’s mistakes was struck by the Israeli historian Martin
van Creveld, whose Supplying War appeared in 1977. In his widely-cited
chapter on Operation Barbarossa, van Creveld argued that Germany's
logistic network and its lack of the crucial resources of fuel and rubber
condemned Germany to defeat. W
 hile the Wehrmacht had proved itself to
be a formidable fighting force in France, the invasion of the much larger
Soviet

Union

was

simply

not

a

winnable

war

given

the

glaring

inadequacies of German planning. This was the fault not just of Hitler, but
also of the whole machinery of senior military planning. For van Creveld,
Germany fatally underestimated what would be required to win the war.
It was the ‘crisis in railway transportation’ - especially of fuel - that began
well before the onset of the frost that was the real issue, because even
when the ground hardened it was still difficult to resume the offensive:
It seems certain, therefore, that the mud was only one factor that
brought the Wehrmacht to a halt. No less important were the
railways, which had already experienced such tremendous difficulties
in building up a base at Smolensk and which were simply unable to

cope with the increased demands for a fresh offensive.
Van Creveld dismissed the Kiev diversion as a decisive factor. Given the

poor supply situation, Army Group Centre could not have attacked
Moscow at the end of August because of the need to wait for supplies.

Van Creveld also noted that the Red Army continued to fight when
surrounded and that this delayed the German attack and caused further
410
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supply problems.
     Hitler, the mud and the snow mattered far less than the

German military planners getting their   sums
           wrong.
            411

 
Taken together, the effect of these accounts was to shift the focus away
from Hitler to the generals and German military planning more broadly.
Germany had fatally underestimated the task of defeating the massive
Soviet state. Confirmation that a change had occurred in the way 1941
was being described in the military histories of the mid-Cold War period
came from the most vehement advocate of the Halder school. Writing in
1982, Russell H. S. Stolfi recognised that he was part of a minority of
historians when he argued that the blame for the German defeat lay with
the “dilettantish” Hitler. According to Stolfi, “Western historians and
writers” had by this stage fallen into line with the Soviet view that “Hitler
subjected himself and the Germans to inevitable defeat by the invasion of
the Soviet Union”.412
Nonetheless, Carell, Liddell Hart, and van Creveld were still describing a
German defeat in the terms described at the beginning of the thesis. It
was the geography of the Soviet state, the difficulties of transportation,
the need to repair and replace tanks and aircraft when resources were
stretched across multiple fronts, the mud and the snow combined with
Stalin’s seemingly inexhaustible reserves that the Germans should have
taken into consideration but suicidally did not. At the same time, these
authors clearly rejected the claim of the German generals that the war
would obviously have ended successfully for Germany were it not for
Hitler’s mistakes.
The German counter-narrative
411
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Van Creveld was not the first historian to argue that Germany simply
lacked the resources to achieve a successful invasion of the Soviet Union.
German historians had been developing just such a case from the 1960s.
The flood of memoirs, commentary and diaries from the German generals
began to dry up by the 1960s. Thereafter a very different German “voice”
regarding 1941 came to the fore.
David Stahel has noted how in the early 1960s, historians in Communist
East Germany began to suggest that the focus on the initial runaway
successes of Operation Barbarossa placed undue emphasis on this one
aspect of the war at the expense of explaining the longer-term reasons
for German failure.413 In 1962 Hans Busse challenged the Halder group’s
assertion that Hitler’s decision to divert troops in July and August 1941,
and the subsequent argument with Halder, was the main explanation for
the failure to capture Moscow.414 In 1965 Helmut Göpfert noted that
German forces enveloping large Soviet armies in the early phase of the
war were overexposed and unable to be adequately protected from Soviet
counterstrokes. The massive successes of the German kessels therefore
simultaneously

drained

overall

German

fighting

strength

at

an

unsustainable rate.415
These accounts had little impact outside of East Germany. According to
Ueberschär, to put forward these ideas in West Germany inevitably
attracted “a storm of accusations about being a tool of Communist
propaganda”.416 Or as Stahel has put it, the East German accounts “fitted
all too well into the familiar communist mythology … that a Soviet victory
413
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was inevitable from the very beginning”.417 On the other hand, the
accusation that a counter-narrative to the German generals was simply
Soviet propaganda became more difficult to sustain when the United
States began to release German military archival material in the 1960s.418
As Stolfi has described it, documents covering “several thousand feet of
shelf space” were transferred from the American National Archives in
Virginia to the Federal Republic of Germany.419 This was information that
was not available to the German generals in the 1940s and 1950s but did
become available in the late 1960s and 1970s to West German historians
who could now present their work as based on array of primary sources
not previously available.420
The author who had the greatest impact by mining this archive was
professional soldier Klaus Reinhardt, whose Ph.D. became the now classic
book Die Wende vor Moskau. Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im
Winter 1941/42 (1972).421 It was the first work published by ‘The Military
History Research Office’ of the West German military or Bundeswehr.422
Like the German generals, Reinhardt considered 1941 to be decisive.
According to Reinhardt, however, the extensive source material “now
available” demonstrated that the traditional narrative of the war - that
despite the setback at Moscow, the German Army and German industry
was able to recover and it was only at Stalingrad where there was the
true turning point of the war - “does not stand up to critical analysis”. As
for exactly when the war was lost, Reinhardt claimed that Hitler’s plans
“and therefore the prospects for a successful outcome of the war for
Germany” had failed most likely by October 1941, “and certainly so at the
417
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start of the Russian counter-offensive in the Battle of Moscow in
December 1941”. It was therefore misleading to assert that the war could
have been won if not for Hitler’s decisions. German political and military
leaders shared the illusion that they would win the war long before there
was mud or snow.
Reinhardt’s central claims were that blitzkrieg could not be maintained
over a long period, labour shortages restricted Germany’s military and
armament capabilities, hopes of compensating for raw material shortages
in captured Soviet territories went unfulfilled, as did hopes of “enabling
Germany to become economically self-sufficient from the Anglo-Saxon
naval powers”. Reinhardt noted that from the planning of Operation
Barbarossa in the autumn of 1940, the assumption was that quick victory
would be won and that it would be a war of marching and organisation of
supply more than a war of eliminating and neutralising Soviet armies:
“The German Army High Command (OKH), overrating its own capabilities,
simply thought that a different outcome was unworthy of further
consideration”. According to Reinhardt, the striking German successes of
1941 were Pyrrhic victories:
Although the German Eastern Army had not yet been defeated, but –
in strictly military terms – had won one victory after another, its
combat effectiveness had been greatly reduced, even before the final
decision had been achieved on the battlefield.
A crucial problem was that matériel lost by the panzer divisions was not
being replaced by Hitler. Hitler believed he could successfully take
Moscow with the forces at their current strength, and as a result was
reluctant to free up forces earmarked for campaigns after the Soviet
demise. In mid-July, when Hitler was told that an estimated fifty per cent
of panzers on the entire Eastern Front had been lost, he released only
seventy new Panzers (IIIs and IVs), as well as some seized Czech tanks.
Hitler appeared to be “hoarding” for planned winter operations in the
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Middle East and North Africa. More generally, the German war machine
simply did not have enough trains, tank workshops or the capacity to
manage spare parts that differed from tank to tank.
Reinhardt questioned whether Moscow would have fallen had the assault
on the Soviet capital been ordered in August. Reinhardt did concede that
the mud mattered in October, when the rasputitsa slowed the German
spearheads, especially around Tula. At the same time, the role of the mud
had been overplayed by the former German generals in their history
writing:
[t]he failure of the OKH to prepare themselves in time for the
consequences of the muddy season led them, after it had begun in
the autumn of 1941, to claim to be the victims of an extraordinary
natural disaster and to speak of an ‘abnormally long and hard muddy
season’…The army command attempted thus to ascribe the blame for
their own failure to a higher power.423
Reinhardt even suggested that the level of rainfall in October and
November 1941 was less than usual, making the rasputitsa drier and less
devastating than would normally be expected.424 Reinhardt criticised
Hitler’s generals as much as the Führer himself. On 7 December, Bock’s
diary listed several reasons for the crisis the Germans found themselves
in. The list included the autumn mud as a crucial factor that crippled
supply and prevented the Germans from capitalising on the victory as
Viaz’ma. He also listed the failure to predict the extent of Soviet
resistance in terms of fighting and industrial capacity as crucial.425 To
Bock’s assertions, Reinhardt argued that:
it must be remembered that he himself was largely responsible for
the inaccurate assessment of the enemy. His demand that the
423
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offensive be continued in mid-November despite the obvious
shortcomings in rail transport was an important contributing factor to
the difficulties now facing his units.426
Reinhardt’s thesis suggested that this was not just a German defeat, but
also hinted at the possibility that 1941 could be reframed as a Red
victory. At one level, Reinhardt described a massively unrealistic plan on
the part of German political leaders and military planners, an explanation
for the German defeat that places huge importance on German
incompetence. On the other hand, Reinhardt’s point was that this
incompetence only mattered because of unexpected Soviet resistance. If
the Soviet Union had collapsed as France had done, none of the German
miscalculations would have mattered. Reinhardt’s conclusion was that:
the Eastern Army was brought to a standstill not by the cold, but,
even before the first cold spell, by the catastrophic state of their own
units, by the breakdown of supplies and especially the continuing
resistance of the Russian troops in the sectors of all three army
groups.427
This last claim – “especially the resistance of the Russian troops” – was of
course something that Reinhardt could not develop before the opening of
the Soviet archives.
Reinhardt’s views received significant confirmation in the Military History
Research Office’s thirteen-volume History of Germany and the Second
World War. The fourth volume of this series, which was published in
German in 1984 and released in an updated form in English in 1998, was
devoted to Operation Barbarossa.428 In a direct criticism of the view
pressed by the former German generals, Manfred Messerschmidt noted in
426
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his introduction to the fourth volume that, “[t]he findings of this volume …
[a]bove all … show the very limited value, in many respects, of the
‘Studies’ produced under Halder’s general editorship on behalf of the
American army”.429 For Messerschmidt:
The first wave of West German accounts, more especially the military
memoirs of the postwar period, failed, with a few exceptions, to bring
out the dimensions of that war. In them, Hitler frequently appeared
as an amateur who messed up the victory for his military men …
Such an approach is inappropriate in every respect.430
Messerschmidt argued that the Battle of Moscow was decisive for the
Second World War. The German failure was a result of three factors,
“[o]pponent, geographical expanse, and climate brought the Wehrmacht
to the brink of disaster; in that order”.431 Messerschmidt’s hierarchy of
factors – opponent, geography, then weather - was certainly not in accord
either with the German generals or the histories written in the West by
Liddell Hart, Seaton, and Ziemke.
Writing in the same volume, Rolf-Dieter Müller argued that Operation
Barbarossa was poorly planned at least in part because the German
leadership underestimated the Red Army.432 Müller noted that from the
very beginning of planning the attack on the Soviet Union, several key
factors were not considered, especially the economic potential of the
Asian part of the Soviet Union. The warnings from military geographers
about the Soviet Union’s daunting problems for an invader “received scant
attention”.433 For Müller, the idea that the Soviet government might
organise enough stubborn resistance to weaken German fighting strength
and allow time to relocate armaments industry further east “was left out
429
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of consideration from the outset”.434 The inability to consider these things
stemmed from a prejudice against the Bolsheviks and their organisational
abilities more than any practical considerations.435
Ernst Klink’s contribution to the volume continued Müller’s discussion of
the lack of cohesion in the German High Command, though focussed on
the disagreement once the invasion actually began.436 Klink argued that
despite later claims that all mistakes were Hitler’s alone, the German
generals were not entirely free from blame: “Hitler’s rejection of their
views caused great dismay among the army leaders, but the officers
concerned obeyed him”.437 Klink criticised Bock’s failure to concede that
that failure before Moscow was not caused by the weather alone, but by
“his own share of the blame for the disaster, and that of the chief of the
Army General Staff”.438 Klink’s account did note the weather as being a
factor in the outcome of 1941, but presented the supply crisis caused by
the rasputitsa as occurring at the time that “strategic ideas replaced
reality in the thinking of the Army General Staff”.439
Writing in 1994, Gerhard Weinberg declared that Reinhardt’s view that
Germany lacked the resources to win the war against a determined and
much underestimated Soviet opponent was now “generally accepted”.440
Nonetheless, the views put forward by Reinhardt and the German official
history would take time to make an impact outside of Germany. In the
first place, Reinhardt’s work did not appear in English translation until
1992. Secondly, Reinhardt and the official German history were still
vulnerable to the criticism that they were simply following a political
434
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agenda. According to Ziemke, the West German attack on the generals’
view was driven more by domestic and foreign policy concerns than
anything else. For Ziemke, Reinhardt expressed the 1970s version of the
‘German point of view’ that sought to reassure the Soviet Union that
Germany was no longer a threat. At a time of Ostpolitik, the German
military establishment thought it desirable to demonstrate that the Soviet
victory was straightforward and that the war was won in October 1941, or
at the latest in December 1941.441 This emphasis upon the lack of
capacity of Hitler’s war machine reinforced the message of the West
German government that Germany constituted no real threat to the
Soviet

Union.

Ziemke

was

plainly

unconvinced

by

this

“quaintly

tendentious Cold War relic”.442
Thirdly it should be noted that the post-war German histories did not
speak with one voice. Joachim Hoffmann’s chapter in the official History,
entitled ‘The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes’, flatly contradicted
the general thrust of the volume.443 Hoffmann was deeply sceptical about
the claims of the official Soviet view of the war. Hoffmann noted that after
the war the likes of Zhukov, Konev and Vasilevskiĭ all claimed that the
desperate fighting by encircled Soviet troops at Viaz’ma played a vital role
in gaining time for strengthening the Mozhaĭsk Line. For Hoffmann, this
advantage, so stressed by Soviet historians, came at an enormous price
in men and matériel. It was therefore impossible to talk of the “undying
glory” of the encircled troops without mentioning that 673,000 of them
surrendered.444 According to Hoffmann, incompetent and profligate Soviet
commanders cobbled together defences with untrained soldiers to save
Moscow. The reader would get the impression from Hoffmann that
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something close to a miracle was needed to save Moscow.445
Moreover, the fourth volume in the official history was soon eclipsed by
the controversy of the historikerstreit that took place in Germany between
1986 and 1989. This controversy was set off when intellectuals from the
conservative right of German politics argued that it was time for Germany
to recognise that Stalin’s crimes were the equal of Hitler’s, and that the
Wehrmacht had fought to save Germany from a barbaric Red Army.446 In
opposition to these ‘revisions’ of history, prominent historians such as
Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat argued against what they saw as
diminishing of Nazi crimes and German responsibility for the Holocaust.447
Bartov and Wette argued that the German generals were mostly in
agreement with the Nazi leadership in terms of waging an ideological and
racist war in the East and that they did just that.448
The accounts of Clark, Reinhardt, the German official history, and van
Creveld suggested that the German defeat had to be viewed in much
broader terms than an otherwise flawless plan being brought undone by
Hitler’s blunders. In each case, the assertion was made that Soviet
resistance mattered a great deal, perhaps more than Hitler and the
weather. This in itself would not count as a “Red victory” argument in the
terms described in the introduction to this thesis. These accounts of the
German side of the war simply did not go into any detail about what the
Red Army actually achieved; Hoffmann’s account of the Soviet side of the
war explicitly rejected any suggestion that the Red Army was the agent of
its own survival in 1941. Among historians writing in Britain, however,
there was a more sustained effort to tell a story of Soviet agency in the
war.
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The British counter-narrative
Alexander Werth was arguably the first well-known writer in the West to
make the case that Soviet resistance was clearly the most important
factor in the defeat of the German invaders in 1941. Werth grew up in
Saint Petersburg before his family migrated to the United Kingdom in
1917 to escape the Revolution. Despite having fled the Bolsheviks, Werth
remained fond of Russia, and even sympathetic to the Soviet cause. In
1942 he stated that upon hearing of the German invasion “the Russian
half of me was clamouring to ‘go home’ – after 24 years”.449 Rejecting
Cold War stereotypes was clearly one of the motivations for Alexander
Werth, who knew wartime Russia as a journalist working in the Soviet
Union for the London Sunday Times and the BBC. Werth’s Russia at War
appeared in 1964 and was unusual because of its aim to broaden
knowledge of the Soviet contribution to the Allied victory to a wide
audience. This was a reworking of earlier reports on the war aimed at the
general reader. Werth’s work was clearly sympathetic to the Soviet war
effort, and in the preface to Russia at War indicated that his efforts were
intended to counter widespread ignorance and deliberate Western
amnesia with regard to the role of the Soviet Union in winning the war,
specifically the misinformation spread by the anti-Communist John Birch
Society.450 Werth was of the view that the Western powers should have
collaborated with the Soviet Union to stymie Nazi aggression, and that the
Soviet Union was justified in annexing eastern Poland and the Baltic
States.451 Werth acknowledged that Russia at War was not meant to be a
work of academic history, but that he had been able to speak informally
to soldiers and civilians alike, and visit battlefields.452
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Werth stressed the enormous role played by the Soviet Union in the
defeat of Nazi Germany and the debt therefore owed by the Western
Allies.453 When he discussed Guderian’s complaint regarding mud and rain
affecting the German war effort, Werth noted that German claims that the
thermometer dropped to minus sixty-eight degrees were improbable and
scoffed at “Guderian’s urge to blame everything on the weather!”454 What
mattered was the extraordinary effort of common Red Army soldiers,
volunteers from Moscow and civilians in defending against the German
invader.455
The difficulties facing those who wanted to make the case for more Soviet
agency in the events of 1941 during the Cold War is illustrated in the
accounts of two British historians of the Red Army, Malcolm Mackintosh
and Geoffrey Jukes. For these experts on the military history of the NaziSoviet War, only published Soviet sources were available. They relied
upon the memoirs of the generals that Khrushchëv and then Brezhnev
permitted to appear in the 1960s.
Mackintosh’s Juggernaut: The Russian Forces, 1918-1966 appeared in
1967 and described the evolution of the Red Army from the Russian Civil
War

of

1918-1920

to

1966.

Strikingly

for

the

modern

reader,

Mackintosh’s account was based entirely on published Soviet sources,
such as the memoir of Marshal Vasiliĭ Sokolovskiĭ. Furthermore, its
account offered few references and no primary sources. Mackintosh
devoted considerable space to the Nazi-Soviet War, but had nothing to
say about whether the Germans could have won at Moscow or not.
Instead, Mackintosh emphasised the Red Army’s capacity to endure the
German attack of 1941 and learn from its mistakes.456
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The first English-language account dedicated to telling the military history
of the Battle of Moscow from the perspective of the Red Army was written
by Jukes and appeared in 1970.457 Like Mackintosh, Jukes was hamstrung
by a lack of reliable primary evidence. The Defense of Moscow was limited
in scope, appearing as a volume in Ballantine’s Illustrated History of
World War II. Apart from the plentiful illustrations, the first half of the
book was a description and analysis of events: the second half of the
book comprised lengthy extracts drawn from Zhukov’s recently published
memoirs.458 Its theme was summed up in Jukes’ contention that the
defence of Moscow “was primarily the work of one man”, Zhukov. 459 Apart
from the hero worship of Zhukov, there was no attempt to stake out a
clear position on whether this was a German defeat or a Red victory in
the terms discussed in this thesis. It was testimony to how little was
known about the Soviet side of operations that

most of Jukes’

commentary was about the conflicts over German strategy. Jukes devoted
an entire chapter to the conflict between Hitler and his generals over
whether to strike at Moscow or Kiev. According to Jukes, Hitler’s decision
on 21 August not to advance directly on Moscow was decisive:
This, then, was the vital decision. The idea of actually capturing
Leningrad was quietly abandoned, and an advance on Moscow was
ruled out for the time being.460
On the other hand, Jukes made mention of staunch Soviet resistance
throwing the German plans into chaos. Jukes noted that the mud of the
rasputitsa equally affected the actions of each combatant side: as Soviet
troops retreated they found the mud as much of a hindrance as the
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advancing Germans.461 With regard to the devastating winter, Jukes
noted that the lack of winter clothing did have an enormous effect on the
Wehrmacht, but pointed out that the resulting handicaps were selfimposed.462 Jukes also noted that Soviet historians covered up the scale
of the Red Army’s horrendous losses. Jukes’ account of the Defense of
Moscow minus the illustrations and the quotations from Zhukov amounted
to only about forty pages of text. Taken together, Werth, Mackintosh and
Jukes made a case for the importance of Soviet resistance but, outside of
published Soviet sources, had no evidence for their claims.
It was left to Erickson’s histories, Road to Stalingrad (1975) and Road to
Berlin (1983) to provide the first analytical and detailed account of the
Red Army at war.463 Erickson’s work was a synthesis of German archival
material, Soviet war literature and interviews with Soviet veterans with
whom he had cultivated a relationship during the Khrushchёv ‘thaw’.464
Erickson, for example, interviewed Marshal Konev as part of his research.
He was able to make an extensive study of “diverse private papers,
diaries, single documents and personal accounts,

many of which

undoubtedly have their counterpart in the central archives”.465 When
using published Soviet materials, Erickson made contact with the author
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or research group responsible in order to discuss the findings. 466 These
contacts would help Erickson overcome a lack of access to Soviet
archives.467
There are many references to the role of the mud and snow in Erickson’s
account.468 However, Erickson insisted that both sides were equally
affected.469 The weather was only important in connection with the
resistance of the Red Army. As the German assault faltered before
Moscow in late November and early December, Erickson seemed to share
some of the Soviet schadenfreude: “At Istra, Beloborodov’s Siberian
troops fought hand-to-hand with the SS infantry of Das Reich Division,
the young Aryans who died icy and bare-footed in their boots”.470 This
type of flourish is, however, rare. Erickson’s own view on the reason for
the Red victory is hinted at in his assessment of the failure of the final
German push on the Soviet capital in which he summarises the Germans
faltering

due

to

“losses,

exhaustion

and

undiminished

Soviet

resistance”.471 Erickson’s dense narrative implies that the mud and
resistance worked together:
Heaving itself forward out of a sea of clinging mud, the German
attack on 9th Army was held up at Kalinin, where Panzer Group 3 (redesignated Third Panzer Army) was under direct attack by the Soviet
30th and 31st Armies: driving straight from the west, the German
Fourth Army ran into fresh Soviet formations (49th, 43rd and 33rd
Armies) and on its southern wing could push no further than the
Nara-Serpukov area.472
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To illustrate how Erickson differed from his contemporaries, Erickson’s
depiction of the German assault on Kalinin can be compared with Seaton’s
account of the same battle. Both accounts deal with the events of 12
October 1941. According to Seaton:
Because of the shortage, the remaining motor fuel was pooled in
order the make a motorized infantry battalion, supported by a tank
company and artillery battery, fully mobile. This motorized battalion
group was detailed to make a thrust on the great city and industrial
area of Kalinin, fifty miles to the north, and made excellent progress
during 12 October, the demoralized and panic-stricken Soviet enemy
running away, leaving trenches and equipment at the sight of the
armored personnel carriers.473 [emphasis added]
Erickson described this same event differently:
On 12 October, Kaluga had fallen and two days later Kalinin (ninety
miles north-west of Moscow and leading into the rear of the Soviet
North-Western Front) also fell, in spite of the furious resistance of
units formed out of Moscow AA gun-crews, motor-cycle companies,
machine-gun squads and more militia.474 [emphasis added]
The footnote used by Seaton to support his description of the mopping up
operations around Kalinin cited Bock’s diary as a key source. However,
Bock’s description of the assault on Kalinin is very matter of fact and
tends to support Erickson over Seaton: “Panzer Group 3 entered Kalinin in
heavy fighting”.475 Erickson noted that he consulted two of Seaton’s
works, The Battle for Moscow (1971) and The Russo-German War (1971)
for information on Soviet defence and German exhaustion, describing
Seaton as invaluable for his analysis of German operational matters. 476
The implication is that Seaton was less valuable when it came to
describing the actions of the Red Army.
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Erickson’s scholarship attracted praise for having greater balance than the
accounts based simply on German sources.477 On the other hand,
Erickson’s terse academic style presented facts with scant editorialising
and revealed little to the reader about the author’s personal perspectives.
Often, the reader is left to draw his or her own conclusions. Mawdsley
commented that, Erickson “does not readily share on paper his own
analysis of individuals and events”.478 As the American historian Peter
Kenez noted, Erickson is “ambivalent” on whether the Germans could
have triumphed at Moscow.479 Certain aspects of Erickson’s approach
became clear, however, in his discussion of his sources. Erickson rejected
the notion that there was a dearth of useful Soviet source material at the
time of writing.480 He added that it was acceptable to use official Soviet
publications as long as one was aware of some shortcomings: “much
Soviet work is far from ‘propaganda’ in the blatant or simplistic sense
(though a somewhat perfervid patriotism is never entirely absent)”.481
Erickson himself summarised his aims as “an attempt to probe how the
Soviet system functioned under conditions of maximum stress: from this
point of view it is less military history per se and might more properly be
regarded as a form of social history”.482
Erickson’s account does not resemble more recent ‘social history’ because
the war experience of the common Red Army soldier is mostly absent. As
Kenez noted, “Erickson sees the war through the eyes of the generals: he
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makes no effort to comprehend the world of the private”.483 Erickson’s
works provided a sense of the desperate and brutal nature of fighting at
the front, but vignettes detailing the individual exploits of common
soldiers were conspicuously absent. For example, as the Germans made
their final push on Moscow in late November, desperate Soviet defenders
died in their thousands:
The shreds of these Soviet formations hung on like grim death,
where many died inconspicuous and wretched, others in a great glow
of fame, like Panfilov’s 316th anti-tank men, ground to pieces fighting
German tanks on the Volokolamsk highway.484
Erickson rejected the automatic dismissal of Soviet histories, suggesting
that such an approach had undermined the attempt to understand the
war. As Erickson put it:
Distortion and imbalance, however, do not reside exclusively on the
Soviet side. Ignorance of and apathy towards important sections of
Soviet historiography of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ on the part of nonSoviet historians and commentators have led to some serious
shortcomings even in avowedly serious works dealing with the Soviet
Union at war.485
Erickson did not have an obvious political agenda like Werth. He clearly
did not approve of the brutal methods of the Communist state, but nor
did he think that repression underpinned the victory. He noted the
ruthless role played by the NKVD (Narodnyĭ Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del
– People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) in forcing Soviet troops to
fight through the “discipline of the revolver”.486 Erickson described how
during the Battle for Moscow, “the army’s political baggage train grew
more unwieldy with the weight of commissars and political inspectorates:
483
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deep in its wake came the NKVD”.487 Erickson, like Seaton, viewed Stalin
as an example of the dysfunction of a totalitarian system. For Seaton,
Stalin “displayed oriental deviousness” and eventually infected the entire
Soviet system with his own long list of defective personality traits: “brutal
and harsh, a hypocrite and a liar, he scorned human decency and human
life, exploiting for his own purpose only the lower instincts of human
nature,

by

provocation,

terror,

demoralization,

corruption,

and

blackmail”.488 Erickson’s description of the dangers of entrusting all power
to Stalin contains fewer stereotypes but is just as critical:
Locked up in the Kremlin, the master of a world which he had
created by his own selective killings, and which reflected back upon
him only those images he had himself ordained, steeped in his own
‘genius’ and fed on its outpouring, Stalin could rage away dissension
and doubt, from whatever quarter it came.489
For Erickson, the Soviet leadership made amateurish errors in preparing
for the war:
the whole organisation of the defence rested on the assumption that
the Red Army would not be taken by surprise, that decisive offensive
actions would be preceded by a declaration of war, or that that
enemy operations would be initiated by limited forces only, thus
giving the Red Army time to fight covering actions to facilitate
mobilisation.490
What made Erickson’s work stand out however were his many hints that
Red Army resistance was a crucial, perhaps the crucial, factor in the
defeat of the Wehrmacht. As a result, Erickson’s scholarly tomes were still
criticised for producing an account too sympathetic to the Cold War
enemy.491 In 2006 Norman Davies criticised Erickson for choosing to
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“stress the colossal and victorious war effort of the U.S.S.R. while turning
a blind eye to the manifest failings of the Soviet political system”.492
Challenges to the conventional wisdom did not attract a wide readership.
The works of Erickson and Werth, the two authors that deviated most
from the dominant German school in the pre-glasnost’ era, did not enjoy
much commercial success. Smelser and Davies noted that Erickson’s Road
to Stalingrad and Road to Berlin both went out of print soon after
release.493 Not surprisingly, Werth was an easy target, and his works
were

criticised

for

his

apparent

over-reliance

on

official

Soviet

publications.494 Russia at War went out of print after its first release in
1964 and was not re-published until 1986.495 As van Creveld pointed out,
by the 1970s there were thousands of books on Hitler’s invasions of
Russia;496 there were far fewer on what the Soviet state, army, and
people did in response.
One striking feature of the Cold War is that the counter-narrative
described above did not tend to come from American historians;
according to Liedtke, the United States’ military establishment had
“wholeheartedly embraced” the view pushed by the Halder group, and
that view had become especially dominant.497 There was, however, one
noteworthy American exception. Of all the Cold War accounts published in
the West, arguably the most favourable to Stalin was the American
historian Bryan Fugate’s claim that Stalin foresaw the events of 1941 and
fought a brilliant strategic war. Writing just before the archival gold rush,
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Fugate argued that Western researchers had failed to notice that there
was more than a kernel of truth to the Stalin-era accounts of how Stalin
shrewdly revised his plans in a timely fashion.498 Fugate’s original thesis
was followed by the 1997 work Thunder on the Dnepr, co-authored with
retired Russian Lieutenant-colonel Lev Dvoretsky. This work presented
the same thesis, this time supported by previously unavailable archival
materials.499
Fugate considered that the failures of the German High Command were
important to the story of 1941.500 However, the overarching thesis of the
works was that Soviet strategic prowess mattered more. For Fugate, it
was simply an enduring myth that Stalin and the Red Army were caught
by surprise and had no sense of the importance of a controlled strategic
retreat.501 Stalin and his generals’ “plan for Soviet defence took
advantage of the Soviet Union’s intrinsic strengths: its resources,
manpower, and overall capabilities”.502 The Soviet generals, particularly
Zhukov, deliberately allowed Soviet armies to be encircled in order to
slow down the German advance and hopefully destroy it from within.503
They made excellent use of the time bought by the large encirclements to
build up defences and vast reserves, which were then deployed to deadly
effect.504 Hitler and his generals walked into Stalin’s carefully prepared
trap, which then sprung shut at Moscow.
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Fugate’s claim that Stalin was largely in control of events from the outset
has remained a distant outlier among the accounts of the events of 1941
to this day. Fugate’s criticism of the German generals came from his
assessment of their operations after the Battle of Kiev. For Fugate, the
Kiev diversion was a necessary measure to protect Bock’s southern flank,
but the German commanders erred when they resumed the assault on
Moscow rather than pressing further into the Caucasus.505 The difference
between Fugate’s and other accounts is that where Cold War-era histories
settled with German error as the cause of the failure of Operation
Barbarossa, Fugate argued that German failure resulted from, and then
was exacerbated by, Soviet military planning. Fugate summed up the
interplay between German error and Soviet strategic brilliance by arguing
that:
It is not an exaggeration to say that Germany could have won the
war on the Eastern Front had they forgone the assault on fortress
Moscow in December 1941 and not placed Army Group Center in
extreme peril from Zhukov’s skilfully positioned strategic reserve.506
[emphasis added]
In that respect, Fugate resembled the testimony of the German generals
– 1941 was a close run thing and could have turned out very differently
were it not for the contingencies of German decision making. On the other
hand, Stalin’s strategic genius contrasted favourably to the mistakes of
Hitler and the German generals.
Conclusion
In retrospect it is clear that the influence of the German generals began
to decline from the 1960s as new sources came into play, especially in
West Germany. This was also an era when academic historians were
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exposed to Cold War revisionism, which attempted to modify the Cold
War demonization of the Soviet Union. If we look at the period from the
1960s to the 1990s, there was a flourishing of diverse perspectives and
certainly no global alignment of views. Liddell Hart, Seaton and Ziemke
remained the major texts on the German invasion, and the story of
Hitler’s amateurism and images of the mud and snow dominated much of
the less specialised literature. In Britain, the likes of Werth, Jukes and
Erickson described a much more active Soviet state and Red Army but
had little impact in the short term because of a lack of credible Soviet
sources. The most striking change was the scepticism first in evidence in
the 1960s with the likes of Clark and Carell about Germany’s capacity to
win the war. In West Germany, Reinhardt’s thesis that 1941 was indeed
the “turning point”, because his claim of Germany’s lack of capacity to
sustain the war gradually became the dominant argument about the
Battle of Moscow. Given that Reinhardt was not translated into English
until 1992, many readers would have associated the “mission impossible”
thesis with van Creveld who argued much the same case.
The influence of the German generals was clearly less important in the
second half of the Cold War than it was in the first half of the Cold War.
As we have seen, there was a strong connection between the accounts of
the German generals and the English-language military histories from the
1940s and 1950s. Many accounts of the Nazi-Soviet War written after the
Cold War suggest that the view of the generals remained stubbornly
important all the way through to the present. In fact, the view of the
German generals was heavily criticised by the likes of Clark, Carell,
Reinhardt, and van Creveld. The paradigm established by the German
generals did not suddenly collapse when the Soviet archives opened in
the 1980s. It was clearly in decline during the two decades before.
Taken together, Reinhardt and Erickson wrote the first draft of what, as
we shall see in the next chapter, would become the new orthodoxy or
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paradigm after the opening of the Soviet archives. Until the opening of
the Soviet archives in the late 1980s, however, it could not be said that a
“Red victory” paradigm was in place. Reinhardt and van Creveld
emphasised the importance of Soviet resistance but offered little detail.
Erickson wrote the only substantial account of what the Soviet Union
actually did on the battlefield, although his work remained silent on the
impact of Hitler’s mistakes and the weather. He also offered the most
substantial evidence of the agency of the Red Army in 1941, but his work
was still vulnerable to the accusation that historians emphasising the
agency of the Red Army were duped by the official Soviet history and that
their accounts lacked independent verification from the archives. Erickson
was understandably timid in what was asserted and offered no opinion on
whether Moscow was likely to fall had Hitler headed straight for Moscow in
August 1941.
Before the end of the Cold War, it was difficult, arguably impossible, to
make a credible case that the Battle of Moscow should be viewed as a
“Red victory”. This would change only when Soviet archival material
became available from the late 1980s.
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Chapter Five: A New “Red Victory” Paradigm?
It is argued in this chapter that something new has occurred in the
Western historiography of 1941 since the opening of the Soviet archives.
This new historiography has four main features: a) it is explicitly critical of
the account offered by the German generals, b) it tends to date the
defeat of the German Army to the failure of the blitzkrieg in the summer
of 1941, c) it suggests that Soviet resistance was more important than
Hitler’s mistakes and the weather in the failure of Operation Typhoon, d)
it describes a Soviet state and Red Army with considerable agency that,
these accounts argue, was underestimated both by the German invaders
and a previous generation of historians.
It has to be acknowledged that this new historiography is not an
endorsement of Stalin and Soviet Communism. Nor do the historians
speak with one voice. Most accounts note that explaining the outcome of
1941 is complicated – German decision-making, Soviet resistance, and
the weather all deserve discussion. For the first time in the Western
historiography of the war, the agenda was set by new information from
Soviet archives. Another new aspect was that for the first time American
historians took the lead role in establishing the agenda around 1941. The
dominant author was David M. Glantz, an American soldier-turnedhistorian who published prodigiously on the topic of the Red Army using
the

newly-opened

Soviet

archives.

Importantly,

Glantz

and

other

historians using Soviet archives to tell the Soviet side of the war are cited
in just about every recent account telling the German side of the war. The
result, as Citino has put it, is that historians looking at the German and
Soviet sides of the war “are now living in the ‘Glantz era’”.507 At three
levels – Soviet leadership, Red Army operations, and the motivations of
Soviet soldiers – there has been a clear tendency over the last two

507

Citino, The German Way of War, n. 64, pp. 371-372.

132

decades to recognise Soviet agency as crucial to understanding the
events of 1941.
To examine this question, some thirty historians and their accounts of
1941 were considered. The initial question asked was whether the
historian prioritised Soviet resistance over the weather and Hitler’s Kiev
delay in their account of why the Germans failed to defeat the Soviet
Union/capture Moscow in 1941. The results – with a comparison to the
Cold War era - are summarised in the following table:
Author

Year of
Prioritised
Publication Hitler’s errors
and the
weather over
Soviet
resistance.

Strongly
agree
Former German commanders
Halder
1949
YES
Raus
1949
YES
Assmann
1950
YES
Guderian
1952
YES
Blumentritt
1956
YES
Manstein
1958
YES
PRE-Soviet Archives
Liddell Hart
1948
YES
Anders
1953
YES
Lederrey
1955
YES
Seth
1964
YES
Carell
1964
Werth
1964
Clark
1965
Ziemke
1968
YES
Jukes
1970
Liddell Hart
1970
Turney
1971
Seaton
1971
YES
Keegan
1971

Agree

Prioritised
Soviet
resistance
over Hitler’s
errors and the
weather
Ambivalent Agree

Strongly
agree

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
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Reinhardt
Erickson
Van Creveld
Cooper
Boog et al
Fugate
Piekalkiewicz
Haupt
Ziemke &
Bauer
POST-Soviet
Stolfi
Dunn
Glantz &
House
Fugate &
Dvoretsky
Overy
Glantz
Glantz
Ueberschär
Ziemke
Glantz
Mawdsley
Roberts
Braithwaite
Forczyk
Megargee
Nagorski
Bellamy
Stahel
Jones
Fritz
Glantz
Stahel
Zetterling &
Frankson
Radey &
Sharp
Bergström
Kirchubel
Luther
Hartmann
Stahel
Ellis
Stahel

1972
1975
1977
1978
1984
1984
1985
1986
1987
archives
1991
1994
1995

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

1997

YES

1998
1998
2001
2002
2004
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2007
2008
2009
2009
2011
2012
2012
2012

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

2012
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2015
2015

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
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Liedtke
2016
Hill
2017
SUMMARY
German Generals
Pre-Soviet archives
Post-Soviet archives
Table II

YES
YES
100%
36%
6%

0%
27%
9%

0%
0%
12%

0%
0%
32%
5%
42.5% 30.5%

What follows is an examination of specific key texts to see how they
explain the outcome of the Battle of Moscow. As we shall see, it is not the
case that every historian offers an explicit view on why the Battle of
Moscow turned out as it did. A result of this is that there is a category for
“ambivalent” in the table. Inclusion in this column means that the author
is unclear in their conclusions, or silent on the issue. The historian in
question will typically describe German errors as part of the analysis.
What is noteworthy however is that Soviet resistance, which in the Cold
War-era historiography was often the last factor mentioned or was not
mentioned at all, is now explicitly prioritised in the majority of accounts
discussed below.
Archival Revolution
While there is much debate among historians as to Gorbachëv’s motives
in taking the course of action that he did, there is general agreement that
the Soviet leader’s determination to build a new and cooperative
relationship with the West effectively ended the Cold War even before the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Western historians were among the
beneficiaries of Gorbachëv’s policy of glasnost’. In the 1970s and 1980s a
small number of British and American historians were allowed limited
access to the Soviet state archives; but they were confined to a special
reading room where access to certain files was strictly vetted and
controlled.508 It was not until 1989 that foreign researchers were first
allowed to move beyond the constraints of the special reading room in the
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state archives, an event that R. W. Davies described as a “memorable
day”.509
One striking change in Western historiography brought about by the
opening of the Soviet archives was that the Soviet-German War is no
longer the “unknown war”. The secondary literature dealing with the
military events of 1941 has grown enormously. In the words of Jukes,
there is a case for saying that the Soviet-German War has been “done to
death”.510 Not only has the Eastern Front become a favoured object of
study, but also the conventional wisdom about it has changed: Western
historians are much more likely to readily accept the importance of the
Eastern Front and the decisive nature of the fighting there.511 As Mark
Harrison has put it, the view that the Eastern Front was decisive, “once
seemed radical and is now a tired orthodoxy”.512
Secondly, after gaining access to the Soviet archives, the official Soviet
historiography, memoirs and document collections could now be checked
with at least some independence by Western scholars working with
Russian historians and archivists. At the elite level, there was new
information about Stalin, his interactions with leading Soviet political and
military figures, and the considerations and disputes among the leaders of
the Red Army about how to fight the Nazis. It became clear that just
about every building block of the story of 1941 needed to be checked and
rechecked. For example, it used to be thought that Stalin’s military purge
509
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decapitated the Red Army by sending half its officers to their deaths. As
Roger Reese has shown, the Red Army’s officer corps was considerably
larger than was once thought, and the percentage of executed officers
was much lower than the fifty percent commonly cited in the past.513
Attention has turned from the impact of the executions to the impact of
the poorly-managed expansion of the Red Army’s officer corps. Another
staple of the standard accounts was Stalin’s apparent nervous breakdown
and retreat to his dacha upon learning of Hitler’s attack; the appearance
of Stalin’s appointments diary made it clear that he was actively involved
in the conduct of the war from the very beginning.514
Thirdly, much new information emerged about how the Red Army actually
fought the war. Mackintosh, Jukes and Erickson writing in the 1960s and
1970s had to rely upon the edited memoirs of Soviet generals to look
behind the official documents. Since the early 1990s, historians of the
Red Army have had to contend with the opposite problem of enormous
numbers of hitherto unpublished materials that had to be analysed and
assessed for their significance. Russian archivists have assisted this
process by publishing new document collections that are very different to
their Soviet predecessors. Zhukov’s memoirs appeared in an expanded
three-volume form that could now be checked against the expurgated
Soviet version. This enabled a major re-evaluation and debate about
Zhukov, whose record as the architect of the Red victory was questioned
and defended.515 The publication of significant archival collections such as
V.A.

Zolotarev’s

twenty-five

volume

Russkiĭ

Arkhiv:

Velikaia

Otechestvennaia Voĭna, 1941-1945 published between 1993 and 1998
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dramatically increased the sources available to historians.516 Valuable
materials also found their way onto the Russian Ministry of Defence’s
People’s Victory website.
Complementing the 'archival revolution' of the last twenty years there has
occurred what Budnitskii has described as a “revolution of memory”.
Unpublished diaries, memoirs and interviews with Soviet political and
military figures have had an enormous impact on how the history of the
war is written.517 Soviet soldiers were forbidden from keeping diaries at
the front, although those diaries that were secretly kept became an
important resource for historians.518 At the same time, the online oral
history project ‘ia pomniu’ (https://iremember.ru - available in Russian
and English) provided a unique platform for Russian and Soviet veterans
to share the stories of their wartime experience. The website, funded by
the Russian Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communication, is
regularly cited in the bibliographies of Western historians and has done
much to provide a human face to the ordinary Red Army soldier. 519 Other
valuable internet sources such as the website Podvig Naroda and
militera.lib.ru are collated by Russian historians and enthusiasts, and
make Russian and Soviet archival and second hand materials freely
available.520
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The Soviet Side of the War
As noted in the previous chapter, American scholars were noteworthy for
their absence in the challenge to the German generals in the Cold War
era. This changed dramatically with the opening of the Soviet archives.
The historian who made most use of the new archival freedom and who
has towered over the history of the Red Army in the Second World War
since the opening of the Soviet archives was Glantz. Glantz made such
extensive use of Soviet archival material for his 2005 work Colossus
Reborn that he provided a companion volume to detail his sources.521 One
agenda driving Glantz was that “consciously or unconsciously … German
accounts were often just as biased as their Soviet counterparts, warping
our understanding of the titanic struggle that occurred on what the
Germans taught us to call the ‘Eastern Front’”.522 As Robert Kirchubel has
put it, Glantz went on a “one-man mission to set straight the record of
the Nazi-Soviet War”.523
One of Glantz’s early contributions was to draw attention to the “forgotten
battles” of the Soviet-German War. For Glantz, what conventional
Western histories viewed as minor hurdles on the road to greater and
more famous battles at Moscow and Stalingrad were actually of critical
importance. Glantz noted that the relative anonymity of these battles
stemmed from the imbalance of sources as well as the unwillingness of
many Soviet/Russian historians to discuss severe Red Army defeats.524
For Glantz, the Wehrmacht’s “seamless and inexorable march” towards
Moscow was a figment of the imagination of Nazi propagandists.525
Furthermore, Soviet offensives and counter-offensives in 1941, such as
521
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those at Kelme, Rasenai, Grodno, Dubno, Sol’sty, Lepel’, Bobruisk, Kiev,
Smolensk, El’nia and Roslavl’ played an enormous role in slowing down,
blunting, and eventually stopping Operation Barbarossa.526 The confused
and fluid nature of the fighting meant that the Germans at the time did
not recognise the battles for what they were, and they have consequently
been ignored with dire consequences for our understanding of why the
Germans eventually failed to achieve their goals in 1941. In Glantz’s
telling the mud and snow played a role in the outcome of Operation
Typhoon,527 but both sides were disadvantaged.528 It was the consistent,
costly

and

determined

Soviet

counter-attacks

that

brought

the

Wehrmacht to the point of exhaustion by December 1941. Without this
resistance, the weather and overextended supply lines would not have
stopped the Germans.529
While Erickson could not deliver on his promise of a “social history” of the
Red Army, Glantz most certainly could. Glantz stated that his aim in
Colossus Reborn was to provide the “perspectives of the Red Army
soldiers, Slav and non-Slav, men and women alike, who fought in the
army’s ranks and either perished or survived in a war whose ferocity and
brutality knew few bounds”.530 This was not a Soviet-era story of every
Soviet soldier as a volunteer. This was a conscript army and some
420,000 political prisoners and convicts were pressed into the Red Army
in 1941 alone.531 The Red Army’s patriotism was rooted in any number of
factors, ranging from pan-Slavism to traditional Russian nationalism to
loyalty to the Soviet state.532 For Glantz, the iron discipline of Stalin and
his henchmen was the “essential ‘glue’ that bound the Red Army
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together”.533 Yet, Red Army soldiers also fought for patriotic reasons:
“Whether or not they despised Stalin’s regime, like their ancestors before
them, they understood that foreigners were invading their motherland
(rodina)”.534 Glantz is a careful historian and makes it clear that Hitler’s
decision-making, the geography of the Soviet Union and the weather have
to be taken into account. Glantz’s point is that the Soviet state and Red
Army’s capacity to endure and fight were much more significant than the
German invaders anticipated and an earlier historiography was willing to
admit.
Roger Reese’s account of the Red Army offered a less than glowing
assessment of Red Army performance, but still pointed in the direction of
Soviet agency when it came to explaining why Germany could not achieve
its goals in 1941.535 According to Reese, the Red Army’s problems
revolved around the lack of respect and trust at all levels. Not just the
purges, but also the ill will caused by collectivisation and above all a
hopelessly mismanaged expansion of the Red Army ensured a lack of
coordination at the front, which was apparent in the Red Army’s less than
stellar performance in the Winter War of 1939-1940 and its response to
Operations Barbarossa and Typhoon. Unable or unwilling to trust their
subordinates in more complicated tasks such as manoeuvre, the Red
Army commanders reverted to “typical Russian massed infantry attacks”
with predictably dire consequences.536 For Reese, the defeats of 1941
were caused not by a rejection of the Stalin regime but by superior
533

ibid., p. 582.
ibid., p. 586.
535
Roger Reese is an American academic who has published several books on the Soviet Union
and the social history of the Red Army. For his contribution to the debates about 1941, see, for
example: Roger R. Reese, ‘Motivations to Serve: The Soviet Soldier in the Second World War’, The
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 20, no. 2 (2007), pp. 263-282; Roger, R. Reese, ‘Red Army
Professionalism and the Communist Party, 1918-1941’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 66, no.
1 (January, 2002), pp. 71-102; Roger R. Reese, Red Commanders: A Social History of the Soviet
Army Officer Corps. 1918-1991 (Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Roger R.
Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army 1925-1941 (Lawrence,
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1996); Roger R. Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A
History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); Roger R. Reese,
Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in World War II (Lawrence,
Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 2011).
536
See Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers, pp. 206-208.
534

141

German operational capacity and the failure of the Red Army’s plans to
counter-attack and win the war at the frontiers. Reese distinguished
between the relatively weak “tactical performance” of the Red Army from
its strong “effectiveness” which depended upon small-group cohesion and
the desire of the army at all levels to overcome its enemy.
The key to 1941 for Reese was that the Red Army kept on fighting.
Soldiers fought for a variety of social and personal reasons: “[s]ervice,
however, was not an endorsement of the oppression of the Stalinist
state”.537 Patriotism did not necessarily equate to loyalty to Stalin’s
regime. It was “a patriotic love for the historic Russian motherland that
transcended politics”.538 Coercion mattered too, but not as much as the
older stereotypes of blocking units mowing down retreating Red Army
units en masse suggested. What in the end decided the outcome of 1941
was the capacity of the Soviet state to mobilise millions of its citizens.
Reese made a great deal of the mobilisation of women into the armed
forces, as well as the willingness of Red Army soldiers in general to fight,
which was encouraged by coercion and propaganda but also reflected the
array of motivations described above. For Reese, 1941 was not decisive,
and it was not until 1944 that the war would be won. Nonetheless,
Reese’s narrative is about the capacity of the Soviet state and Red Army
to absorb the Wehrmacht’s blows and fight on to victory.539
Mark von Hagen noted that during the Kliment Voroshilov era (19251940) a cult of invincibility pervaded the Red Army. Meanwhile the
“pathology” of the Stalin system, especially the “inordinate power of the
Soviet security police” harmed military professionalism at all levels. 540 The
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lessons of the Finnish War and the replacement of Voroshilov by
Timoshenko was supposed to lead to reforms, but investigations into the
Red Army’s performance in 1940-1941 found depressingly widespread
evidence of inattention, laziness, lack of initiative, failure to take
responsibility and poor training that stretched all the way from senior
commanders to privates, from engineering units to the cavalry. This was
still a peacetime army and the soldiers, often freshly conscripted into
units, lacked the necessary complement of officers and had no training in
camouflaging their operations of crossing rivers.
According

to

von

Hagen,

the

Red

Army

suffered

greatly

from

‘shapkozakidatel’stvo’ (‘cap-tossing’), suggesting “carelessness and lack
of discipline and authority grounded in a false sense of superiority or
invincibility”. It was not surprising that encircled soldiers in 1941
demonstrated confusion and panic given that much of their inadequate
training had been wasted on non-military tasks. The cult of secrecy
around enemy movements and capabilities and fear of punishment
contributed to the confusion and lack of initiative that soldiers would
display when confronted by the German blitzkrieg. Nonetheless, these
defects would not prove fatal in part because the “majority of Red Army
men, the Russians and Ukrainians, shared some degree of Soviet
patriotism and commitment to the political and social order of the Soviet
state”.541
One of the early post-archival accounts of the Red Army was Walter S.
Dunn’s 1994 study of Red Army doctrine, mobilisation and wartime
performance, Hitler’s Nemesis, which was endorsed in a foreword written
by Glantz.542 Dunn’s target in writing his book was the stereotype of a
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backward Red Army prone to surrendering en masse:
The popular Western image of the Red Army during World War II was
a huge army of illiterate, ill-trained, ill-clad, poorly-equipped, subhuman soldiers who fought because they feared the NKVD machine
guns at the rear. Victory for the Red Army as viewed by the West
came only by trading ten Russian lives for one German life.
For Dunn, this was a distortion. The Red Army was not a passive
bystander in 1941, and, from the outset, its superior use of artillery and
antitank weapons wreaked havoc on German strong points. According to
Dunn, Soviet military doctrine and organisation stood the test of war: “the
mobilization was an outstanding accomplishment … the new divisions
went into the field and halted the German Army in December 1941”. This
was not a story of mass surrender: encircled Red Army units, especially
those that remained in their prepared positions, were able to bog down
the Germans in drawn out defensive engagements. Battles such as El’nia
and Smolensk were crucial in halting the German advance. The initial
success of Germany’s invasion meant that Stalin did not have unlimited
manpower at his disposal: Soviet manpower was torn between the needs
of the military and the needs of industry, and thus the Soviet Union had
to develop a system of ruthless efficiency in the deployment of its
resources. For Dunn, “[t]he Russians were not robots but individuals with
dissimilar emotions”. They fought “as most soldiers, not with outstanding
brilliance but with persistent determination… because of national pride
and hatred of the Germans.543 This “normalising” of the Red Army soldier
became a common theme during the two decades after the opening of the
Soviet archives.
In addition, the opening of the Soviet archives offered more information
about the weather so that the diaries of the German generals could be
reinterrogated. Arguably the main advance here was made by two non543
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academic authors, Jack Radey and Charles Sharp, who have specialised in
Operation Typhoon, especially the Battle of Kalinin on the northern
approaches to Moscow and the weather issues that the German generals
claimed were so important.544 In a book with an approving foreword
written by Glantz, Radey and Sharp focused upon a ‘forgotten battle’,
Kalinin, which proved to be crucial in saving Moscow.545 As Operation
Typhoon got under way, the Wehrmacht attempted to outflank Moscow
from the north. While the Mozhaĭsk Line directly west of Moscow was
heroically defended, what mattered was that significant German forces 9th Army and Panzer Group 3 – became bogged down in bitter fighting
around Rzhev and Kalinin on the northern flank of Army Group Centre.
Much to the surprise of the Germans, the supposedly beaten Red Army
mounted fierce counter-attacks.546 Soviet defenders delayed German
spearheads and inflicted enough damage to blunt the final stages of their
advance.547 Between 7 October and the end of that month:
A closer look at the movements of various units … clearly
demonstrate[s] that all maneuver was not prevented by muddy
roads. The fact is that there was something else that stopped the
Germans from reaching Moscow in mid-October … Along virtually
every major axis leading into the Soviet capital, they found
determined defenders blocking the road, defenders who refused to
roll over and play dead.548
Radey and Sharp also offered the first critical analysis of the weather and
its impact upon German and Soviet operations. Studying German and
Soviet field diaries and reports from the Kalinin area covering the period 9
to 23 October 1941, the period often cited as the height of the
Wehrmacht’s mud problem, Radey and Sharp found that “[a]ll in all the
544
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roads were useable to some degree on all but the 19th-23rd, four days
out of fourteen”.549 Radey and Sharp were happy to acknowledge that the
mud was important, but not as important as earlier historiography
suggested.550 Army Group Centre became bogged down at the end of
October because of four factors; one factor was the failure to marshal
sufficient fuel, ammunition and other resources to support the advance; a
second was the capacity of the Red Army to regroup and blunt the
German spearheads; a third was the poor quality of the transport
network, especially the roads, and the demolition of bridges; finally there
was the weather, which was not as severe as is often imagined, and
affected different parts of the front in different ways.551 They concluded
that, “[m]ud was a contributing factor to the breakdown of Operation
Typhoon, but it was far from the only, or even most important factor”.552
This leaves open the question of how important is a “contributing factor”
and how helpful is a conclusion that mud was “far from the only, or even
most important factor”? While historians often do attempt a hierarchy of
causes in explaining a particular outcome, Radey and Sharp concluded
that a list of four interacting factors is the best that can be achieved:
The weather played a part but each of these factors contributed to
the long pause in offensive operations. It is pointless to assign
responsibility to one factor and ignore the others, just as it also
seems pointless to try to quantify the relative responsibility of each
factor in causing the outcome.553
Radey and Sharp’s account in the end made the point that the weather
only mattered because Soviet resistance endured and strengthened in
that critical month. On a small-scale tactical level, the professional
Wehrmacht remained a quality and experienced fighting force. However,
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“at the operational and strategic levels, there was wildly unrealistic
optimism, based on unfounded assumption of enemy inferiority and wilful
disregard of the constraints of time, distance, and logistics”.554 Instead,
the Germans were confronted with “mass heroism”, which they suggested
was more than just Russian nationalism or the defence of Holy Russia.
Rather, what was at work here was a sense of loyalty to the Soviet state.
Radey and Sharp echoed Werth’s account when they wrote that:
Whatever its shortcomings, Soviet socialism was something that was
theirs, that was building up their country and giving it a chance at a
better life, and they were willing, if necessary, to die to stop those
who came to destroy it.555
Outside of the United States, a major contributor to the study of the Red
Army in 1941 is Evan Mawdsley.556 Mawdsley’s Thunder in the East was
first published in 2005 and was followed by a second edition in 2016. The
differences between the two editions of the same work are instructive. In
the preface to the second edition, Mawdsley stated that “[m]y overall
interpretation of the Nazi-Soviet war has not changed fundamentally over
the past decade, but I have certainly ‘refined’ my views on specific events
and aspects”.557 The newer work was supplemented with a wider variety
of source material, and was able to take advantages of developments in
the historiography of the past decade.
An example of the ‘refining’ is Mawdsley’s 2016 discussion of the Battle of
Smolensk. The 2005 version of Thunder in the East described the Battle
of Smolensk as an important and overlooked engagement, in which
desperate Soviet resistance played a large part in stalling German plans.
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The 2005 edition argued that Smolensk played a role in disrupting the
German plan to quickly knock the Soviet Union out of the war; however,
the battle was not as decisive in thwarting German plans as many Soviet,
and some Western historians, have previously argued.558 The 2016 edition
repeated the earlier claim that Soviet losses at Smolensk were severe,559
but cited more recent research by Glantz and Stahel to argue that
Smolensk had a far more serious impact on German strategy than was
previously assumed in the historiography. Smolensk in fact derailed
Operation Barbarossa.560
Mawdsley’s main theme was that the crucial factor in the failure of
Operation Barbarossa was the delusion of both Hitler and the German
generals that the war could be won at the frontiers. This flawed plan was
as much Halder’s fault as it was Hitler’s. Contrary to the German High
Command’s expectations, the Red Army did not collapse, and instead
conducted fierce, albeit costly, withdrawals, and the Soviet political
system was robust enough to produce and field new armies despite
enormous losses. The German successes in the first weeks of the
campaign were vast, but they were of a Pyrrhic nature: “although the
German Army won great victories in the first months of Operation
Barbarossa, it had done so at a heavy cost”.561
Mawdsley described Liddell Hart’s thesis that Hitler’s Kiev decision was a
fatal error as “influential, but wrong”. Hitler in fact had good reason to
divert forces away from Army Group Centre in August 1941. Firstly, there
was the lure of the vast production and resource potential of Ukraine. The
war against Britain and the Soviet Union was lasting longer than German
planners had expected, and Hitler’s decision was driven first and foremost
558
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by economic considerations. In this instance, Hitler was simply following
the long-held German nationalist idea that Ukraine was vital for securing
Germany’s food and resources. Secondly, the decision to divert parts of
Army Group Centre to assist Army Group North was consistent with the
Operation Barbarossa plan, which always envisaged seizing Leningrad
before Moscow. Finally, leaving aside the Soviet capital’s political value,
Moscow was no more important than Leningrad or Ukraine in terms of
resources and industry. For Mawdsley, however, “the ‘resource’ side of
Hitler’s argument made little sense in the short or medium term. If the
war was to be won in 1941, then Russian resources did not matter”.
Furthermore, the diversions to the north and south were necessary to
secure Bock’s flanks, to allow Army Group Centre time to recover from
the effects of weeks of fighting, to address growing logistical concerns,
and to deal with Soviet soldiers caught behind German lines.562
Mawdsley argued that the situation for Army Group Centre in August,
when it supposedly should have pressed for Moscow, was fundamentally
different from what it was when it actually did attack in late September.
The conditions favoured the September attack, not the August. First,
Army Group Centre received significant reinforcements between August
and late September. Second, the fighting at Kiev and in the north did
indeed protect Bock’s flanks. Third, the supply situation by late
September was much better than August, tanks had been refitted and
allowed to catch up. Fourth, the fighting at Kiev forced the Soviet
Command to send troops to the south, and weaken the defences in front
of Moscow: “We know that the decision Hitler took at the beginning of
September ended in German failure. That does not mean that another
decision, an earlier move on Moscow, would not also have failed”.563
For Mawdsley, all of Germany’s problems flowed from the “Barbarossa
562
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fallacy”, the notion that victory would come with the destruction of the
Red Army west of the Dvina and Dnepr rivers. Red Army resistance, while
poorly managed and excessively costly in human lives, had the effect of
stymieing the Germans to a degree that neither Hitler nor the Wehrmacht
expected. Meanwhile, Soviet forces used the weather to their advantage
in a way that the Germans could not. Mawdsley concluded that, “the
Russians were victorious at Moscow and elsewhere in December 1941
because the Wehrmacht was exhausted and because the Red Army had
much greater recuperative powers than Hitler and his generals expected”.
Other relevant factors were that Stalin was able to transfer fresh troops
from Siberia and that Hitler had to shore up Mussolini’s ailing campaign
against the British in the Mediterranean by transferring his air power. In
the end, Soviet resistance ruined Germany’s plan for a quick victory, and
the subsequent disruption of German plans led to the logistical nightmare
in the mud, and the freezing death of the winter: “The Germans did not
fail to get to Moscow because the weather broke; they were caught by the
freeze because they had failed to reach Moscow”.564
There are accounts of 1941 that appear to follow the old historiography,
but on closer inspection do not. Of all the accounts examined for this
thesis, Chris Bellamy’s account contained the most extensive discussion of
the weather.565 Bellamy described the winter of 1941-1942 as an
especially harsh one: “no one could predict the uncertain, fickle nature of
the weather. The winter of 1941-2 was the worst in central and eastern
Europe for many years”. Yet Bellamy’s account was not like those of the
Cold War era. Bellamy’s unusually detailed description of the winter has to
be viewed in the context of his argument that, by the time the snows
struck, the German war effort was already petering out as a result of
564
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exhaustion and over-stretch. The Germans got tantalisingly close to
Moscow, but could not reach their objective:
With just 41 kilometres to go to the Kremlin, the Germans’ energy
had run out. This was the ‘culminating point’. The logistical bungee
cord, stretching from around Warsaw, through Minsk, and then
Smolensk, was starting to pull them back.
As noted in the Introduction, Bellamy’s view that the Germans were
capable only of Pyrrhic victories was perhaps best summed up in the
name of his chapter, ‘Winning oneself to death’. In Bellamy’s telling of the
story, German successes were always hampered by consistent, persistent,
and strong Soviet resistance, which came either from regular attacks from
the east or by partisan activity. Hitler’s decision to halt Army Group
Centre at the end of July was a classic case of the Germans’ hand being
forced by fierce Soviet resistance more than any other factor. The
encirclement of Soviet troops at Viaz’ma was undoubtedly a catastrophe
for the Red Army, but desperate fighting by encircled troops did tie down
five German divisions until the end of October.
The Soviet disasters at Viaz’ma and Briansk made the Germans
overconfident, and Army Group Centre was ordered to spread like a giant
funnel to the north and south as it approached Moscow: “The combined
effects of funnel and mud had an inevitable synergy” and the German
attack faltered. Ultimately, the Germans fighting on the approaches to
Moscow faced terribly cold weather and “ever-hardening resistance and
constant counter attacks”. The cold played a major part, but the Germans
had already reached the end of their tether. In making an assessment of
how the Soviet state survived this ordeal, Bellamy noted that both the
people’s patriotism and the resources of an effective totalitarian state
were in play:
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The survival of the Soviet Union in 1941-42 and its resilience in the
face of the shattering defeats can be ascribed to the character and
patriotism of its people, especially the Russians, or to the draconian
measures imposed by Stalin, Beria and the Lieutenants. In fact, it
must be ascribed to both. During the war, the already authoritarian
system became more so. In spite of the catastrophic errors that led
to the events of 1941 and 1942, the system was able, using the
mixture of terror and propaganda, to mobilize the latent patriotism of
the nation.566
Alexander Hill too follows the formula of the new historiography
established by Glantz.567 In his account, Soviet resistance was described
as less nimble than its German opponent, but the Soviet state was certain
to win a long war because of its superior resources. The German
leadership erred because of its “complete and utter disregard for the
resolve

of the

Soviet regime”

and its underestimation of Soviet

mobilisation capacity based on “ideological prejudice rather than rational
analysis”. As for Halder’s plan for establishing a new defensive line along
the Urals, this “was in the light of evidence from the summer of 1941
sheer fantasy”.568
For Hill, it was not the Germans who almost won, but the Red Army that
could have stopped the Wehrmacht at the frontiers with different
deployment had they avoided the mistaken idea of having skeleton units
deployed at the front. What the Germans had not realised was not just
the “sheer size” of the Red Army but just as importantly was the “resolve
of many of its troops who fought hard despite the predicament in which
their leaders had put them”. As for why these soldiers fought hard, Hill
echoed Reese by noting that that commitment was “fostered by the barrel
of a gun, sometimes by patriotism, sometimes by the sort of factors that
566
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could motivate soldiers in any army like loyalty and commitment to
comrades in arms”.569 In short, the reasons for fighting were varied and
complex.
As noted earlier, Overy suggested that Hitler’s decision to prioritise Kiev
and Leningrad may well have harmed the Wehrmacht’s prospects of
victory.570 However, Overy’s theme overall was the hitherto unrecognised
contribution that the Soviet state and people made to its own survival.
According to Overy, the key to understanding 1941 was German hubris:
“Soviet forces were capable of a great deal more than their enemies and
allies supposed. They were the victims not of Bolshevik primitivism but of
surprise”. Soviet soldiers continued to resist. Overy was happy to concede
that the Kiev diversion “possibly saved the Soviet capital”, but Hitler’s
drive to the south was justified on military grounds. While, “[t]he savage
fighting held up but could not halt the German armies”, Overy rejected
the weather as the explanation because it affected both sides:
It is commonplace to attribute the German failure to take Moscow to
the sudden change in the weather. While it is certainly true that
German progress slowed, it had already been slowing because of the
fanatical resistance of Soviet forces and the problem of moving
supplies over the long distances through occupied territory. The mud
slowed the Soviet build-up also, and hampered the rapid deployment
of men and machines.
On the other hand, the German victories between June and October were
insufficient because Soviet resistance strengthened rather than weakened
the longer the war went on:
By late November the power of the German assault was visibly
wilting … The last offensive demanded too much of the tired German
soldiers, short of tanks and ammunition and poorly prepared for the
569
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fierce winter conditions. The number of dead and wounded increased
spectacularly with stiffening Soviet resistance.571
Geoffrey Roberts’ account of the Soviet-German War was entitled Stalin’s
Wars for a good reason: Stalin made errors of judgment, and his brutal
policies at times led to millions of deaths, “but without his leadership the
war against Nazi Germany would probably have been lost. Churchill,
Hitler, Mussolini and Roosevelt were all replaceable as warlords, Stalin
was not”.572 Like Glantz, Roberts stressed that “[t]he Red Army did not
defend passively; in line with its offensivist ethos it launched numerous
counter-attacks, often forcing German forces to retreat and regroup”.573
Roberts dismissed complaints about the Kiev diversion as “the selfserving arguments of German generals re-fighting the Second World War
in their fantasies”, and noted the utility of the decision given the potential
exposure of Army Group Centre’s flanks.574 Stalin was much better at
waging war than Hitler and was better able to maintain the support and
cohesion of his leading military personnel. According to Roberts:
In truth, the German-led forces lost to an army that was better as
well as bigger: an army with superior arms, strategy and leadership.
Stalin was a far better Supreme Commander than Hitler. The Soviet
dictator did not seek to dominate his generals. He did not always
take their advice but he learned from their military professionalism
and strove to create a coherent and effective high command.575
Roberts put an extremely positive spin on Stalin’s wartime leadership as
being at the heart of a “Red Victory”, something that most of the
571
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historians described above do not do. Nonetheless, all of these historians
agree that 1941 was a crucial and perhaps the crucial moment in the war,
that the Soviet capacity to resist went unappreciated by the Nazis and the
standard historiography, and that Hitler’s alleged errors and the weather
only mattered because of Soviet resistance.
According to Glantz, Reese was the first historian to put a “human face”
to the Red Army soldier. He was certainly not the last. For her 2006 study
on the experiences of ordinary Russian soldiers, Catherine Merridale
conducted more than two hundred interviews with veterans.576 Merridale
used interviews and first-hand accounts - diaries, letters home - to
describe how the common soldier fought, thought and trained, how they
lived, rested and what inspired them. Merridale noted that to generalise
about the Red Army is to generalise about a thirty million strong army
representative of a whole society: “[g]eneralizations about Ivan, in other
words, are either crude shorthand, or cruder racism”.577 While her
account of the Battle for Moscow was only a small part of her project,
Merridale noted the German tendency to blame the weather through
extensive quotation of Hoepner’s account, and added that the “Red Army
deserves more credit for stalling the Nazi advance than Hoepner gave it”.
After noting that Zhukov is often credited with the victory at Moscow, she
added that, “the capital was also defended by conscripts from the
hinterland, and even by intellectuals, old men, and students”. Similarly to
Reese and Hill, Merridale argued that the motivations of Stalin’s soldiers
were varied and complex: fear alone was not enough to force people to
fight for Stalin. On the other hand, it was too simplistic to argue that
Soviet soldiers fought for ‘patriotism’, because the meaning of the term
was vastly different for different people. There was a gap between what
576
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the Soviet authorities meant when they said ‘patriot’, and what those who
signed up were thinking. The soldiers themselves were more likely to
conceive of patriotism as “love for home village, family, language and
even – for some – an informal nostalgia for peasant religion”. For
Merridale, it was in the end the fact that “the Soviet state commanded
real support among large numbers of ordinary citizens” that mattered
more than repression or the “idealism of an elite of young activists”.578
Michael Jones and Rodric Braithwaite have both made extensive use of
oral history and primary evidence to write accounts of the Battle of
Moscow. Braithwaite, who used his contacts as a former British
ambassador to Russia to write an account of the Battle of Moscow,
focused on how ordinary Soviet citizens experienced the war.579 His
account too fits the mould established by Glantz. Apart from his use of
nine Russian, five British and four United States archives, Braithwaite’s
bibliography included seventy-seven interviews. Braithwaite argued that
Hitler’s decision to divert troops to Kiev only appears poor with hindsight.
Having not mentioned the weather in the first half of his account,
Braithwaite noted that the “rasputitsa spared the Russians no more than
it spared the Germans. Their vehicles and their wagons sank into the mud
just as quickly”. The Red Army was hamstrung in its efforts to move
wounded soldiers to the rear, and to supply food and ammunition to the
front. Braithwaite noted that 100,000 German soldiers had died by the
time that the advance halted short of Moscow in December 1941. Victory
rested upon the solidity of the Soviet regime: “the army’s subsequent
recovery, its willingness to fight in encirclement, to retreat without
breaking, to hold its ground and to counterattack were due in no small
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measure to Stalin’s ruthless willpower”. On the other hand, “Stalin himself
understood that the people were fighting for Russia, not the regime”.580
Jones’s The Retreat: Hitler’s First Defeat (2009) had as its focus the
Battle of Moscow and the German retreat from the Soviet capital in the
winter of 1941-42.581 Jones’s theme was that Western readers still did not
realise the significance of the Eastern Front and his account quoted from
diaries, letters home, memoirs and interviews to tell the story of the
Soviet War. Jones described his project as focusing on, “the experience of
soldiers, prisoners of war and civilians”,582 and an effort to “pay tribute to
the remarkable courage of these Russian fighters ... and tell the human
story of the Red Army”.583 Citing examples such as Brest-Litovsk as the
type of stubborn resistance the Red Army could offer in even hopeless
situations, Jones contended that resistance only got stronger as the war
went on. Jones described Kiev as an enormously successful battle, but
one that fatally exhausted the German troops. By mid-October, “everyone
assumed that the Red Army was finished”, and yet, the Soviet formations
continued to fight. While the weather figured prominently, Jones
contended that both sides were adversely affected, and, if the Germans
were more adversely affected, it was because their commanders
inexplicably refused to recognise the entirely predictable realities of
Russia’s climate. Meanwhile, the Soviet state continued to field new
armies.584
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Mark Edele summarised the polarised nature of the earlier debate by
providing two contrasting narratives of motivation in the Soviet state.585
In one account, Soviet citizens welcomed the Germans as liberators, and
mass

desertion,

performance.

In

surrender
the

other

and

panic

reckoning,

characterised
Soviet

solidarity

Red

Army

drove

the

narrative: Soviet citizens enlisted en masse, soldiers doggedly resisted
the German assault, soldiers desperately fought to escape encirclement,
and news of German atrocities only served to strengthen an already
stiffening resolve.586 As Edele put it, both accounts were “empirically
correct, and yet both [were] wrong in their universalism”.587 Similar to
Reese, Merridale and Hill, Edele noted that there is in fact no blanket
explanation to account for Soviet loyalty to Stalin and the motivations of
Red Army soldiers who served. For Edele:
People fought for Stalin, Socialism, or Russia, the homeland or their
native city, to defend women and children and to avenge the death
of loved ones or conationals; many simply did as they were told,
subjecting themselves to the authority of the state, while others saw
the defense against aggression as a just war; many hoped that the
war would usher in a more humane kind of socialism, devoid of
coercion, terror, and collective farms, while others hoped to redeem
their own or their family members’ past “sins.”588
The shift away from attributing Soviet motivation to either visceral fear or
blind love for Stalin showed the growing tendency to see the Red Army
less as an amorphous mass, fighting and dying at Stalin’s will. Instead of
passive sub-human hordes, Red Army soldiers who resemble the soldiers
of other armies have emerged. Edele’s list of possible motivations finds an
585
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echo in the summary of studies of German ‘morale’, provided by Stephen
Fritz:
A complex set of motives was at work: ideology, the successful
creation of a Nazified vision of the nation, a sense of duty, the
material successes and rewards proffered by the regime, fear of
Communism, a strong sense of camaraderie, and the growing
realisation that the enormity of Nazi war crimes left them no way
out.589
In other words, the post-archival accounts normalised Red Army soldiers
in a way that had not been true of Cold War accounts. Citing Soviet
archival materials, Western historians were much more likely to note that
‘complex motivations’ were at work in the minds of Red Army soldiers.
Stereotypes were less in evidence as readers were shown a Red Army
soldier who was both more complicated and more human. It became at
the very least possible to imagine how such an army might have achieved
a Red victory brought about mainly through its own efforts.
Moreover, the historians studied here were often struck by the fact that
the Soviet system had considerable capacity because, even when it
displayed strategic and tactical weaknesses, the populace mostly stayed
loyal. Bernd Bonwetsch summed up this rejection of the older view that
the Red Army was vulnerable because of widespread antipathy to the
Soviet state:
The people of the Soviet Union really did accomplish miracles under
material conditions much worse than before the war. Red Army
soldiers fought at least as stubbornly as soldiers of other countries…
the capture of huge masses of Soviet soldiers by the invaders was
evidently due to the speed of the German advance and inadequate
strategies and tactics on the Soviet side, not to anticommunist
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feelings among the troops, as historians like Joachim Hoffmann tend
to believe.590
These assertions about the surprising solidarity of the regime and
populace received more detailed evidence as historians mined the newly
available archives. It is the type of claim that risked scorn and the
accusation of gullibility to Soviet propaganda during the Cold War. Such
claims are now routine.
While the post-archival literature about the Soviet war built on the work
of Erickson and others, it is clearly different to the literature of the Cold
War. In the first place, American authors – most notably Glantz - have
taken the lead in rewriting the history of the war with Soviet resistance
factored in. Secondly, the older stereotypes of faceless Russian hordes
have given way to a more complex view of the Red Army soldier. Thirdly,
the new histories are sourced with an abundance of archival references
and oral history that just was not available to the Cold War generation of
historians. These accounts tend to agree that the Soviet state was mostly
united in the fight against the Nazi invaders, an important factor in
cancelling out the military advantages enjoyed by the Germans brought
about in part by the miscalculations of the Soviet political and military
elite.
As for why the likes of Glantz, Reese, Mawdsley, Bonwetsch, and Hill have
chosen to interpret their archival findings in this way, multiple factors are
likely to be at work. Correcting Cold War stereotypes and calling into
question the account of the German generals is likely to have been a
motivation for Glantz given that this is part of the justification he offers
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for his work.591 It is possible that the end of the Cold War removed the
stigma of disloyalty from writing a history recognising the Soviet
contribution to the Allied victory. It is also possible that the sheer weight
of evidence about Soviet agency in 1941 meant that inevitably these
accounts would challenge the idea that the Red Army was essentially
roadkill for the Germans until the weather set in. As Fitzpatrick has
pointed out, “revisionist” history around the Stalin era flourished from the
1970s. The generation of historians that emerged after the Vietnam War
and the social movements of the 1970s tended to be critical of earlier
histories that emerged during the Cold War.592 Historians such as Glantz
and Reese, like Erickson before them, are plainly motivated by the desire
to tell the story of the Red Army “from below” and not simply repeat older
clichés about the totalitarian system and its endless reserves of cannon
fodder.
The German side of the war
It could be suspected that historians specialising in the Soviet side of the
war might have an inbuilt bias that would cause them to emphasise
evidence of Soviet agency. What is striking about those telling the
German side of the story in the last twenty years is that overwhelmingly
they are the heirs of Reinhardt and van Creveld, and not of Seaton,
Liddell Hart and Ziemke. They emphasise the hubris of Hitler and the
German generals, the Pyrrhic nature of the victories of the summer of
1941, the sound military reasons for the “Kiev diversion”, and the
importance of Soviet resistance in combination with Russia’s weather and
geography in bringing the advance of the Wehrmacht to a halt before
Moscow. For the majority of these accounts, the war was lost for the
Germans in the summer long before the mud and snow. While an earlier
generation of experts on the German army overwhelmingly relied upon
591
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the testimony of the German generals and German archival material, the
post-archival historians of the German war invariably reference the works
of Glantz and others who have specialised in telling the Soviet side of the
war using Russian archival material.
Robert Citino has written fourteen books on the Nazi-Soviet War and
might well be regarded as Seaton and Ziemke’s replacement as the
leading North American expert on the German side of the conflict. There
is little doubt as to where Citino has placed himself on the “German
Defeat” versus “Red Victory” spectrum. Hitler’s former generals blamed all
errors made in the war on Hitler as a “convenient way for former General
Staff officers to shift the blame. He had the perfect credentials. He was
dead, first of all, and therefore incapable of defending himself; and
second, he was Hitler”. For Citino, the buck stopped with Hitler, but
standing alongside him when major decisions were made was the General
Staff, which “for all its glorious intellectual tradition, all the thought it had
poured into wars both historical and theoretical over the centuries, the
staff designed and launched some terrible operations in this war”.
The most terrible of the decisions was the invasion of the Soviet Union in
the expectation of a quick victory. Germany did not do enough to take
advantage of its (albeit brief) domination of most of Europe to help its
war effort. It is wrong to say that Germany’s only ally, Italy, was too
weak to be advantageous: “Germany began this war with the mighty ally
indeed: the Soviet Union”. When Operation Barbarossa began, the
Germans sliced through the Soviet armies like a hot knife through butter,
the grand attacks and encirclements “gave a new definition to ‘battle of
annihilation’”:
The only trouble was, it didn’t annihilate. Although the Red Army was
getting clobbered, it continued to defend tenaciously, and the
Wehrmacht even found the Kessels to be troublesome. Sealing off a
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pocket to two hundred thousand men was like trying to blockade a
small city, and in fact the Germans failed repeatedly.
Many Soviet troops escaped encirclement and returned to their lines, or
joined the partisans. The Germans underestimated Soviet equipment such
as the T-34, and German intelligence failed to recognise the size and
potential mobilisation of the Soviet population. They also had poor
knowledge of the nature of Soviet roads and terrain. Meanwhile, “[t]he
Red Army never stopped counterattacking”.
The German generals would claim that the Kiev encirclement was one of
the turning points of the campaign, but, according to Citino, “this
reasoning is specious all the way down the line. The road to Moscow was
certainly not wide open. The battles in front of Smolensk had proved
that”. Despite post-war complaints about Hitler, there was quite a lot of
support in the General Staff and command echelons for the attack on
Kiev. Furthermore, Citino questioned whether a battle that took 665,000
prisoners of war really can be considered a disaster: “Certainly, from the
perspective of the battle of annihilation, the only perspective most
German officers had, Kiev was a masterstroke”.
For Citino, the Germans made crucial mistake when deciding to resume
the advance on Moscow. Typhoon was an operational mess for which all
of the German commanders must accept some blame. Army Group Centre
did not concentrate its forces enough. Guderian was pushing for Tula, but
at the same time much of his 2nd Panzer Army was tied up maintaining
the Briansk pocket. At the same time, OKH was ordering to push east to
Kursk, “Guderian was a flexible panzer leader, but even he had a difficult
time going in three directions at once”. In the north, forces of Army
Group Centre were diverted northward to support the south of Army
Group North: “This was no longer concentric advance, but ‘excentric’ –
with main bodies flying away from one another. It was the sort of thing
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one did when the enemy was defeated and one was occupying as much
territory as possible”. The Germans pushed on, Soviet resistance
stiffened, and by the time of the Soviet counter-attack, the German
offensive had “sputtered out”. The theme of Citino’s account is that the
German errors only mattered in the context of the Soviet resistance that
the German generals, and not just Hitler, had totally underestimated.593
David Stahel aimed to demolish what he considered to be two myths: the
first was that the German advance of 1941 was in some sense a German
success story because both Operations Barbarossa and Typhoon degraded
the Soviet capacity to resist. What has to be remembered, however, is
that “for good reason both operations were tasked with achieving victory
in the east” and they failed.594 The second myth was that Moscow was a
“near-run thing”. According to Stahel, Germany had lost the war by the
middle of August 1941 when Operation Barbarossa had failed in its key
objective of decisively destroying the Red Army before the weather
became a factor.595
For Stahel, Hitler was no fanatical or ideological madman when it came to
strategy on the Eastern Front; the Führer simply shared the strategic
delusions of the German military establishment.596 The German generals
failed to realise or wilfully chose to ignore the fact that as they appeared
to be winning the war, they were in fact losing.597 Stahel argued that Kiev
was an enormous victory for the Germans, but a Pyrrhic one, where the
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vagaries of over-extension and concerted Soviet resistance greatly
reduced German success later in the campaign.598 Stahel noted that
German commanders tended to refer to Kiev as a modern Cannae and
Tannenberg, but added:
Without disputing the decisiveness of such battles, the German
generals nevertheless missed the fundamental point that in 1914 and
1941 even their greatest battles did not necessarily determine the
outcome of their campaigns or wars. At Tannenberg, Cannae and
Kiev, the victor ultimately lost.599
While seventeen panzer divisions invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941,
only the equivalent of six panzer divisions remained by November. The
state of the infantry was somewhat better; of 101 infantry divisions that
invaded in June, the equivalent of sixty-five were still fighting in
November. By November, the 3.4 million strong invasion force had
suffered 686,000 casualties in four and a half months. Red Army
casualties were far higher, but Stalin’s resources were much more
plentiful. In June, the German Army and its allies outnumbered the Red
Army in the western districts of the Soviet Union, 1.4:1. In December, the
Red Army at Moscow outnumbered the Ostheer 1.2:1.600 The Germans’
only strategy of a war of movement had failed and there was no realistic
possibility of making good the losses.601
Stahel made the point that the inclusion of the role of the Red Army into
the Western narrative is not an acquiescence to the Soviet view that the
heroic Red Army and population alone stopped Hitler’s forces, “but rather
recognition of the fact that events on the ground were impacting upon the
strategic circumstances of the war to a much higher extent than the
decisions of the German high command”.602 Moscow was saved by a
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deeply flawed German strategy and the unexpected resilience of the Red
Army: the two are not mutually exclusive. Neither Hitler, nor his generals,
paid sufficient attention to the build-up of Soviet strength:
Indeed, the Red Army would prove to be the single greatest obstacle
in reaching Moscow and, even if it was not apparent to the principal
German commanders, a Rubicon had been crossed and the success
of Operation Typhoon was at exceptionally long odds.603
Stahel argued that Germany’s failure to quickly destroy the Red Army
near the border meant that Germany lost the war in a matter of weeks:
“By late August 1941, Operation Barbarossa was a spent exercise,
incapable of achieving its central objective of ending Soviet resistance”.604
Furthermore, it was hardly surprising that the Red Army actively used the
Russian climate to its advantage. Discussion of the role of the rasputitsa
must be placed in the wider context of failed Nazi strategy: “The autumn
rains did not create the supply crisis behind the eastern front; they only
intensified a preordained problem, which the German command had failed
to foresee”.605
Similarly to Stahel, Craig Luther considered the turning point to be August
1941, when appearances suggested that the Germans were enjoying
enormous victories.606 As Luther has put it, the “cruel calculus of
production, industrial capacity, and material and manpower reserves” that
were plainly not in Germany’s favour leads to an intriguing question:
Is
it
possible
to
pinpoint
the
precise
moment
when
Operation Barbarossa was defeated – when the opportunity, however
slim, to crush Soviet Russia was, in all likelihood, gone forever? In
this author’s view, the question can be answered in the affirmative:
The critical turning point came in August 1941, with the disruption of
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Army Group Centre’s advance on Moscow during the three-week
battle of Smolensk.
Even as the Germans surged forward, the depletion of German units
amounted to more than three hundred thousand men; Bock’s fatal
casualties amounted to 50,000 soldiers in August and the average time a
German infantryman fought on the Eastern Front was two months before
being wounded or killed. Unlike the Red Army, the German Army lacked
the capacity to replenish losses of this magnitude. In other words,
Germany lost the war before the Kiev diversion, Operation Typhoon and
the rasputitsa. By 30 September, German forces had suffered 185,198
casualties, and the situation continued to deteriorate; there were 51,033
fatalities in September compared to 46,066 in August.
It was at Smolensk that “the seemingly unstoppable momentum of the
German blitzkrieg was first broken by the Red Army’s increasingly
effective resistance”; thereafter, the prospects of a German victory
receded each day as the Soviet state and Red Army rebalanced and
became stronger, not weaker as Hitler and his generals had assumed.
Like Stahel, Luther was of the view that the Germans could never have
won a long war of attrition, no matter their virtues of tactics,
professionalism and courage. At the start of Operation Barbarossa, the
Germans had more than 1,800 tanks and 2,300 combat-ready planes. By
September 1941, they had only 510 operational tanks and 960 combatready planes. The Soviet Union’s evacuation of some fifteen hundred
factories and rolling stock, and the destruction of the transportation
network slowed the German advance. The Germans soon suffered
significant shortages of ammunition, petroleum and oil.
The crucial point for Luther was that the Red Army offered unexpected
resistance:
Unlike France in 1940, the Soviet state, its people and its armed
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forces, simply refused to acknowledge defeat, no matter how many
blows they endured – a remarkable fact which not only underscored
the collective will of the Soviet people, but the enormous strategic
depth of a country which could absorb such catastrophic blows and
survive.
Luther’s theme was that the Soviet Union was a considerably more
formidable opponent than Hitler and his generals ever imagined: “If
Stalin’s pre-war policies helped to bring his country to the brink of
extinction in the summer of 1941, they also built the foundation that
enabled the Soviet Union to emerge victoriously in 1945 and survive
another 46 years”. Furthermore, Stalin has to be compared favourably to
Hitler:
if Stalin’s military decision-making sometimes proved calamitous in
the summer of 1941 – for example, his tardy decision to withdraw his
forces from Belorussia in late June, and his failure to abandon Kiev
and much of the Ukraine in August – it at least avoided the paralysis
and byzantine politics which characterized the German command
apparatus in July/August 1941, due to Hitler’s inability to control his
own refractory and disloyal general staff.607
Gregory Liedtke is a dissenting voice.608 However, this is not because he
thinks that Germany would have won the war were it not for Hitler’s
mistakes and the weather. Instead, in Enduring the Whirlwind (2016), he
targeted

Halder’s

claim

that

the

German

Army

was

constantly

outnumbered and fought heroically against the odds. For Liedtke, the
spurious assertion that the Wehrmacht lacked the necessary men and
equipment in 1941 was advanced by former German commanders seeking
to rescue the reputation of the German military, as well as themselves. As
Liedtke has noted:
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This argument of a German Army possessing generally superior
leadership and near-flawless operational and tactical skill but starved
of sufficient men and equipment that doomed it to defeat became
one of the main pillars upon which Western perceptions of the RussoGerman War were constructed.
Liedtke used an analysis of German field diaries and other sources to
argue that the Wehrmacht was not severely outnumbered by the Red
Army, and in fact at many stages during the advance to Moscow enjoyed
a

numerical

advantage.

Losses

sustained

during

the

enormously

successful advances of Operation Barbarossa were able to be replaced
from German Feldersatz (Field Replacement) battalions already in the
east and from formations elsewhere. To take one example, Army Group
Centre lost 198,000 men between 22 June and 30 September. In this
same period, 125,000 reinforcements came from Germany, which, when
combined with men available in Feldersatz battalions, amounted to some
161,340 available reinforcements. According to Liedtke, this meant that
on the eve of Operation Typhoon, Army Group Centre was short 37,058
men - an average of seventy-two men per battalion - theoretically
keeping each battalion at 92-93 per cent of its authorised combat
strength. Liedtke made a similar argument for the German ability to
replace war machinery lost throughout the campaign. Germany built up
vast supplies in war matériel during rearmament before the war, and
military production only increased after the war began in 1939.609
Logistical problems and Soviet partisan activity played a role in
hampering German efforts, but “given the availability of spare parts and
time, operational readiness could be restored in relatively short order”.610
For Liedtke, it was not Germany’s shortage of men and matériel but
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instead a litany of causes. The order of his list is typical of the new
historiography:
Operation Barbarossa would fail for a number of reasons – the
resistance of the Red Army, poor German planning, logistical failures,
the climate and terrain – but faltering unit strengths and personnel
and equipment shortages only became a significant issue after the
operation had already been lost.611
Stephen G. Fritz’s Ostkrieg (2011) focussed on the

Wehrmacht’s

complicity in Hitler’s war of annihilation in the east.612 The first third of
the 612-page book focussed on the military events of 1941. The theme of
this work was how the military and exterminationist aspects of the
German invasion overlapped. Fritz offered a variation on the theme
described above. He was of the view that 1941 was lost for the Germans
at Smolensk but that the Germans received a second chance in 1942
when they finally did indeed lose the war. For Fritz, stubborn Soviet
resistance was the key to the German failure to capture Moscow in 1941;
the resistance halted blitzkrieg, and was therefore was a crucial factor in
the failure of the Operation Barbarossa plan to win a quick and decisive
victory in the east.
Fritz used the image often found in the post-archival historiography: “The
Germans did, indeed, kick in the front door, but contrary to Hitler’s
expectations, the structure wobbled but did not collapse”. For Fritz, the
Germans were losing the war at the very moment that it appeared that
they were winning; German losses in the successful battles of July 1941
far exceeded those of December and were the worst suffered by the
German Army until Stalingrad. During the Battle of Smolensk, the
German command came to realise that, rather than collapsing, Red Army
611
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resistance was in fact stiffening, causing panic in the German command in
the second half of July. While discord between Hitler and the generals did
not help the German cause, “if they were to achieve a decisive victory,
the Soviet forces had to be annihilated, a task, given previous experience,
every Landser knew meant bitter fighting and heavy casualties”. When in
July the Soviet-German War became a war of attrition, victory was no
longer obtainable in the timeframe that the Germans had set themselves.
As for Hitler’s decision to delay the attack on Moscow, Fritz was of the
view that this made perfect military sense in the context of stiff Soviet
resistance on the flanks of the advancing Germans. The problem was that
“far from pursuing a defeated foe, as advocates of the thrust to Moscow
imply, German commanders readily acknowledged that Soviet resistance
was stiffening rather than slackening”.613
The opening of the archives did not bring about a change of perspective
on the part of the German historians associated with the earlier West
German

official

history

project.

Rolf-Dieter

Müller

and

Gerd

R.

Ueberschär’s Hitler’s War in the East: A Critical Assessment, which
became available to English-language readers in 2002, is a good example.
Ueberschär wrote the chapter on the military campaign and argued that
the most important factor in the failure of Operation Barbarossa was
German hubris. Nazi planners completely underestimated the military
potential of the Soviet Union and the Red Army, and thus failed to
adequately prepare for the war. Despite the heavy losses in the early
phase of the war, the Red Army fought doggedly and with great skill and
prevented the Germans from seizing a quick victory:
The assumption that the Soviet Union would rapidly crumble or
disintegrate from within proved to be grossly in error. In fact, it was
the German forces that were gradually worn down by the conquest of
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such vast expanses, and their ability to launch powerful new
offensives steadily eroded.
Ueberschär rejected the argument that the weather was the biggest
factor, and instead stated that the winter of 1941-1942 was, “neither
especially hard or unusual”, and that, “snow fell on the Red Army as
well”. Ultimately, the failure of 1941 did not rest with Hitler alone, but all
of the High Command.
For Ueberschär, the emphasis on the weather was a view first established
by the German High Command when seeking to explain the loss, and
became prominent in later histories of the conflict. Similarly, Ueberschär
argued that emphasis on indecision in German strategy and the so-called
Hitler-Halder crisis simplified the reasons for the German defeat. To argue
that a lack of firm, established targets in German plans from early on in
planning Operation Barbarossa led to ‘detours’ such as Kiev later on failed
to take into account that German operational plans were always
“predicated on unrealistic expectations”, and that disagreements, such as
those between Hitler and Halder were not so crucial. There were many
reasons for the failure of Operation Barbarossa, but the most important
was the underestimation of the military potential of the Soviet Union and
the Red Army. This underestimation led to an arrogant belief in swift
victory and a consequent lack of adequate planning.614
In a similar vein, Christopher Hartmann noted that Operation Barbarossa
flowed from Hitler’s fanatical ambition and ideology.615 Hartmann argued
that German planners had forgotten the military maxim that victory is
only assured with a three-to-one advantage. Despite the enormous
German successes early in the campaign, the Soviet Union had enormous
614
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reserves of manpower at its disposal, and as the war progressed, the
increasingly exhausted Germans faced an increasingly well-equipped and
experienced Red Army. According to Hartmann, the German concentration
of vehicles into motorised divisions created enormously powerful and
decisive forces in the early phases of the war, but the relatively slow
infantry coming up the rear was unable to keep up, leading to exhaustion
of motorised and foot soldiers alike as early as the autumn of 1941. The
toll on German men and equipment was too great as the Germans pushed
further and further east: “it was the largest military force Germany had
ever assembled. But it would not be large enough”.
For Hartmann, the attack on Kiev was a militarily sound decision and the
battle had been a success, but had not proved decisive. The attack on
Moscow was carried out too late in the year by an increasingly exhausted
army: “It is almost as though the German military, in near desperation,
were clutching at this one tangible goal merely so as to make sense of an
increasingly unmanageable campaign”. For Hartmann, seizing Moscow
would have been an enormous blow to the Soviet Union, but a successful
outcome for Germany would not perhaps have proved as decisive as
German commanders were later to insist. The Germans did get their
decisive battle, “albeit moving in the other direction”.616
For Geoffrey P. Megargee the German Army was indeed a superior
fighting force: “Materially, tactically, and operationally, the Wehrmacht
simply outclassed its opponents”.617 The problem was that Germany
simply could not match the vast manpower, economic and industrial
capability of Stalin’s regime. Whatever its merits as a fighting force, the
German Army was not equal to the task. In Megargee’s telling, this was
616
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as much the fault of the German planners and commanders as Hitler. The
decision to invade the Soviet Union was a gamble, a gamble that may
only seem unreasonable with hindsight, but a gamble nonetheless. The
German generals had “no fallback position, no alternative plan should the
Soviets continue to fight”. The hubris of Hitler and his generals was
decisive here: “the Germans set themselves an overly ambitious goal and
then, through poor planning and ruthlessness, made its achievements
even less likely”.
For Megargee, the debates over Kiev missed the point. By the end of
August, the Germans were experiencing logistical problems that were
already affecting their ability to fight. Army Group Centre could muster
enough men and supplies to support Guderian’s drive to the south, but
not enough for Bock to reach Moscow. Bock found it difficult enough to
hold his line, let alone press forward, and if Kiev had not been taken the
exposure of Bock’s southern flank would have proved disastrous. The
Germans simply did not have the resources to do everything they needed
to do if they were to win the war.618
Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson co-authored an in-depth account of
Operation Typhoon in 2012.619 In their work, they criticised the tendency
of Western historians to heap the causes for the failure of Operation
Typhoon into an oversimplified basket such as the weather and Hitler’s
blunders. Unlike Liedtke, Zetterling and Frankston strongly argued that it
was the Germans who were outnumbered at the start of Operation
Typhoon. As their account put it, the Germans had foolishly taken on the
world and did not have the resources to achieve their goals. Germany’s
industrial and economic capacity was never enough to defeat the Soviet
618
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Union in a long war. Hitler was both short of resources and excessively
optimistic about a quick victory in the east. Soon after German troops
crossed the Soviet border, the misguided expectation of a quick and
decisive victory caused Hitler to order German military production be
shifted away from army weapons and equipment to production for the
navy and air force. The belief was that the land war in the Soviet Union
would soon finish and that air and sea power would be needed for the
inevitable war with the United States. When the Soviet Union was not
quickly defeated as planned, the Germans found themselves stuck in a
protracted land war with the wrong war production regime, a problem
that could not quickly or easily be rectified. As Zetterling and Frankson
put it, “[t]he Germans had, effectively, already mortgaged the expected
victory over the Soviet Union”.
Zetterling and Frankson pointed out that it would be wrong to say that
the weather did not matter. Given that the Germans easily broke the
Soviet lines at the beginning of October and that the training and combat
experience of the troops, and the state of communication lines, were
significantly poorer in mid-October, it was “unlikely that the Red Army
would have coped better along the Mozhaisk Line without some new
advantages”, and that, “[i]t is hard to accept any conclusion other than
that the weather seriously impeded German efforts during the second half
of October”. On the other hand, the war was supposed to have been won
long before the weather was a factor. Time was not on the German side
and it was the timing they had got wrong:
Weather was thus crucial and contributed significantly to the halting
of the German offensive in mid-October, but that was hardly a
surprise. When the Germans began Operation Taifun, they knew they
were in a race against the clock, but they did not know when their
time would run out.
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They reminded the reader that the Red Army similarly faced the
seemingly intractable problems that came with waging a war on this
scale: “Had no Soviet forces been in position between the Germans and
Moscow, the Soviet capital would have fallen, despite adverse weather”.
For Zetterling and Frankson, the Germans might have been better off to
mop up at Viaz’ma and Briansk and then build new defensive lines to
consolidate their gains for 1941, extending the war into 1942. This was,
however, an unattractive option for Hitler and his generals given the
looming threat of American entry into the war.620
Christer Bergström belongs in a different category to Stahel, Luther,
Citino, and Liedtke, but not because he endorsed the view of the German
generals.621 According to Bergström, the West “allowed itself to be duped
by the ideologically distorted accounts by former servicemen of Nazi
Germany”. Worse, according to Bergström:
distorted accounts of the war on the Eastern Front dominate in
literature. Even though the facts are readily available in archives and,
in some cases, in publications, the image in most Western accounts
of the war between Germany and its allies and the Soviet Union
remains in general colored by old accounts by Germans and former
allies of Nazi Germany”.
For Bergström, the crucial German error was the assumption that the
Soviet Union would collapse soon after the invasion, and that Hitler’s plan
to invade and colonise the Soviet Union was “doomed from the start”:
Operation Barbarossa, based on the huge misjudgements of racial
prejudices, was Hitler’s greatest military mistake, and led directly to
Germany’s defeat in the war.
620
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The Germans took Hitler’s quote about ‘kicking in the door’ too literally,
and the unexpected refusal of the Soviet Union to bow down despite
heavy losses threw German plans into disarray. What saved the Soviet
state was its “impressive capacity of generating new forces in those few
days [in July]”. Bergström dismissed the claim of the German generals
that the dispute between Hitler, Alfred Jodl, Bock and Halder fatally
undermined the campaign. In fact, Hitler ordered major advances of Army
Group Centre on Moscow on 8 July, 19 July and 22 July. In each case it
was the Red Army that thwarted the German advance.
Hitler’s hubris in believing that the road to Moscow lay open led him to
order Army Group Centre to advance on Moscow only with infantry armies
and to divert the motorised units to Kiev and Leningrad. On the other
hand, Bergström defended the Kiev decision because after taking Kiev
and the surrounding areas, Hitler not only seized some of the Soviet
Union’s most important industrial, agricultural and mining areas but
dramatically reduced Stalin’s ability to generate new forces, the principal
threat to German operations. It was because of “tenacious Soviet
resistance” that Bock was “reduced from the main force of Operation
Barbarossa to a mere supplement to the two other army groups”. For
Bergström, it was “German accounts colored by racist prejudices" that led
to the myth of massive Red Army casualties and mass surrenders.
Nothing of the sort occurred despite the advantages that the German
Army had in terms of supply and skilful execution of its plans. The
Germans inflicted a higher ratio of losses on their Western foes; the ratio
was 19:1 in favour of the Germans in the Western campaign, and
between 3.2: 1 and 4.8:1 during Operation Barbarossa.
For Bergström, Kiev was the great success of the German campaign, an
achievement for which both Hitler and the flawless execution of the
German armies in the field deserved credit. At the start of Typhoon, the
Red Army had 1,250,000 men against Army Group Centre’s 1,183,000.
177

While the Germans were concentrated and primed for the attack, the Red
Army was widely spread across their front and rear areas and desperately
trying to rebalance after the disaster at Kiev. The weather did indeed
matter at this point. Bergström described the mud as being both
dishonestly underplayed in Soviet literature, and misleadingly overstated
by the former German generals. The German forces at the end of October
were held up by severe shortages of fuel and ammunition caused by the
mud, and had Army Group Centre been able to attack with all its might,
"the Soviet persistence would not have sufficed". On the other hand,
Bergström rejected what he described as the myth that the weather
decided the outcome when in fact, the revitalised Red Army in the second
half of October played just as much of a role. Ultimately, Bergström
concluded that the fact that the Soviet Union managed to survive rested
on three main pillars: “The generation of new forces, the relocation of the
industry to the east, and the incredible resilience of the Red Army’s
troops”.622
Robert Kirchubel penned a 2013 study of Operation Barbarossa that was
aimed at a popular audience, and is complete with maps, case studies,
dramatic paintings and timelines.623 Kirchubel belongs in the ambivalent
category because he is somewhat sympathetic to the view of the German
generals. He described the Kiev diversion as a “self-inflicted paralysis”
that was “arguably the most critical nonoperational factor in Barbarossa’s
failure”. On the other hand, Kirchubel noted that the success at Kiev
secured Bock’s southern flank, and that “[i]t is hard to imagine Typhoon
or any other autumn maneuver being nearly as successful with the
622
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Southwestern Front intact in the Ukraine”. There was no open road to
Moscow because, as Smolensk showed, Red Army resistance was
continuing

and,

if

anything,

stiffening.

An

over-extended

German

spearhead isolated on the road to Moscow may well have suffered a
catastrophic defeat and it was for this reason that the Germans had to
pause and plan their next move. In the end, Operation Barbarossa was
doomed by the “four horsemen” of Nazi strategic overstretch: troop
exhaustion, personnel and matériel attrition, anaemic logistics, and the
continuing inability to settle on attainable objectives. Given the fact that
this was “a relatively small country … invading the world’s largest nation”,
the Germans would have had to “perform flawlessly if they were to win in
Russia”. They did not.
Kirchubel noted that “[e]xhaustion, poor logistics, and the rasputitsa
would put the final bullets into the German leaders’ plans to rush into an
undefended Moscow”. Of course, Moscow was far from defenceless. As the
Germans sought to capitalise on the victories at Viaz’ma and Briansk,
“[t]heir own weaknesses, the weather and Soviet resistance made this
impossible”. Elsewhere, Kirchubel attributed the German failure of 1941
to unrelenting Soviet resistance: “The constant Soviet counterattacks, the
death-by-a-thousand-cuts technique, eventually saved the USSR”.624
Another historian who belongs in the ambivalent category is Robert
Forczyk.625 Forczyk’s account was critical of the German generals’
perspective, but at the same time urged caution against ascribing the
outcome of 1941 to the superior performance of the Red Army. This really
was a case of failed German planning and a failure to foresee that the war
would not be won at the frontiers. For Forczyk, German operational
mistakes were the root cause of both Operations Barbarossa and
624
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Typhoon. Despite Soviet claims that it was their military prowess that
saved Moscow, “the performance of the Red Army against Typhoon was
generally weak”. On the other hand, Forczyk did not entirely accept the
case made by the German generals. Hitler’s decision to divert troops to
Kiev was, regardless of historical hindsight, a “militarily sound” one given
the need to protect Bock’s flanks. Bock, according to Forczyk, was
mistaken in his haste to press for Moscow and overly keen for German
and personal glory.
Forczyk noted that given that Operation Typhoon covered an area some
five hundred kilometres long from north to south, it is difficult to discuss
the weather as consistently affecting the entire German operation at any
one period of time. Most of the rain fell in the south, affecting Guderian’s
movements; further north in the area covered by the Ninth Army, rain
barely affected manoeuvres at all. For Forczyk, “[t]he greatest impact of
the mud upon German operations was to add further strain to the
impoverished Wehrmacht logistical system”. With regard to the cold,
Forczyk noted that although German frontline troops may have been
miserable throughout November as the temperature began to drop, it was
not until the end of November and early December that the effects of
illness and frostbite seriously began to affect the German troops, by which
point Typhoon had already failed.626
In briefly describing and quoting from these authors, it is impossible to do
justice to the breadth of scholarship and the complexity of their
arguments. What is clear is that these accounts reject the older view that
Hitler’s mistakes and the weather alone were sufficient to explain the
outcome of the Battle of Moscow. They tend to follow Reinhardt, rather
than Halder, in arguing that Hitler was losing the war even when he
appeared

to

be

winning

because

the

invaders

spectacularly
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underestimated the resources that would be needed to defeat the Soviet
Union. As for why the resources were not sufficient, all the accounts refer
to Soviet resistance, German decision-making, geography and the
weather. Soviet resistance is explcitly prioritised in the accounts of Citino,
Stahel, Luther, Fritz, Liedtke, Bergström, and Ueberschär. Usually, the
historians telling the German side of the war – like their counterparts
telling the Soviet side of the war - urge caution when it comes to Soviet
claims that the Red Army outfought the Wehrmacht. The accounts of
Zetterling and Frankson, Forczyk, and Kirchubel emphasise the military
feats of an outnumbered German army. Nonetheless, the point that all of
these accounts make is that it was Soviet resistance and not Hitler’s
amateurish decisions that imposed the crucial strain on German logistics.
Hitler’s errors of underestimating the enemy and poor planning were also
the errors of his generals. The plans of the German High Command were
brought undone by a total underestimation of the task that confronted
them and the capacity of the Soviet state and Red Army to offer
resistance. If the Soviet state had collapsed as the Germans expected,
their failure to plan a long war would have gone unnoticed. For many of
these writers, the war was lost in summer because the Germans only had
the one plan, which was to win a quick war of annihilation. Smolensk,
Kiev, Briansk and Kalinin were victories that the Germans could not
afford.
Counter-narratives
Another way of demonstrating the change in the historiography is to
quantify the accounts that explicitly endorse the older paradigm. There
are certainly general Western accounts that dismiss any suggestion that
1941 was a Red victory. This case was put most forcefully by Norman
Davies in his 2006 No Simple Victory, a discussion of the entire Second
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World War in Europe.627 Davies did note that attributing the Soviet victory
solely to the weather simplified the matter and that the failings of German
logistics also need to be taken into account.628 He also stressed that if
justice were truly done all histories of the war would have at three
quarters of their content devoted to the Eastern Front.629 However, he
also stressed how important it was that heavy rain, snow and a falling
thermometer delayed Operation Typhoon.630 This was indeed fortunate for
Moscow, which was protected only by newly formed armies of “pressganged, over-age veterans, a trawl of Moscow’s jails, and conscripted
zeks” leavened by freshly arrived Siberian troops taking advantage of the
-40ºC temperatures to counterattack on 5 December.631 This was a view
closer to Seaton than Stahel.
On the other hand, this study found only four English-language military
histories that focus upon the Battle of Moscow, have appeared since
1991, and argue the case made by the German generals. The most noted
in the literature is Russell H. S. Stolfi’s Hitler’s Panzers East, described by
Citino as “the definitive statement on how Germany could have won the
war in the east”.632 According to Stolfi when Hitler chose to delay the
advance on Moscow he made “the most important decision of his life and the most important judgement for the political shape of the twentieth
century world”.633 Stolfi argued that Germany lost the war in August
1941, when:
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Hitler’s dilatory orders strayed from the army strategic concept to
smash immediately the Soviet armies defending Moscow and move
into the Moscow-Gorki space. He missed the golden opportunity to
defeat the Soviets quickly and shifted the entire war into one of
attrition, logistics, and production.634
In this telling, responsibility for the outcome of the war rests squarely on
Hitler’s shoulders, there was little his long-suffering generals, or the Red
Army, could have done about it. It is perhaps a measure of how
paradigms discriminate against outliers that Stolfi has come under furious
attack from those with a perspective less sympathetic to the German
generals and the Wehrmacht. Kirchubel denounced Stolfi’s work as
“completely discredited” and of “doubtful analytical value”.635 For Stahel,
Stolfi’s work contained “glaring factual errors” and his thesis as “laden
with

contentious

assertions

and

beset

by

dubious

methodology,

underlining the difficulty of supporting a largely untenable case”.636
R. D. Hooker also made a spirited case for how fortunate the Red Army
was at Moscow:
By mid-month in August 1941, Russian forces defending along the
Smolensk-Moscow highway stood swaying, like a punch-drunk
fighter waiting for the knockout blow…Supreme in the air,
dominant on the ground, with all the advantages of the initiative
and unchecked success, the final operational bound from Smolensk
to Moscow against a shaken and demoralized Red Army was surely
within their grasp, as the German generals themselves argued so
vehemently.637
Yet Hooker himself lamented that his was already a maverick view by the
late 1990s; the standard view had become that Operation Barbarossa was
“mission impossible” from the very outset.638 Hooker blamed van Creveld
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for the tendency to dismiss Hitler’s errors as pivotal in the outcome of
1941, and instead argued that a German victory always depended upon
boldness and speed. Once Hitler overruled the generals, the Wehrmacht’s
best chance of taking Moscow and dealing a fatal blow to Stalin was
lost.639
Arguably, the most substantial account endorsing the older view came
from Frank Ellis, who published a ‘reframing’ of Operation Barbarossa in
2015.640 Ellis acknowledged unexpectedly stubborn Red Army resistance
and self-sacrifice as well as the ability of the Soviet Union to recover from
the initial devastating blows.641 However, for Ellis, the Kiev diversion was
a huge mistake. Guderian was right when he argued that the Germans
needed to press straight for Moscow; the disruption to railroads and
political impact would have been fatal to Soviet war efforts.642 To be fair,
Ellis noted eight relevant factors for the German defeat; Red Army
resistance was factored in at number six. First, Ellis prioritised “time,
space, and terrain” as contributing to German exhaustion. Second, third
and fourth came the treatment of occupied non-Russian peoples of the
Soviet Union: the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, the treatment of
commissars, and the treatment of Jews. Their maltreatment led to fierce
resentment and a rallying to the Soviet cause. Fifth on the list came
German intentions to exploit Soviet agriculture and maintain the
kolkhozy, which also rallied support for Stalin. The sixth cause was the
mistaken assumption that the Soviet Union would collapse soon after the
invasion. Seventh was Hitler’s failure to make a radio address to the
Soviet people, which would have persuaded the Soviet people that the
639
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Wehrmacht brought liberation. Finally for Ellis came the failure to heed
the advice of commanders such as Guderian and press for Moscow above
all other objectives.643 In this telling, 1941 was a case of poor German
decisions and different decisions would have led to a different outcome at
the Battle of Moscow.
Of the post-archival accounts telling the story of the Soviet side of the
Battle of Moscow, the only account sympathetic to the German generals
this study could find was Nagorski’s The Greatest Battle (2007).644
According to Nagorski, it was Hitler’s indecision that caused the effects of
the weather to be so keenly felt by the Wehrmacht late in 1941. Hitler
was a stubborn amateur in the face of advice from his professional
Wehrmacht generals. Aside from his failure to prepare his troops for a
winter war, Hitler’s other colossal blunder was to refuse to listen to
Guderian and his other generals “who wanted to keep driving due east
from Smolensk in August, making Moscow their immediate goal”. The
generals in the field were left dumbfounded by three weeks of
prevarication and delay. This was not a story of Soviet agency; Stalin
credited himself for his victory at Moscow despite the fact that “Hitler had
bailed him out by making enormous mistakes”. As for Soviet resistance,
Nagorski considered that this was the discipline of the revolver: “most of
those who went to war in 1941 recognized – or soon came to recognize –
that it was not only the Germans who threatened their lives; it was also
their own comrades, superior officers, and NKVD enforcers”. Stalin, unlike
nearly every other war leader, had no concern for the human price of
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military operations. Were it not for Hitler’s errors, which led to the mud
and snow, Stalin’s regime was likely to have come crashing down.645
In the accounts described above, Soviet resistance was clearly not the
decisive factor in the outcome of 1941, at least not compared to Hitler’s
mistakes and the weather. Nagorski’s or Ellis’s account would have been
considered mainstream if they had been written during the Cold War.
Situated among the accounts of Glantz, Reese, Citino, Stahel, Luther,
Mawdsley and Hill, they instead look like outliers. Of course this does not
mean that Nagorski or Ellis are wrong about 1941, it is just that their
accounts are now a counter-narrative to a new historiography that
stresses Soviet resistance.

Conclusion
In accounts of 1941 published in the West since the opening of the Soviet
archives, the ground has clearly shifted away from the idea that Moscow
was saved simply by geography, weather and Hitler’s mistakes. There is a
trend towards viewing Soviet resistance in a more favourable light than
was the case in the past. There is also a strong trend towards viewing the
contest as one of competing systems in which the relatively weak German
state was doomed to lose almost from the outset.646 While historians are
unlikely to claim that Hitler fought a flawless war or that the weather did
not matter, the type of history that is now written is much more likely to
emphasise the agency of the Soviet state and army than works written
during the Cold War. In that sense, the post-archival historiography can
be described as having moved towards describing a “Red victory” rather
than a “German defeat”.

645

These two paragraphs are a summary of aspects of Nagorski, The Greatest Battle. Quotes and
information taken from pp. 312, 102-103, 230, 311, 103-104, 313, 64 and 247.
646
This is the theme, for example, of Stahel, The Battle for Moscow; Luther, Barbarossa
Unleashed; and Glantz, Barbarossa.

186

Why has the historiography changed? Or to put the question differently,
why are the military historians writing today the heirs of Reinhardt and
Erickson rather than Liddell Hart, Seaton or Ziemke? This is not a
straightforward question to answer because various factors including new
information, broader changes in the historiography about the Soviet Union
and Nazi Germany, and the influence of dominant researchers like Glantz
are just some of the factors that need to be considered. The case made
here is that the breakdown of the paradigm established by the German
generals evolved over time and not because of a decisive new piece of
information or archival revelation.
Three interrelated factors seem especially important in the justifications of
their work offered by the historians themselves. Firstly, the archival
revolution in Soviet studies has given those telling the Soviet side of the
war a cornucopia of new information by which to test the official Soviet
accounts and the accounts of the German generals, and to describe the
strengths as well as the weaknesses of the Soviet state and Red Army;
secondly, there is an explicit rejection of the German generals’ emphasis
on Hitler’s mistakes and the weather as being unreliable and self-serving;
thirdly, more general shifts in academic circles such as the movement
away from racial/national stereotypes and a deepening scepticism about
the ‘clean’ Wehrmacht must be considered.
The archival gold rush that began in 1987 during the Gorbachëv era
supplied ample evidence of Soviet activity for those historians who
wanted to tell the Soviet side of the war. While the new openness of
Soviet society produced a profound questioning of the old Soviet myths
inside Russia, most of the revelations about the horrors of the Stalin
dictatorship were not news to Western historians. Instead, the latter
tended to document the ample new evidence of Red Army activity in
1941, the sum of which was to create a picture of the Red Army as the
agent of its own survival in 1941. The impression to be gained from
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Seaton or Liddell Hart was that the Germans were at war with themselves
and the elements. The evidence unearthed by Glantz and his fellow
archive-diggers was that Soviet resistance thwarted the German invaders
and the role of the weather could only be understood as interacting with
Soviet resistance. Earlier historians, just like the Nazi invaders, had
underestimated the capacity of the Soviet state and Red Army to offer an
effective resistance. This was not the old Soviet propagandistic story of
certain victory and universal heroism. The Red Army at great cost –
although not at the cost described by the German generals - derailed first
Operation Barbarossa and then Operation Typhoon.
The goal of giving due credit to the Soviet war effort has been in evidence
at least since the 1960s. British historians such as Jukes and Erickson
attempted to expand on what was known about the Soviet side of the war
by incorporating into their accounts the new documentary and memoir
literature of the Khrushchëv and Brezhnev eras. The opening of Soviet
archives from the mid-1980s led to a flood of new material, the effect of
which was to add enormously to the evidence of the decisiveness of
Soviet activity in the face of the German invasion, and to humanise the
Red Army soldier so that older stereotypes have all but disappeared from
the specialised miliary histories.
In terms of the justifications offered by the historians themselves, one
clear theme is the aim of finally killing off the legacy of the Halder school.
Luther spoke for most of the other recent accounts examined here when
he claimed to offer “a sober alternative to the dubious narrative first
advanced by Hitler’s generals”.647 Reading the introductions to the
specialised military histories of 1941 published in the last two decades,
the reader would get the impression that the paradigm established by the
German generals remains a powerful influence to this day. This is despite
the fact that the accounts of 1941 written by Western military historians
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today are radically different to the classic accounts of Liddell Hart,
Seaton, and Ziemke. While for Cold War historians Soviet propaganda
was routinely criticised, now the criticism is routinely directed at the
German generals. In reality, the enemy against whom Glantz, Citino,
Bergström, Stahel, Hill, or Smelser and Davies have directed their fire has
become a phantom that had all but disappeared from the military history
literature even before the opening of the Soviet archives.
It is possible that the desire on the part of these historians to finally lay to
rest Cold War mythologies - such as the reliance upon the testmony of
the German generals, the West’s turning of the Eastern Front into the
“unknown war”, and the persistence of the “clean Wehrmacht” myth served to foster the “Red victory” case at the very time that the opening
of the Soviet archives made such a case credible for the first time. From
the perspective of a new generation of Western historians who wanted to
put an end to Cold War mythology, the ghost of the Halder school was
revived once more.
Broader influences on the historiography are likely to have been
important in bringing about this paradigm shift. For example, it is no
longer fashionable in academic history writing to rely on national
stereotypes that were common in the 1940s and 1950s. For those
historians specialising in the German side of the war, the efforts of Bartov
and Wette to demolish the myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht called into
question the credibility of the German generals. Cold War “revisionism”
suggested that the contribution of the Soviet state to the victory over
Hitler had been minimised and Stalin’s role in starting the Cold War was
exaggerated. The “revisionism” in Soviet studies that began with
Fitzpatrick encouraged historians to look at the Soviet state and army of
the Soviet era as having greater capacity and solidarity than was
previously thought. The information available in the Soviet archives for
the first time added real flesh to the bones of this argument.
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It cannot be said that there was any single “smoking gun” revelation from
the archives that changed the historiography. In reality, the Halder school
was in steep decline at least from the 1970s when Reinhardt and van
Creveld wrote their critiques, and Erickson argued the case for greater
Soviet agency. In the West, the effect of the opening up of the Soviet
archives was to provide ammunition for historians to bolster the case of
Reinhardt, van Creveld and Erickson: the new information did not create
the new paradigm itself. The early Cold War histories viewed the Germans
as a virtually invincible invader and the Soviet state as weak and
vulnerable. The military histories written in the West since the opening of
the Soviet archives tend to suggest that the invaders were much weaker
and more vulnerable than previously thought, and the defenders much
more capable of determining their own fate.
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Chapter Six: Responsibility for the War
In suggesting that 1941 was a Red victory, Citino’s assumption was that
the Red Army resolutely fought back against a surprise German attack.
But what if the war started in very different circumstances and Hitler had
only launched a pre-emptive strike across the Soviet border because he
knew of Stalin’s plans to attack westwards? During the Cold War, the
claim – originally made by the Nazis - that Stalin intended to attack Hitler
in 1941 was widely dismissed. It is more widely discussed today because
of the controversy that has developed around the so-called Icebreaker
thesis.
The argument of this chapter is that the Icebreaker thesis has not
achieved much traction in the West. As a sample of the historiography on
this issue, twenty-seven well-known accounts of the outbreak of the war
were examined, including twenty-one accounts published since the
opening of the Soviet archives. The only noteworthy change that has
occurred is that post-archival accounts are more likely to be sympathetic
to Stalin’s bungling of the opening phase of the war. The results are
summarised in the following table.
Author

Year

Stalin
fooled for
no good
reason

Pre-opening of archives
Churchill
1950
YES
Garthoff
1954
YES
Shirer
1960
YES
Whaley
1973
Erickson
1975
YES
Hoffmann
1984
Post-opening of archives
Conquest
1993
YES
Raack
1995
Glantz &
1995

Stalin
fooled but
with
excuses

Stalin
planned to
attack Hitler

YES
YES

YES
YES
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House
Roberts
1998
Gorodetsky
1999
Glantz
2001
Erickson
2001
Glantz
2005
Murphy
2005
Roberts
2006
Nagorski
2007
Bellamy
2008
Mosier
2010
Hastings
2011
Roberts
2012
Beevor
2012
Kirchubel
2013
Hartmann
2013
Luther
2013
Haslam
2015
Ellis
2015
SUMMARY
Pre-opening of archives
Post-opening of archives
Table III

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
66.6%
42.9%

16.7%
52.4%

16.7%
4.7%

Cold War accounts dealing with the start of the war mostly depicted a
cynical yet helpless Soviet leadership that was left stunned by the
surprise German invasion on 22 June 1941. The utter incompetence of the
Soviet leadership in 1941 was a consistent theme of the early accounts of
the disastrous performance of the Red Army. William Shirer’s classic
history of the Third Reich described how Stalin’s pact with Hitler came
back to haunt him. When France, Poland and the British Expeditionary
Force were defeated, Hitler had the entire Western European militaryindustrial complex at his disposal, and there was no chance of a second
front opening up in Western Europe to help the Red Army. In 1939-1940,
an anti-Hitler coalition was still possible, and would have massively
reduced the German forces thrown against the Soviet Union. In fact, if
Hitler had known from the start that he would eventually have to take on
Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union all at once, there might
not have been a war at all. Stalin received accurate and timely warnings
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of

the

looming

German

attack

from

the

American

and

British

governments. For Shirer, it was “almost inconceivable, but is nonetheless
true, that the men in the Kremlin, who were usually so hard-headed and
suspicious, refused to take note of the enormous German force on their
border and the information they were receiving”.648
Winston Churchill agreed with Shirer on these points. He described Soviet
foreign policy before the invasion as an “error” as much as it was a “coldblooded calculation”, which showed the “amazing ignorance about where
they stood themselves”. To not see the coming German invasion, said
Churchill, was perhaps the greatest mistake in the history of the world.
Rather than “selfish” calculations, the collaboration with Hitler was an act
of “simpletons”. For Churchill, the Soviet victory was won by the heroic
Soviet masses despite the terrible Soviet leadership:
The force, the mass, the bravery and endurance of mother Russia
had still to be thrown into the scales. But so far as strategy, policy,
foresight, competence are arbiters Stalin and his commissars showed
themselves at this moment the most completely outwitted bunglers
of the Second World War.
On the other hand, Churchill acknowledged that until the end of March
1941 he himself was not convinced that Hitler was going to invade the
U.S.S.R. If anything, it seemed more likely that Hitler and Stalin were
planning to join forces and divide the spoils of the British Empire.
Nonetheless, Churchill claimed that all of the evidence from the middle of
June pointed to a German attack on the Soviet Union, which Stalin chose
to ignore.649
In the United States, Raymond Garthoff in 1954 offered only a slightly
648
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more sympathetic account of Stalin’s role in the outbreak of the war.650
According to Garthoff, there were eight main causes of the Soviet
reverses of the period from June to December 1941. The first was the
failure of Soviet leadership to follow their doctrine of preparedness
against attack. The second was German operational and tactical surprise
and the unplanned retreat. The third was the deployment of Soviet forces
at the frontier without the necessary mobile reserves. The fourth was that
there was no plan for withdrawal or strategic defence in depth. The fifth
was that there was inadequate tactical defensive training. The sixth was
the breakdown of the communication and command network almost from
the outset of the fighting. The seventh was the qualitative inferiority of
Soviet tanks and aircraft. The eighth was the greater combat experience
of the German invaders.651 While this was a long list of failings for which
Stalin was ultimately responsible, it is these failings that mean that,
according to Garthoff, Stalin could not be accused of seeking to launch a
surprise attack on Hitler’s Germany.
Robert Conquest, who was ferociously critical of Stalin’s method of rule,
nonetheless did not suggest that Stalin started the war. Conquest’s
judgment was that Stalin did receive a lot of information about the
coming invasion, but that:
Not only was Stalin’s assessment erroneous. His system of rule also
prevented alternative counsels being put forward. His colleagues
either accepted his superior wisdom, or had to behave as if they did.
Conquest noted that Stalin was convinced of his own military genius. He
kept close control of how the war was run and thus made a series of
disruptive “petty interventions”. His steadfast belief in his military genius
led him to make orders to hold untenable lines and make suicidal counterattacks. Such orders culminated in Kiev, “the single greatest defeat of the
650
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whole war”. Red Army troops fought mainly for fear of Stalin and his
commissars. It was only “a great increase in the size and powers of the
army’s security apparatus” that enabled the Red Army to fight at all. Even
German mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war was in the final analysis
Stalin’s fault because it was Stalin who refused to sign the Geneva
Convention. Yet despite this criticism, for Conquest it was Hitler and not
Stalin that started the war.652
Barton Whaley, writing in the early 1970s, noted that the vast majority of
experts, analysts and commentators were in agreement that “only the
monstrous fatuity of a Byzantine dictator and his authoritarian system
could explain such blindness” as Stalin’s refusal to face facts. Yet upon
investigating the information available to Stalin, Whaley concluded that
even the “authentic warnings were mutually inconsistent, individually
ambiguous, and often transmitted by less than credible sources”.
Furthermore, the majority of world leaders and intelligence services,
using basically the same data, miscalculated Hitler’s intentions as badly as
Stalin did. It was not authoritarianism, paranoia or blindness that lay
behind the attack because democracies made the same mistakes. For
Whaley, the surprise Operation Barbarossa attack fitted the Wohlstetter
model, named after an American analyst who showed, using Pearl Harbor
as an example, that “strategic surprise could result from ambiguous
information, information that only the wisdom of hindsight makes seem
explicit”.653
At the end of the Cold War, the majority view among experts on Soviet
foreign policy was that Stalin was genuine about his commitment to
collective security. A minority view held that Stalin preferred to partner
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with Hitler.654 The view that Stalin had in mind an aggressive war against
Hitler was confined to a relatively small number of historians. Ernst
Topitsch and Joachim Hoffmann had written accounts whose aim was to
show that it was Stalin who was planning a war of annihilation.655
Hoffmann, the author of the official history’s chapter dealing with the
Soviet view of the war, argued that Germany had had little choice other
than to launch a pre-emptive strike. For Hoffmann, there was certainly no
surprise German attack: as Khrushchëv acknowledged, the Soviet
leadership had ample warning from diplomatic channels, espionage and
reconnaissance.656 Soviet scholars did not want to admit to the failings of
the Communist Party and Soviet government on the eve of the war and
thus tried to explain the failure to prepare on various “political, economic,
and military factors” which were “basically no one’s fault”. However, in
truth “the responsibilities cannot be fudged”. For Hoffmann, blame must
rest with Stalin, his cronies in the Politburo, the Central Committee and
the Soviet Government, as well as Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Zhukov and
Golikov.657
It was Viktor Suvorov (real name Vladimir Rezun), and his Icebreaker
thesis that brought the question of Stalin’s imperialistic intentions in 1941
to the fore. Suvorov, who had worked in Soviet intelligence and defected
to the United Kingdom in 1978, published a series of books in the West
detailing how Stalin planned to attack Hitler. Suvorov initially attracted
little attention in the West, but in the 1990s became enormously popular
in Russia as an explanation of how the Red Army could perform so poorly
in the opening battles of the war.658 Stalin, according to Suvorov, was a
fanatical Communist, who was about to attack Hitler in his own version of
654

Uldricks, ‘War, Politics and Memory: Russian Historians Reevaluate the Origins of World War II’,
p. 66-67; Teddy J. Uldricks, ‘The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?’, Slavic
Review, vol. 58, no. 3 (Fall, 1999), pp. 628-629.
655
Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. x-xi.
656
Hoffmann, ‘The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes’, p. 833.
657
ibid., p. 834.
658
David M. Humpert, ‘Viktor Suvorov and Operation Barbarossa: Tukhachevskii Revisited’, The
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 18, no.1 (2005), p. 73.

196

Operation Barbarossa; Hitler, anticipating Stalin’s fiendish plan, was able
to strike first. Suvorov claimed that Stalin intended to invade westward –
an invasion timed for 6 July 1941 - and had prepared an enormous
invasion force.659
Suvorov’s case revolved around what he considered to be evidence of
plans for an offensive war going back to the early 1930s; the advanced
positioning of Red Army forces near the Soviet border; the massing of
Soviet paratroopers; the deployment of wheeled tanks to move swiftly
along the German Autobahn; and ‘flying’ Soviet tanks ready to be airlifted
into German territory all pointed to the offensive intentions of the Red
Army.660 According to Suvorov, other pieces of the jigsaw puzzle now
fitted perfectly. Stalin’s push into eastern Poland massively weakened the
Soviet Union’s defences, but brought the German and Soviet borders into
a direct contact more favourable for offensive than defensive action. The
Soviet Union showed that it was capable of erecting massive, in-depth
defensive lines over a large area in a short amount of time in 1943 when
preparing for Kursk. The fact that it did not use its skills in this area in
1939 could only mean that it had no interest in preparing defences at all.
Stalin could have bolstered the existing defensive line, built new ones on
the Soviet-German border, and built several lines in between. Instead,
the Red Army improved roads and built bridges to open up, rather than
shut down, the frontier.
Suvorov pointed out that in 1939-1941, when the Soviet Union
proclaimed itself to be neutral, many thousands of its troops were fighting
and dying in various campaigns. Stalin seized territories with a population
of about twenty-three million people: “not bad going for a neutral state”.
The fact that Hitler had called for Stalin to sign a non-aggression pact
only days before he invaded Poland was part of the theatre of this era.
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For Suvorov, Hitler and Stalin were co-accomplices, although Stalin was
worse than, not just equal to, Hitler in his deviousness. Stalin’s treachery
began as soon as he signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. According to
Suvorov, Stalin was following his own timing, and desperately wanted to
appear to have peaceful intentions with Germany and not provoke war
before he was ready to attack. Stalin did everything he could to convince
Hitler that he would remain neutral. Stalin’s orders that there were to be
no attacks on German reconnaissance planes flying over Soviet territory,
and the TASS proclamation about the commitment of the Soviet regime to
the pact with Hitler, constituted an elaborate ruse to lull Hitler into leaving
the German-Soviet border undefended.661
Suvorov’s account certainly suggested greater agency on the part of
Stalin who was so often portrayed in the manner of a frightened animal
paralysed by the headlights of the oncoming German invasion. Yet Stalin
had often made the point that the Bolsheviks were not pacifists: Bolshevik
propagandists were developing their themes around the concept of an
offensive war in May-June 1941, and the Red Army’s doctrine was to fight
the next war on enemy territory. In the decade following its first
publication, Suvorov’s Icebreaker thesis was greatly helped by two new
pieces of evidence that received widespread attention as the Soviet Union
collapsed. The first piece of evidence was Stalin’s speech to graduating
students on 5 May 1941. In this speech, Stalin proclaimed that:
Defending our country, we must act offensively. From defence to go
to a military doctrine of offensive actions. We must transform our
training, our propaganda, our agitation, our press in an offensive
spirit. The Red Army is a modern army and the modern army is an
offensive army.662
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The second piece of evidence was a proposal to Stalin over the signatures
of Commissar for Defence Timoshenko and Stavka head Zhukov to launch
a pre-emptive strike against Hitler that appears to have been formulated
for the dictator on 15 May 1941.663
Richard Raack was the most outspoken of the minority of Western
historians to have come out in support of the Icebreaker thesis. For
Raack, Stalin was the arch villain of the twentieth century. Stalin was the
joint instigator of the Second World War, and a totalitarian and duplicitous
expansionist who caused the Cold War as well. According to Raack, Stalin
never abandoned the Communist dream of world revolution.664 Stalin, like
Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese military government, viewed war as
the means of achieving political goals. It was only because Stalin was
more cautious and less flamboyant than his counterparts that he was able
to convince Western statesmen that he was a “sincere, plausible, and
reasonable partner in international affairs”.665 The invasion of Finland and
Poland were small steps towards the goal of conquering central and
Western Europe for Communism. It was the signing of the Nazi-Soviet
Pact and the carving up of Eastern Europe that led directly to the
outbreak of the Second World War.666 The ease with which Stalin was able
to annex Poland, Bessarabia and the Baltic States emboldened Stalin to
think that he could get away with anything. Stalin provoked Hitler by
pushing his imperialist agenda in the Balkans and then adopted the
wrong-headed view that Hitler would not repeat the mistake of the First
World War and open a second front with Russia.667 For Raack the denial
by the majority of Western historians of the Icebreaker thesis was
663
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evidence of a Leftist conspiracy to hide Stalin’s shared guilt in the causes
of the Second World War.668
If it were true that Stalin had intended to attack Hitler in 1941, then that
would raise the bar considerably in terms of what a ‘Red victory’ would
require. Yet Western historians have largely rejected the Icebreaker
hypothesis. The evidence strongly shows that the Red Army was simply
not ready, organised, trained, or equipped enough to carry out an attack
in the summer of 1941.669 For many Western historians, Stalin did not
want war against Germany in 1941 because he knew that he would lose.
The standard view during the Cold War was that the Red Army had been
severely weakened by the purges. The effects of the purges were
especially noticeable on the front line where the Red Army performed
poorly in 1939-1941.670 While the war against Japan in the Far East had
gone reasonably well, the invasions of Poland and Finland in 1939
revealed the full scale of the deficiencies of the Red Army. As Glantz has
put it, the 15 May pre-emptive strike plan, often cited as evidence of
Stalin’s intentions, was “normal contingency planning, a routine function
of the General Staff”.671 There is no clear evidence that Stalin approved or
even saw the plan.672
For Glantz, the Icebreaker thesis was “a virtual by-product of political
turmoil in the Soviet Union shortly before its fall”.673 Glantz noted that,
“[all] existing archival sources refute this contentious assertion”.674 For
Glantz, Stalin was not guilty of “obstinate blindness” in refusing to believe
that the Germans would invade when they did, but was guilty of “wishful
thinking”.675 Stalin genuinely believed that Germany’s enemies - Britain
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675

Raack, ‘Stalin’s Role in the Coming of World War II: the International Debate Goes On’, p. 48.
Glantz, Colossus Reborn, p. 15; Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, p. 27.
Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, p. 10.
Glantz, Colossus Reborn, p. 15.
ibid.; Robert’s, Stalin’s General, p. 95.
Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and interpretations’, p. 616.
Glantz, Colossus Reborn, p. 15.
Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 41-42; Glantz, Before Stalingrad, p. 25.

200

and the Polish resistance - were actively trying to involve Moscow in a
war. Stalin considered that putting extra troops on the border in a war
footing would be the kind of casus belli that might provoke Hitler to
invade.676 Evidence of Stalin’s desperation includes his scrupulous
adherence to the economic clauses of the Soviet-German agreement; the
last Soviet train to enter German territory did so only hours before the
invasion began.677 Ironically, the fact that Hitler delayed the start of the
invasion of the Soviet Union to accommodate the invasion of Yugoslavia a delay often criticised as dooming the invasion - helped sow confusion
around Operation Barbarossa by causing its start date to be changed from
the original date of 15 May. Many of the initially correct intelligence
warnings of the invasion were rendered incorrect, thus leading Stalin to
become more distrustful of warnings of impending war.678 For Glantz, the
Red Army was caught in between a defensive and offensive posture when
the invasion came.679 The most important factor was not strategic or
tactical surprise, but institutional surprise. Hitler managed to attack when
his forces were strongest, and when the Soviet forces were in a state of
transition and reorganisation.680
Uldricks attacked Suvorov by pointing out that his thesis is “not entirely
novel; it has been made before – by Adolf Hitler”,681 and that his books
are “sensationalistic and journalistic in the worst sense”.682 The Israeli
historian Gabriel Gorodetsky strongly criticised Suvorov’s “flimsy and
fraudulent” work and placed Suvorov in the context of the German
historikerstreit of the late 1980s.683 The historikerstreit was a dispute
over Germany’s ‘historic past’ where conservative German historians
launched an attack on ‘left-wing’ views that Nazism and Hitler were
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somehow different to and worse than Communism and Stalin. According
to Gorodetsky, Stalin’s actions were driven above all by a genuine desire
to avoid war.684 The Soviet state’s foreign policy was characterised by “a
gradual but consistent retreat from hostility to the capitalist regimes
towards peaceful coexistence based on mutual expediency”.685 The NaziSoviet Pact was not an alliance with a view to attacking the West, but was
a product of Stalin’s deep mistrust of Britain, an historic enemy of
imperial Russia. Stalin believed that Britain would do everything in its
power to foment war between the Soviet Union and Germany. 686 Stalin, a
practitioner of Realpolitik, understood the weakness of the purged Soviet
military and did everything he could to avoid war, not because he was a
proponent of peace, but because he was not ready for war. Stalin’s
intense desire to avoid war meant that he ignored not only the British
reports, but also his own intelligence services.
For Gorodetsky, Stalin was no revolutionary zealot. Instead he was typical
of the tsars who preceded him in his concerns for maintaining the great
power status of Russia. Stalin was defensive rather than offensive, but
ultimately mistaken in his rational assumption that Hitler would not be so
foolish as to launch a two-front war.687 Stalin cowed his entourage into
submission,

and

his

suspicions

“led

to

self-deception

of

colossal

proportions”. Stalin subscribed to the illusion that there was a split
between a peaceful Hitler and a warlike Wehrmacht. In mid-April when
Filipp Ivanovich Golikov, head of military intelligence, informed Stalin of
massive German troop movements to the west, Stalin’s strategy was to
684
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balance his loyalty to the pact with not appearing to be so weak that the
Germans would be tempted to attack him.
Gorodetsky dismissed the idea that Stalin had excellent knowledge of the
likely date of the invasion. Soviet spy Richard Sorge’s reports from Tokyo
were contradictory, sometimes based on out-of-date information, and did
nothing to steer Stalin away from his conviction that an invasion was
much less likely than further diplomatic pressure from Hitler. Nonetheless,
the disaster of 1941 was Stalin’s fault because:
Stalin’s refusal to reckon with the potential consequences of a
miscalculation, while adamantly pursuing his appeasement and
avoiding provocation at all costs was perhaps the single most
important factor in the calamity.688
Western accounts that are very critical of Stalin’s political and military
acumen have nonetheless tended to exonerate Stalin of aggressive intent
in 1941. David E. Murphy described a duped Stalin whose actions were in
part driven by suspicion of Western provocation, and added that even
though intelligence reaching Stalin regarding German intentions was
accurate, the Soviet dictator was locked into a Marxist view of the world
that assumed that Western governments and their intelligence services
saw the Soviet Union as the principal enemy.689 Ultimately Stalin did not
expect an attack in June 1941 and did everything in his power to avoid
provoking one, including lulling his own people with calming propaganda
about the strength of the relationship with Germany. All of this proved
almost fatal when it was the Germans who struck with massive force and
the advantage of surprise.
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According to Hastings, Stalin was well informed by spies such as Sorge as
to the exact date of the coming invasion, but refused to believe the
reports for inexplicable reasons. To make matters worse, his obstinate
refusal to prepare for war was a fatal and terrible mistake.690 Hitler was
simply the better poker player who easily fooled a surprisingly gullible
Stalin. Even though Stalin expected that he would eventually end up
fighting Nazi Germany, in 1939 he sought territorial expansion with the
aid of Hitler. Hastings argued that Stalin’s refusal to heed the warnings
were a result of German misinformation, a firm belief that Germany would
not open a second front, and Ruldof Hess’ flight to Britain, which only
served to heighten his suspicions of potential British-German cooperation. According to Hastings, Stalin foolishly thought that he would be
the one to choose when war began. As a consequence, the opening
months of the war were a remarkable mismatch. The Red Army was
caught unprepared for war. Stalin’s purges had killed off most of the
senior officers and replaced them with “incompetent lackeys”. After the
routs of Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, Stalin retreated to his dacha in a
state of nervous collapse.691
Kirchubel described an active and somewhat shrewder Stalin who was
confronted with a dilemma that would have been difficult for any leader to
resolve. According to Kirchubel, Stalin never took the Nazi-Soviet Pact
seriously and was just buying time to continue his military build-up via
the third Five Year Plan. In this, Stalin was no different to Britain and
France, who sacrificed Czechoslovakia in order to buy a few more months
of peace at Munich. The Pact, from a Soviet perspective, was an entirely
successful undertaking because it kept the Soviet Union out of the
European war for nearly two years. Stalin was aggressive and confident in
690
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this period, as shown through his actions in the Baltics and Bessarabia,
but also in his dealings with Hitler. Stalin genuinely believed that he had
Nazi Germany in his pocket through the trade agreements that he
assumed were vital to Hitler, whose war in Western Europe made him
dependent on Soviet resources. Stalin was convinced too that Hitler would
not dare open a second front while the Anglo-American maritime powers
maintained their ascendency over the oceans. Thirdly, he was convinced
that the invasion would be announced with some kind of ultimatum, as
had been done with Czechoslovakia and Poland. Ultimately, Stalin got it
very wrong, and in doing so handed the Germans operational, strategic
and tactical surprise. In the final analysis, however, Stalin was “amply
forewarned” of the German invasion, yet chose to remain “blissfully
ignorant”.692
Erickson dismissed any suggestions that Hitler’s was a pre-emptive attack
as “fantasies, fictions and inventions [that] do not bear comparison with a
horrendous reality”.693 For Erickson, no matter how much Stalin tried to
“wall up in a safe” the mounting evidence of the impending German
invasion from internal and external sources, “[before] many weeks were
out, the safes began to bulge”.694 Thus, Stalin’s “dogged, obstinate
pursuit of what became self-disarming mechanisms” became a terrible
cost that the Soviet Union had to bear.695
Bellamy argued that Stalin and Hitler belong together in the “totalitarian
camp”, but noted that the British and French left Stalin with little choice
other than to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Most likely, Stalin was getting
ready to attack Germany at some point, but Bellamy inclined to the more
traditional view that 1942 would have been the preferred option. In the
692
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lead up to the Nazi invasion, Soviet intelligence services had been
receiving varied, contrasting and disparate reports, leading to confusion
more than anything else. According to Bellamy, part of the case made for
the pre-emptive strike, the text of an address to the Politburo by Stalin on
19 August 1939, was a forgery planted by French intelligence. Instead,
the Red Army was “in the middle of reorganization, retraining and reequipment. Their formations were gearing up for a war still some way
ahead”.

Bellamy

described

the

15

May

“considerations”

as

“circumstantial” and noted that the plan was simply one of many drawn
up by the Soviet command before the war. When elements of the plan
were used after 22 June, this was simply because it was one of the only
workable plans the Soviet command had at their disposal once the
invasion came. For Bellamy, Stalin was suffering from a psychological
illness:
Stalin’s behaviour shows the classic symptoms of someone who is in
‘denial’. Humanistic psychologists recognize a phenomenon where
people who have an overinflated idea of their own abilities or
importance slip (unconsciously) into a state where they do not look
for, or dismiss, information which contradicts their formed view.
Nonetheless, Bellamy’s criticism of Stalin is muted. Stalin ignored the
“superb intelligence provided by his own services, and also sincerely given
by the British”. On the other hand, Stalin rejected or ignored this
intelligence “for understandable reasons”.696
Mawdsley is one historian who has taken a different approach to the
problem of the disastrous start of the war for the Red Army. While not
agreeing with the Icebreaker hypothesis, he does accept that, rather than
their lack of preparation for war, it may have been the nature of their
plans that doomed the Red Army. Mawdsley has argued that the
calamitous early defeats are only comprehensible when it is realised that
696
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the Red Army chose not to prepare a defence in depth, but instead was
planning either an attack or counter-attack in the opening phase of the
war. Stalin had absorbed the lessons of history too literally. In the First
World War, the Russian Army became bogged down when it attacked
Germany through northern Poland, but had subsequently achieved its
great successes further south. In 1941 then, Stalin’s plan was to attack
southern Poland through the corridor that separated the Pripiat’ marshes
from the Carpathians. This meant that the Red Army was strongest west
of Kiev and weakest in Belorussia where the main German attack actually
came.
Stalin’s generals wrongly assumed that the Germans would need weeks to
concentrate their forces and that this could not be done secretly.
Catastrophically for the Red Army, the Soviet generals “could not grasp
that it was the Red Army that would be caught by surprise”. The strong
Red Army forces on the border were supposed to hold the Germans while
the remainder of the Red Army was mobilised. Because the Red Army
planned to fight and hold an invasion at the border, aviation and tanks
had to be placed near the frontiers, and the new borders in Poland had to
be fortified because the rail network did not allow for timely movement
from deep inside the Soviet Union. Thus when the invasion came, Soviet
forces were both incorrectly concentrated to the south, and too close to
the border to avoid disaster.697
For Roberts, Stalin’s refusal to heed the warnings of invasion was not a
question of Stalin’s psychology. The dictator’s hand was forced by the
political and military realities of the situation. Roberts has noted that
Stalin may have been well aware of the danger, but underestimated the
likely consequences of a German attack. From what Zhukov and
Vasilevskiĭ reported later it is clear that the strategic thinking in the
697
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Politburo and the High Command was that even an undeclared war would
be fought for a period (possibly as long as three weeks) along the
frontiers.698 Stalin was of the view as late as 21 June that “what was
unfolding was a peace scenario, not the outbreak of war”.699 The German
campaign to deceive Stalin was successful because it confirmed for Stalin
his hope that, while there were tensions, Hitler would not launch a
premature two-front war against Britain and the Soviet Union. 700 For
Roberts, Stalin’s mistake was his failure to realise just how quickly the
Germans could overrun the Soviet frontier were they to launch a surprise
attack.701
In summary, only a minority of Western historians agree with Suvorov
that Hitler pre-empted an imminent Red Army attack on 22 June 1941.
This is not to suggest that Stalin’s role in the outbreak of the war is
settled for all time. There are many documents apparently still to be
released from Russia’s Presidential Archive and available information
about the war is much less plentiful in Russia today than it was in the
1990s. Archival freedom for Western or Russian historians was never total
and there remains the suspicion that potentially crucial material is still
hidden. Ever since the early 1990s, historians have complained that many
sections of the archives – notably the Presidential Archive - remain
closed.702 Orders, directives communicated orally, and formal as well as
informal conversations that took place during important meetings may
have left no trace. Dmitri Volkogonov, the principal Soviet military
historian of the Gorbachëv era, claimed that the extensive archival
materials he was allowed to consult in his research contained “practically
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nothing on the General Staff’s discussion of strategic questions”.703
Meanwhile, Russian definitions of a ‘sensitive’ topic have changed over
time. At first, scholars were more likely to be rebuffed by archive officials
if they were investigating the 1920s and 1930s. That is now more likely to
be true if they are researching the Great Patriotic War.704 Gorodetsky has
described how he had significantly more access to archival documents
when he started his research into the events of 22 June, but that
documents that he was previously allowed to study are now prohibited
and stored in the Presidential Archive.705 Although once extensively used
by researchers,706 the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense
(TsAMO) is again largely off-limits to foreigners.707 Writing in 2017 Hill
lamented that:
The Soviet military archives were for a number of practical and
political reasons not opened up to the same extent as many other
archives, and access for Western researchers is now arguably worse
than it was during the 1990s.708
Because historians have no way of knowing what remains hidden in
Soviet archives, it cannot be claimed that the Icebreaker controversy is
definitively resolved. The point to be made here is that for most Western
historians writing after the Cold War, Stalin’s alleged intention to strike at
Hitler in 1941 is a dead end that hinders an understanding of why the
German invasion was initially so successful. Apart from Raack, Topitsch
and Hoffmann, it is difficult to find arguments for the Icebreaker thesis in
the Western military literature about 1941. Even the vehemently anti-
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Stalin Frank Ellis described Suvorov as a “talented maverick”,709 whose
thesis “spectacularly unravels” when put to close scrutiny.710
Viewed in these terms, the debate around the origins of the war between
Stalin and Hitler has not undermined a “Red victory” case in the terms
discussed in this thesis. Western historians are mostly in agreement that
1941 saw an unprovoked German invasion of the Soviet Union, and that
Stalin was desperately trying to avoid war. The only noteworthy change in
the historiography is that over time Western historians tended to suggest
that Stalin, far from being unaware of or paralysed by the danger, was
faced with a difficult predicament, that warnings of the invasion were
often contradictory, and that Soviet plans made for the coming war were
based on the mistaken assumption of a war fought at the frontiers. Stalin
received many varied and contradictory reports regarding whether
invasion would come and what date it would begin, and thus can be
partially excused for not believing the one of many that finally gave him
the correct details.711 The Icebreaker thesis has gained much more
traction in Russia since the end of the Cold War. As we shall see, the
divergence over the Icebreaker thesis was the main point of difference
between Western and Russian accounts of 1941 in the Gorbachëv and
Yeltsin era.
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Chapter Seven: The Official Soviet View of the War
It would simply not be possible to read all, or even a significant
proportion, of the Russian-language military histories devoted to the
events of 1941. A Russian research team calculated that by 2002, there
were some 8,784 publications, including 875 books, dedicated to the
Battle of Moscow.712 This vast literature was spread across five periods:
the Stalin era from 1941 to 1953; the Khrushchëv era from 1956 to 1964;
the Brezhnev era from 1965 to 1982; the Gorbachëv era of 1985-1991;
and the post-Soviet period. As we shall see in Chapter Nine, the debate
over the war continues to fuel new publications at a great rate.
Rather than try to cover all of that literature, the approach in the next
three chapters is to look at publications that are prominent in the expert
commentary and bibliographies and represent the three most noteworthy
Russian-language paradigms; the official Soviet view of the war; the
“revisionist” critique of the Soviet view of the war that came to
prominence after 1987; and the “national-patriotic” reaction to the
revisionists that is especially prominent in the Putin era. In much the
same way that the German generals set the agenda for decades of debate
about 1941 in the West, the official Soviet account of the war was the
starting point for all subsequent Russian-language histories.
Writing during the Cold War, Harrison Salisbury remarked that the
“[h]istory in Russia should be published in loose-leafed books so that
pages can be extracted and new ones inserted”.713 In fact, the Soviet
view of the war was more consistent than this remark suggests. While
figures such as Stalin, Khrushchëv and Zhukov moved in and out of
Soviet histories depending upon the era, the basic account of the events
712
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of 1941 did not change during the Soviet period. There were at least
three consistent assertions of the official Soviet view. Firstly, the Soviet
Union was the only European state in the 1930s genuinely committed to
peace. Secondly, the Soviet system displayed unprecedented solidarity in
the face of the trial imposed by the Nazis because it had the unwavering
support of its people. Thirdly, the Red Army, unlike other victims of Nazi
aggression, was a powerful fighting machine that fought on against the
odds in 1941 and displayed incredible heroism on the battlefield.
From the start of the war to the dictator’s death in 1953, the events of
1941 were used to show Stalin as a military genius, who enacted a grand
plan to lure the Germans deep into Soviet territory before the Red Army
launched its powerful counter-attack.714 Apart from claiming that Stalin
successfully planned the defeat of the Germans, Stalin-era accounts also
insisted that it was the West and not the Soviet Union that had facilitated
Hitler’s aggression. Responding to the publication in the early period of
the Cold War of documents detailing Soviet-Nazi co-operation, the Soviet
government countered that the Communist state had made every effort
at collective security in order to prevent Nazi aggression.715 Out of hatred
of Communism, Russophobia, and the influence of anti-Communist
politicians such as Harry S. Truman, the West preferred to encourage Nazi
Germany to attack the Soviet Union.716 The Nazis were part of a Western
“crusade” against the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the enemy
became not “Fascism”, but “imperialism”, a broad category in which many
enemies of the Soviet Union could be placed. The Soviet Union alone had
delivered the world from Hitlerite tyranny, and the so-called Allies had not
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only betrayed the Red Army by refusing to open a second front, but had
actively colluded with the Germans.717
A first draft of what would become the official Soviet view of the war
appeared as the conflict still raged, when a classified military guide
analysed the Battle of Moscow. It focused upon the winter of 1941-1942
and its authorship was attributed to Boris Shaposhnikov, a veteran
member of Stalin’s inner military elite.718 Shaposhnikov’s study restricted
its coverage to the period 16 November 1941 to 31 January 1942, thus
avoiding the defeats of the summer and the Moscow panic while focusing
on

the

winter

counter-attack.

Shaposhnikov

scrupulously

avoided

mentioning the names of all Soviet commanders apart from Stalin and
Zhukov. The most important factor in the Red victory at Moscow was, in
Shaposhnikov’s view, Stalin’s “wise plan”. Firstly, the Germans were worn
down by the Red Army’s “active defence” at the frontiers based around a
solid system of fortifications. Secondly, the Moscow zone of defence
became a stronghold both for the defence of the capital and the
assembling of new forces that could be directed as required to
endangered sections of the front line. Thirdly, reserve armies were
created behind the front and were used by Stalin to defend Moscow and
enable the decisive counter-attack of December 1941. In the end, “the
German defeat at Moscow was carried out according to the plan of the
Supreme Commander Stalin, and under his personal guidance”.719
Shaposhnikov scoffed at suggestions that the weather was responsible for
the “miracle of Moscow”. For Shaposhnikov, the weather only became
important during the Red Army counter-attack in January 1942. It was
717
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Soviet manoeuvres that were most adversely affected by the cold.
Shaposhnikov pointed to the average temperatures of November (minus
five), December (minus two) and January (minus nineteen). Thus,
according to Shaposhnikov, the Germans had it relatively easy in
November and December, and were fortunate that Zhukov’s counterattack was blunted as a result of the difficulties wrought on Soviet
logistics by the severe cold weather of January. In fact, the weather was
the cover for a series of German blunders. Shaposhnikov noted errors in
German war planning, including the failure to take the Russian landscape
properly into consideration when planning Operation Typhoon, and the
absence of reinforcements behind frontline troops.
Shaposhnikov also set the tone for future accounts of the Battle of
Moscow by citing instances of heroism drawn from Soviet press reports.
Between July 1941 and July 1942, 5,050 newspaper articles – between
twelve and thirteen every day – appeared in the national and local
Moscow press detailing the heroic defence of the capital by Red Army
soldiers at the front, partisans in the rear of the enemy and the civilians
of the home front.720 The most famous story concerned the deeds of
General Ivan Panfilov and the 316th Infantry Division. Allegedly based on
events during the Battle of Moscow, Stalin’s propagandists embellished
this story beyond all recognition.721 On 16 November, during the defence
of Volokolamsk, Panfilov’s twenty-eight men found themselves under
attack from twenty German tanks.722 The hero of the story was
Commissar V. I. Klochkov who was reported to have turned to his men
and proclaimed, “[i]t’s not so bad. Less than one tank per man!”. 723 In
the ensuing fighting, the outnumbered Soviet troops destroyed eighteen
720
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tanks and killed scores of German troops.724 Klochkov himself was killed
running under a tank holding grenades after being badly wounded.725
There

was

no

sympathy

for

alleged

cowards

and

traitors.

As

Shaposhnikov described the Panfilov twenty-eight:
Among them were Russians, Ukrainians, collective farm workers from
Tal’gar and Kazakhs from Alma-Alta. Their brotherhood, bound in
blood, was the embodiment of the martial friendship of the peoples
of our country, which rose up against their mortal enemy. There
were 28 heroes. A twenty-ninth was a despised coward who was
terminated by the Guards themselves.726
By an order of 21 July 1942, all twenty eight Panfilovtsy became Heroes
of the Soviet Union, the most prestigious recognition of wartime service
during the Soviet period.
Similar to the Red Army example of Panfilov’s twenty-eight, tales of
individual civilian heroism summed up a remarkably patriotic response to
the invasion. While lands housing forty per cent of the Soviet population
were occupied, the people resisted rather than collaborated. As early as
August 1941, partisan committees prepared stocks of weapons and
supplies in response to the government’s call. By November 1941, Soviet
propagandists highlighted the stoic bravery of Zoia Kosmodem’ianskaia, a
young Komsomol activist and partisan executed by the Germans on 29
November 1941, as the model partisan.727
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During the war, the salvation of Moscow was celebrated for propaganda
purposes.728 After the war, Stalin did not encourage close examination of
the events of 1941 and the studies of the Battle of Moscow were relatively
few in number.729 To discuss 1941 too closely was to discuss how the
Germans managed to get so close to the Soviet capital. The accounts of
the Battle of Moscow that appeared in the early part of the Cold War
instead followed Shaposhnikov’s formula. The chaotic opening to the war
was ignored, German and Western collaboration emphasised, iconic tales
of heroism such as Panfilov’s twenty-eight and Zoia substituted for the
reactions of ordinary people to the war, and Stalin was praised as a
strategic and military genius.
The question that could not be asked while Stalin was alive was how it
could have been that the Red Army, the ‘greatest army in the world’,
could have performed so badly in the opening battles of the Great
Patriotic War. In his 1956 address to the Twentieth Party Congress,
Khrushchёv virulently attacked Stalin, his repressions following the Kirov
decrees, his ‘cult of personality’, his purge of the military, his failure to
heed the warnings of impending war, and his conduct once the war
actually started. Khrushchёv argued that Stalin had strayed from the path
laid down by Lenin, and that it was anathema in “Marxism-Leninism to
elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing
supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god”.
Khrushchёv attacked the official Stalin-era histories as instruments of
Stalin’s propaganda and megalomania:
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When we look at many of our novels, films and historical-scientific
studies, the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War appears to be entirely
improbable. Stalin had foreseen everything. The Soviet Army, on the
basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the
tactics of so-called "active defense," … The epic victory gained
through the armed might of the land of the Soviets, through our
heroic people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film and "scientific
study" as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.
Stalin refused to adequately prepare for war despite the warnings: “Had
our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the Army with
the necessary materiel, our wartime losses would have been decidedly
smaller”. To add insult to grievous injury, Stalin then claimed victory in
the war to rest entirely on his own shoulders. Khrushchёv stated that:
Stalin very energetically popularized himself as a great leader. In
various ways he tried to inculcate the notion that the victories gained
by the Soviet nation during the Great Patriotic War were all due to
the courage, daring, and genius of Stalin and of no one else … Not
Stalin, but the Party as a whole, the Soviet government, our heroic
Army, its talented leaders and brave soldiers, the whole Soviet nation
– these are the ones who assured the victory in the Great Patriotic
War.730
On 12 September 1957, the Central Committee decreed that work would
begin on the first multi-volume history of the war. The six-volume Istoriia
Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg (hence
‘Khrushchëv-era Istoriia’) emerged from the Institute of MarxismLeninism between 1960 and 1965. This work, according to Glantz,
“exemplified the de-Stalinization process and Khrushchevian glasnost’”.731
In the Khrushchëv era, Stalin’s name all but disappeared and the
combined efforts of the Communist Party and the heroic Soviet people
took his place as the key to victory. In the Khrushchëv-era Istoriia volume
dealing with the Battle of Moscow, Stalin is not mentioned until the forty-
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sixth page of the chapter on Operation Typhoon, and even then only as
the Chairman of the State Defence Committee giving his report on the
anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution “on behalf of the Central
Committee of the CPSU(b)”.732 When Stalin is mentioned, the references
are to his address in the Maiakovskiĭ Square Metro station on 6 November
1941 and his appearance at Red Square the following day.733
Just like in the Stalin era, Soviet historians had to adjust their accounts to
suit the politics of the era. As soon as the war was over, Zhukov fell out
of favour and was written out of the histories so that Stalin alone was the
genius of victory. Zhukov returned to favour after Stalin’s death and
assisted Khrushchëv and his allies in the arrest of Lavrentiĭ Beria, a rival
for power. By 1957, Khrushchëv had fallen out with Zhukov who now
disappeared, along with Stalin, from the histories; a Resolution of the
General Committee concluded at the time that Zhukov’s “person and role
in the Great Patriotic War were excessively glorified”.734 In A. M.
Samsonov’s account of the Battle of Moscow that appeared in 1958, there
was only a single mention of Zhukov, who was described simply as the
commander of the West Front at the time of the December counteroffensive.735
As Erickson has noted, a ‘mini-cult’ of Khrushchëv now emerged.736 In the
Khrushchëv-era Istoriia, Khrushchëv was mentioned on one hundred and
thirty two occasions: more often than the GKO and Stalin. Khrushchëv
was mentioned seven times more than Zhukov, whose name appeared
only sixteen times, and mostly in connection with failures of one kind or
another.737 Stalin’s stubborn determination to hold Kiev led to the mass
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encirclement of Soviet troops: disaster would have been avoided if only
Stavka had at the time agreed with Khrushchёv’s proposals.738
Soviet readers under Khrushchëv were granted a very limited view into
how the Soviet state and Red Army had planned for the war. The
Khrushchëv-era Istoriia noted that there was a plan of “defence of the
Western state frontiers” whereby the forces positioned at the frontier
would repulse the invader’s blows, cover the mobilisation, strategic
concentration and development of the main forces of the army. The
Soviet leadership, that is, Stalin, had failed to take into account the
possibility of a surprise attack. It was assumed that there would be a
declaration of war or fighting at the frontiers that would allow the Red
Army to set in motion an effective defence. An indecisive Soviet
leadership did not give the necessary orders to ready the Red Army for
war in the immediate pre-war period.
For all the criticism of Stalin and the disappearance of Zhukov, the
Khrushchëv-era histories did not alter the basic storyline of 1941. Hitler
was the aggressor, the Soviet state responded magnificently to the
challenge, and the people stayed loyal to their government. The Red
Army was taken by surprise and was outnumbered by the Germans who
were at the height of their power with a battle-hardened army, excellent
equipment and all of Europe as their resource base. The Soviet Union was
attacked at a time when the Red Army, unaware of the planned sneak
attack, was not at combat readiness, and in was some cases many miles
from front defence positions. The core of this version of the history - the
Soviet people holding together in the face of a surprise attack by a
powerful Germany – remained constant until the Gorbachëv period.739
Khrushchëv-era histories contended, as Stalin had done, that German
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aggression was allowed to go unchecked for so long due to the Western
refusal to genuinely embrace collective security. Western governments
actively encouraged a German attack on the Soviet Union.740
There was now an attempt to tell the story of the Soviet people at war,
but conducted within strict limitations. The Khrushchëv-era Istoriia
described the remarkable reaction of the Soviet people to the news of the
outbreak of war:
With tears in their eyes, the Soviet people learned that the Nazis had
lied when disseminating messages about the fall of Moscow, and that
Moscow stood unshaken. Listening to the voice of their Party, they
were imbued with a deep faith in the power of the Soviet state, in the
unbreakable will for the Soviet people’s victory, in the inevitable
defeat of the Nazi invaders.741
The solidarity of the Soviet state and people was emphasised in new
histories dealing with the defence of the Soviet capital.742 In 1964, there
appeared a history of the Battle of Moscow under the auspices of the
Military-History Section of the General Staff with overall editorship
attributed to Marshal Sokolovskiĭ that was devoted to the contribution not
just of leaders but of Muscovites more broadly.743 The experiences of
soldiers, partisans and civilians were included in a detailed military
history. Needless to say, only the recollections of Soviet patriots and
heroes were included in these accounts of the people at war. When the
military historian Samsonov attempted to insert a more realistic view of
the suffering, dying and heroism, he was denounced for slandering the
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heroes of the war; Soviet histories, including Samsonov’s, had to be
written to a formula that did not allow grief and suffering to move outside
official boundaries.744
Samsonov’s 1958 account of the Battle of Moscow began with an attack
on the Western historians Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller, whose crimes
were to emphasise the importance of the weather in order to belittle the
Soviet military achievement.745 Samsonov pointed out that the Germans
were first defeated on 28 November at Rostov on the Sea of Azov, where
the conditions were relatively mild.746 This was an early example of the
long-running interaction between Soviet and Western texts. Although
Western histories were not available to the average Soviet reader, they
certainly were available to the Soviet historians, who criticised the West
for their adherence to the view of the German generals, and their
belittlement of Soviet martial prowess.
Another target of Soviet historians was the claim made in the West that
crucial Western aid had propped up the Soviet war effort. Soviet accounts
did

sometimes

acknowledge

Western

Lend-Lease

aid

by

noting

Roosevelt’s willingness to support the Soviet Union. However, these
accounts invariably framed the American aid as cynical pragmatism, a
response to the fact that a German victory over the Soviet Union would
not be beneficial in the short term to Western plans. 747 According to
Sokolovskiĭ, before December 1941 the Western Allies refused to believe
that the Soviet Union could win, and thus the total economic assistance
received only amounted to only one tenth of a per cent of that promised
by

the

end

of

the

year.748

Western promises

were cynical

and

disingenuous until Soviet victory seemed possible, and later supplies only
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came grudgingly. Certainly, these supplies were not decisive in achieving
the victory. Khrushchëv himself knew the truth that Western aid had
contributed to the Soviet victory by supplying lorries, food and medicine
at crucial periods but only admitted this in his memoir, which was
smuggled to the West to be published six years after his removal from the
Soviet leadership.749
Khrushchëv fell from power in 1964 in part because he was perceived as
too radical a reformer. The ensuing Brezhnev era (1965-1982) might be
viewed as an attempt to compromise between the Stalin and Khrushchëv
versions of the war with ever greater emphasis upon the contribution of
the Soviet people to the victory. As Nina Tumarkin has pointed out, from
the mid-1960s, the Brezhnev regime “created nothing less than a fullblown cult of the Great Patriotic War. This included a panoply of saints,
sacred relics, and a rigid master-narrative of the war”.750
While the overblown rhetoric of the Soviet era can be easily dismissed as
Communist propaganda, it should be recognised that this ‘superpatriotism’ had a long history in Russia. How the story of the Great
Patriotic War was framed during the Soviet period has to be viewed in a
broader context of the traditional discourse that Russian elites have
deployed to talk about Russia. Hitler and his generals often described
Russia as barbaric, backward and “Asiatic”. This was the mirror reverse of
the image that dominated within the Soviet Union itself. Long before the
Communists, most Russians learned from government propaganda that
the tsarist state was a benevolent civilization builder in contrast to the
violence and exploitation of the Western colonial empires.751 As Hosking
has put it, “Russian national feeling itself readily takes universalist and
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messianic forms”.752 According to this view, the Russian state has had a
civilising mission.753 Over the centuries this idea of the good Russian
empire united imperial state builders like Peter the Great, Slavophiles,
pan-Slavists, Westernisers, Eurasianists, Communists like Stalin and,
arguably the modern Russian elite, Putin included.754 As James Billington
has put it, there was a “Russian predilection for theories of history that
promise universal redemption but attach special importance to Russian
leadership”.755 The narrative of the Great Patriotic War fitted this idea of
Russian leadership saving the world from evil perfectly.
In the Brezhnev era, there were Soviet historians who sought to go
beyond the official Party line, but this was a difficult choice likely to end in
unemployment and/or arrest. The fate of Aleksandr Nekrich was the
clearest example. Having established himself as prominent historian and
member of the Academy of Sciences, Nekrich published in 1965 1941.22
iiunia, a history of the period leading up to the war and the first days of
the invasion.756 On the one hand, Nekrich’s work contained many
elements that would not be out of place in any other official Soviet-era
histories. Nekrich consistently praised the three pillars that held up the
official Soviet view of the war: the Party, the people, and the Red Army.
In explaining the Soviet victory, Nekrich argued that the Germans failed
to appreciate the bond between the Soviet people and the state, and thus
underestimated Soviet fighting capacity. According to Nekrich, the
Communist Party instilled in the people a deep patriotism and love for the
Soviet Union that prepared them to defend the motherland at all costs:
“This thought was so natural that it became a simple, everyday affair for
millions of young men and women”.
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When the invasion came, Nekrich noted that Red Army soldiers, “fought
heroically, to the last round, to the last breath”, and that, “[h]istory has
not known such massive heroism as Soviet soldiers demonstrated in the
years of the Great Patriotic War”. Equal in stature to the deeds of the Red
Army was the selfless sacrifice and hard work of all of the peoples of the
Soviet Union, whose ceaseless efforts made victory possible. Finally, it
was the role of the Communist Party that:
unified and directed all the efforts of the people. Communists were
the steadiest, bravest fighters wherever they were in the years of the
Patriotic War. In battles and in labour alike they always marched in
front, not sparing their own lives, carrying the people along after
them by their personal example.
Like other Soviet works, Nekrich insisted that the U.S.S.R. was genuinely
committed to collective security, and faithfully upheld the non-aggression
pact with Germany. What made Nekrich’s history distinctive was his
withering attack on Stalin’s competence in the lead-up to the war. Stalin
foolishly relied upon his flawed strategy of appeasing Hitler, ignored the
warning of military experts such as Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiĭ and
launched “baseless repressions” against the Red Army. Nekrich was of the
view that the war could have turned out very differently: “It is quite
obvious that the war would have started and developed very differently if
Hitler’s army had been stopped on the territory of the border military
districts”.757 Nekrich’s book was researched and written in the Khrushchëv
period, but appeared just as the Brezhnev-era re-Stalinisation got under
way. Nekrich virtually overnight became historicus non grata, and the
new leadership began to retreat to a more traditional Soviet interpretation
of Stalin and the first phase of the war. 1941.22 iiunia was banned,
Nekrich expelled from Communist Party (which he had been a member of
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since 1943), publicly attacked, and eventually moved abroad.758 Nothing
like Nekrich’s account would appear again in the Brezhnev era.
The Brezhnev period was noteworthy for the appearance of a twelvevolume history not just of the Great Patriotic War but of the Second World
War as a whole. According to one recent “patriotic” account, the Istoriia
vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny 1939-1945 gg (hence ‘Brezhnev-era Istoriia’) was the
“most serious achievement of the Soviet period” and its research
“continues to hold scientific significance to this day”. 759 Stalin became
more prominent, but the big winner of the Brezhnev era (apart from
Brezhnev himself) was Zhukov.760 During the 1960s, Soviet commanders
published their memoirs for the first time: Konev, Rokossovskiĭ, Zhukov,
Vasilevskiĭ, and Sokolovskiĭ gave their perspectives and settled scores
with other generals.761 In the Brezhnev era, Zhukov replaced both Stalin
and Khrushchëv as the real architect of victory, the military genius who
never lost a battle.762
Zhukov’s memoirs, which were more sympathetic to Stalin than the other
memoirs of the leading generals, became the crucial insider source of
what had happened in the fight for the Soviet capital.763 For Zhukov, the
claims that Hitler cost Germany the Battle for Moscow by diverting troops
to Ukraine were simply a falsification of history concocted by embarrassed
former German generals and bourgeois historians aiming to divert the
onus of victory away from the Soviet Union.764 Had the Red Army at Kiev
not been defeated, the flanks of Army Group Centre would have been
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placed under serious threat in the ensuing Battle for Moscow.765 According
to Zhukov, the Germans were intoxicated by their success in Ukraine and
underestimated the fighting power and spirit of the Soviet people.
Zhukov emphasised that the tragedy of the early defeats was caused
mostly by the benefits of surprise enjoyed by the German Army.766 The
Red Army’s leaders had expected a frontier war that would last three
weeks before overwhelming Soviet counter-attacks would crush the
enemy.767 The plan was for the covering forces – mainly infantry - at the
frontier to hold the Germans while a second echelon of mechanised corps,
infantry and aviation mounted a devastating counter-attack. This was the
basis of the mobilisation plan MP-41 developed in February 1941. There
was no planning for a strategic defence. The counter-attacks were
expected to seize the initiative from the enemy. Apart from the surprise
attack, another factor was the numerical advantage of the German
invasion forces compared to Soviet defence forces. Soviet accounts
stressed that on the eve of the invasion the Germans had an enormous
number

of

fully

staffed,

well-equipped

and

well-trained

divisions

positioned ready for the attack.768 Unlike the Soviet troops opposing
them, the German troops at this point had two years of modern warfare
experience.769
What the Khrushchëv and Brezhnev eras did agree upon was that the
weather had not influenced the fighting to any significant extent. The
Brezhnev-era Istoriia’s fourth volume referred to the weather only twice
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in its presentation of Operation Typhoon, once to explain that the
Germans were desperate to complete Operation Barbarossa and seize
Moscow before the onset of winter,770 and once to note that the Soviet
troops were kept warm in their winter uniforms by the time of the Soviet
counter-attack on 5-6 December 1941.771 The 1976 Sovetskaia Voennaia
Ėntsiklopediia 1: A - Biuro (hence ‘Ėntsiklopediia’) offered only one
mention of weather in its entry ‘The Battle of Moscow 1941-42’; in that
telling, Soviet troops were ultimately successful in their counter-attack of
early December 1941 despite the severe frosts and intense snow cover.772
There was a concession to the influence of the weather in the 1984
Velikaia Otechestvennaia voĭna Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945. Kratkaia
istoriia (hence ‘Kratkaia istoriia’), which conceded that the Germans
suffered 100,000 casualties as a result of frostbite.773 Despite this, the
reader is left in no doubt that the Germans were beaten militarily before
the elements left their mark.
The point of the Soviet diatribes about the weather was that this was the
key method by which the ‘West’ was seeking to rob the Red Army of its
victory. According to the Kratkaia istoriia, the West had come up with the
great lie that:
it was the autumn rains and mudslides that supposedly slowed down
the German advance. This clumsy evasion was later picked up all
sorts of falsifiers of history who are biased and do not want to admit
the truth, that the so-called general offensive by the Nazis on
Moscow was thwarted not by the rasputitsa, not the cold autumn
rain, but the greatest durability and endurance of the Soviet soldiers,
the unparalleled courage and inexhaustible strength of the people,
and the deep belief in the victory of their cause.774
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The Brezhnev-era Istoriia made only one mention of the differing opinions
in the German High Command in October 1941, claiming that the discord
was above all the result of the unexpectedly strong resistance of the
Soviet troops.775 The Kratkaia istoriia stated that Hitler’s indecision after
Smolensk and the subsequent diversion of troops from Army Group
Centre came as a direct result of the stubborn resistance offered by
Soviet troops.776
Soviet memoirists confirmed that Generals ‘Mud’ and ‘Winter’ were merely
the imagined enemies of the beaten German generals. Konev noted that
on 7 October - the same date that Halder first mentioned the mud in his
diary - Soviet manoeuvrability was restricted by a lack of motor vehicles;
the Germans, however, were able to move easily and freely.777 Zhukov
and Vasilevskiĭ were equally dismissive of the importance of the weather:
the Western meteorological focus was simply an excuse invented by
former German commanders and other Westerners unwilling to accept
that it was the Red Army who truly defeated the Wehrmacht before
Moscow.778 According to Zhukov, the mud was only truly impassable for a
relatively brief period in October 1941.779 Zhukov added that the
Muscovite women who were digging defences around the city at the same
time had to work on equally impassable roads and yet managed to get
the job done: “Mud stuck to their boots, too, and to the wheelbarrows
they used to haul earth, and added an incredible load to shovels that
were unfamiliar in women’s hands”.780 As Zhukov summed up (while at
the same time taking the opportunity to attack the Western strawmen
historians):
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Bourgeois historians and former Nazi generals have tried to convince
the public that the million picked German troops were beaten at
Moscow not by the iron steadfastness, courage and heroism of Soviet
soldiers, but by mud, cold and deep snow. The authors of these
apologetics seem to forget that Soviet forces had to operate under
the same conditions.781
Rokossovskiĭ was one of the few Soviet commanders who conceded that
the mud did indeed play a role in stifling the German attack. However, he
also noted that by 17 November, the freezing of the muddy ground
allowed Nazi armoured and motorised units, “their main striking force”, to
have a much freer hand.782
The Stalin, Khrushchëv and Brezhnev-era historians all acknowledged that
the situation was grave in 1941. Nonetheless, the eventual victory
brought about by the superior capacity of the Soviet system was never in
doubt. The most common euphemism employed in the official works to
describe dire situations was “complex” (slozhnyĭ).783 For example, the
Kratkaia istoriia described the German taking of the key city of Kalinin as
an example of the situation at the front becoming “all the more
complicated”.784

The

1976

Ėntsiklopediia,

in

perhaps

the

greatest

understatement of them all, described the envelopment of the forces of
the Briansk Front as a situation where the troops “found themselves in
complicated conditions”.785 In other words, Soviet literature specialised in
euphemisms

when

describing

what

by

any

standards

were

truly

calamitous states of affair.
According to much of the Cold War-era literature written in the West, the
Germans overcame the significant Soviet numerical superiority thanks to
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superior German leadership, professionalism and military art. Soviet
sources claimed that it was the other way around, insisting upon the
military and numerical superiority of the Nazi forces attacking the Soviet
capital.786 It was the Germans who enjoyed first the advantage of surprise
and then the advantage of overwhelming numerical superiority. According
to the Brezhnev-era Istoriia, seventy-eight fully operational Nazi divisions,
1,700 tanks and one thousand planes lined up to storm Moscow as part of
Operation Typhoon. The German forces at the beginning of October
amounted to 1,800,000 soldiers facing a Red Army that was only
1,250,000 strong.787
The Soviet history-writers sought to stress German numerical superiority,
to focus on the heroism and sacrifice of the Red Army, and to find silver
linings even in the most “complex” situations. The Soviet defeats at
Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, and Viaz’ma were all Pyrrhic victories for the
Germans. Soviet readers learned that in the encirclements of the first
months of the war, “tens of thousands” of Soviet troops were killed in an
unequal battle with the enemy.788 However, the German success came at
great cost. As the Kratkaia istoriia claimed, the Kiev encirclement cost the
Germans more than one hundred thousand officers and men. As a result
of the engagement the Germans were delayed in their assault on Moscow
and failed to complete the blitzkrieg before the onset of winter.789
On occasions where the Red Army was forced to retreat, it was always a
fighting retreat. For example, the failure of the Mozhaĭsk Line to hold the
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German advance is explained by overwhelming German numerical
superiority; the Red Army troops fought nearly to the death in the face of
overwhelming odds and only retreated when faced with the risk of
encirclement.790 Soviet troops responded to the call of the Party by
declaring that “there would not be Fascist thugs in Moscow”.791 Displaying
“unprecedented heroism and resilience”, Red Army soldiers defended
every inch of their native land.792 The Red Army gained the necessary
experience to take on their experienced and well-equipped foe.793 Red
Army troops fought bravely and to the last man, defending every inch of
their native soil against imperialist German aggression.794
All Soviet accounts paid tribute to the organisational powers of the
Communist Party. In their memoirs, Timoshenko and Sokolovskiĭ both
heavily attributed the victory at Moscow to the organisational powers of
the Communist Party.795 Zhukov described the welding of front and rear
under the guidance of the Communist Party as “the key factor in our
victory at Moscow”.796 Vasilevskiĭ similarly stressed that victory belonged
to the Communist Party, whose “intrepidity, organisation and staunchness
cemented the troops”.797 The Kratkaia istoriia noted how a grateful Soviet
people “paid tribute to the organisational genius of its Leninist party, who
bore the full responsibility for the fate of the country”.798 In the first five
months of the war alone, 100,000 Communists and 260,000 Komsomol
members enlisted for the front.799 When the threat to the capital reemerged in October, within only a few days twenty-five ‘Communist’ and
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‘worker’ battalions were formed in Moscow; these were seventy-five per
cent staffed by Party and Komsomol members.800 Not only was this a
valuable injection of manpower to the front, but “the strong work ethic”
and “Party temperament” increased the morale of the troops and their
resilience; their “personal example of selfless bravery and courage
inspired men to heroic deeds”.801 Political work in general “strengthened
the soldiers’ confidence in the victory over the enemy”.802
The Party was the key institution in organising the defences of Moscow
and ensuring the military production necessary to enable the soldiers to
fight.803 Soviet readers were told that, “[i]n these difficult days the party
was, as always, with the people, directing their actions, pointing the way
to victory over the enemy” [emphasis added].804 The frantic production
efforts that followed Pravda’s call for total mobilisation to defend the
capital demonstrated the, “great trust of the People in the Party”.805
Despite the Wehrmacht’s proximity to Moscow, “[t]his call by the Party
found a warm response in the hearts of the Soviet people, to give new
strength to soldiers and commanders. A continuous stream of trains filled
with arms and ammunition came to the front”.806 Muscovites en masse
joined workers’ battalions and spent their free time voluntarily digging
extensive defences for the city.807 As the danger to the capital increased,
Party and Komsomol members energetically organised meetings and
rallies, Party members had to “appear to all as a personal example of
courage and perseverance”.808
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On 4 July the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party issued
orders for the city to raise twelve divisions of a peoples’ militia, charged
with the task of constructing defences west of Moscow and of manning
them as a reserve front behind the active front. These divisions were
eventually incorporated into the Reserve Front and saw action at El’nia in
August. When the State Defence Committee called for the reinforcement
of defensive positions near Mozhaĭsk and for extensive defensive lines to
be constructed near Viaz’ma, between 85,000 and 100,000 Muscovites,
mostly women, were mobilised for the task.809 Workers in Moscow began
to work triple shifts, and many women and youths filled the vacancies:
“Thus, the entire working-age population of the capital was involved in
the defence of Moscow”.810 According to Samsonov, it was civilians who
were responsible for extinguishing eighty per cent of all incendiary bombs
that fell on Moscow.811 Teenagers, even children, were trained to disrupt
enemy actions.812 Soviet propaganda developed the image of a mobilised
city with civilians digging trenches and Red Army units regrouping to
march to the front.813 Zhukov praised the “common and united efforts of
Soviet troops and the people of Moscow and the Moscow area,
unanimously supported by the entire nation”.814 Sokolovskiĭ noted that
special mention in the victory before Moscow must be made of the people
of the capital who provided troops and armaments in their darkest
hour.815
Official Soviet histories conceded that Communists had to be used to stifle
the slightest manifestations of panic, cowardice and false rumours. There
809
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was an acknowledgement that a state of siege was introduced in Moscow
on 19 October, but this was explained as a reaction to the threatening
situation on the outskirts of the city, not internal disintegration. 816 The
State Defence Committee urged the people of Moscow at this time to
“respect law and order, and to the Red Army … give every assistance”.817
Zhukov produced the most candid of the Soviet accounts, noting that a
small minority of people did panic and spread rumours, but offered the
explanation that, “there are black sheep in every family”.818
Overall however, the Soviet view of the war affirmed that, while the
danger looming over Moscow was a source of deep concern for the entire
country, the Soviet Union held firm.819 The Soviet people did not succumb
to fear, but were united in their resolve to work harder for the wartime
cause.820 Across the country, meetings proclaimed the collective desire to
defend the capital at all costs.821 According to Zhukov, when Moscow was
in danger the “entire country, the sons and daughters of all the Union
republics, heeded the call of the Party and government for the defense of
Moscow”.822 The Soviet peoples united like never before: “Their persistent
and selfless struggle exemplifies the military cooperation of the fraternal
peoples of our country, because in these troubled days, there was nothing
more important than the salvation of Moscow”.823 Those who did not
directly take up arms aided the capital with their tireless industrial output.
Even besieged Leningrad managed to continue to produce weapons and
armaments for the capital.824
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The smaller towns that formed Moscow’s perimeter were celebrated too.
Tula became a hero-city in 1976 when the Brezhnev period was at its
zenith. Many troops defending Tula were formed from local militias. Other
workers managed to produce for the defenders significant numbers of
weapons,

ammunition,

tanks,

machine

guns,

uniforms

and

food

supplies.825 Still others devoted their efforts to erecting fortifications and
“turning their city into a fortress”.826 After noting that the Germans could
not take their objective and that the ranks of those who fought were filled
with Party and Komsomol members, the Brezhnev-era Istoriia concluded
that Tula was the pride of the Soviet Union: “Their courage was amazing.
Tula residents turned their city into a fortress and did not surrender it to
the enemy”.827 The people of Tula showed examples of “revolutionary
consciousness, discipline and endurance”.828 According to Zhukov, the
Tula workers regiment demonstrated particular steadfastness and courage
in battle; “the glory given to Moscow as a hero city belongs also to Tula
and its people”.829
Conclusion
The Soviet view of the war differed from the dominant Western Cold War
narratives about 1941 in almost every respect. In the Soviet Union, it was
required that historians demonstrate the superiority of Communism, and
the solidarity of the Soviet people, army, and state. Despite minor
fluctuations regarding what leader should be credited with the victory,
and because of the suppression of mildly deviant voices such as Nekrich,
the dominant Soviet message was consistent. Above all, the Great
Patriotic War was a righteous struggle against an evil opponent whose
unprovoked surprise attack was both the sole cause of the war and the
main explanation of why the Red Army conceded so much ground in
825
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1941. Especially from the mid-1960s, the victory over the Nazis became
the principal achievement of the Soviet system and the justification for
the leadership of Brezhnev and the Communist Party as a whole.
Soviet histories explicitly rejected the view of the German generals that it
was Hitler’s errors and divisions between the political and military
leaderships combined with the weather that prevented the Germans from
capturing the Soviet capital. Nor did the Soviet view of the war agree with
the logic of van Creveld and Reinhardt that the Germans lost the war in
1941 because they lacked the necessary resources given the scale of the
task.

According

to

Soviet

historians,

the

Red

Army

was

often

outnumbered but fought skilfully to halt the Germans and then drive them
back in the

December

counter-offensive. Furthermore, as Zhukov

maintained, Moscow was only the foundation of the victory; the Germans,
benefiting from the booty of an enslaved Europe, again seized the
strategic initiative in 1942 and 1943 before their defeats at Stalingrad and
Kursk respectively. In the absence of a second front, the Red Army and
the Soviet state had to carry the burden of the war alone for years after
Moscow.
The real mistake of Hitler and the Nazis according to the official Soviet
view was hubris. The Soviet histories described Hitler as “boastful”
(khvastlivyĭ),830 and the operational name Typhoon as “grandiose”
(gromkiĭ),831 and “cocky” (kriklivyĭ).832 They portrayed the failure to
capture Moscow in the first months of Operation Barbarossa as having a
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“sobering” effect on a few “opportunistic” Nazis,833 who had “linked the
fate of their troops” with the capital’s taking.834 Marshal Konev summed
up the themes of Nazi combat strength, Hitler’s hubris, and the entire
military capacity of European facing Moscow with a boast of his own:
The enemy was at the zenith of its military power. Using the
resources of conquered countries in Europe, he was preparing for a
decisive battle. By grouping a large force in the Moscow area, the
enemy hoped to end the war before the winter cold. Hitler,
intoxicated with victory in the West, was hoping for an easy
victory. He overestimated their strength and underestimated the
strength of the Red Army, the potential of the Soviet Union, and the
morale of our people.835
The Soviet view of the war was a story of agency, of the Soviet state,
army, and people calling upon their reserves of spirit and solidarity to
overcome a treacherous, cowardly, and genocidal opponent. It was only
as Communism faltered in the late 1980s that the story of another, quite
different war became available in the Soviet Union.
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Chapter Eight: The “Revisionist” Critique

The Cold War came to a peaceful end in the late 1980s when Mikhail
Gorbachëv, the last Communist leader, failed in his efforts to revitalise
and strengthen the Soviet system. Gorbachёv in February 1987 put out a
call to “fill in the blank spots of history”.836 Gorbachёv was answered by
the emergence of a bitter conflict over every aspect of Russian history,
but especially over the formerly “sacred memory” of the Great Patriotic
War. The argument of this chapter is that while it might have been
expected that the new era of glasnost’ might have led to a convergence
between Western and Russian historians - who were now able to mine the
archives together in order to reconsider the events of 1941, present
papers at joint conferences and publish collections of essays that showed
both Western and Russian perspectives - the reverse occurred. While
Western historians found in the Soviet archives evidence of greater Soviet
agency and regime capacity than hitherto suspected, a “revisionist”
paradigm emerged in Russia that vehemently attacked the official Soviet
version of the war and the myths that were encrusted around it.
Celebration of the Soviet achievement in the Battle of Moscow did not
suddenly become extinct as Communism collapsed. During the Gorbachëv
and Yeltsin eras, well-known historians from the Soviet period used the
new archival material to offer a more realistic account of the Battle of
Moscow. These histories argued, as their Soviet predecessors had done,
that Hitler and not Stalin was the aggressor, that the Red Army was
unprepared for war but learned from its mistakes, and that actions taken
by the Soviet state along with the patriotism of the people saved the
Soviet capital. The titles of their works told the story: L. A. Bezymenskiĭ’s,
The Taming of Typhoon; V. A. Anfilov’s, The Collapse of Hitler’s March on
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Moscow. 1941; A. M. Samsonov’s, Moscow 1941: From the Tragedy of
Defeat to a Great Victory; and V. I. Nevzorov’s, Moscow Led the Country
to Victory, modified the Soviet story of 1941, but did not fundamentally
change it.837 Historians from the old Soviet military establishment,
sometimes with financial help from Western universities, published
material from the archives in huge scholarly collections that became
available for historians to study. For the Battle of Moscow alone, new
documentary collections appeared almost every year.838
For those demanding a serious revision of the Soviet view of the war,
however, these conventional military histories were either inadequate or
simply continued the falsifications of the Soviet era. The critics of the
Soviet view of the war are often described as ‘revisionists’, whose attack
on the official Soviet view was so pervasive that, by 1997, von Hagen
could write that, “the orthodox views of the war tenaciously holds on, but
is now clearly a minority position and its adherents are ostracised in the
'liberal' and 'democratic media”.839 Or, as M. I. Mel’tiukhov, a critic of the
revisionists, put it in 2000 with a sense of regret:
The events of 1941 are the most studied period of the Great Patriotic
War from both sides. However, in recent years, the conventional
wisdom, especially in popular academic and media writings has
become that this was a period solely of endless defeats for the Red
Army and victories for the Wehrmacht. As a consequence, the
837
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impression is created that only a lucky chance saved the Soviet
Union from defeat.840
Historians in the West often describe more radical critics of the Soviet
view of the war, especially those who embrace the Icebreaker thesis, as
‘revisionists’. This term is popular in Russia too, though the term has
become a pejorative term in much of the recent Russian writing about the
war. As a result of this, many Russian critics of the Soviet view of the war
describe themselves as ‘independent’ of the old Soviet establishment
rather than as a ‘revisionist’ historians. Lev Lopukhovsky and Boris
Kavalerchik wrote in their 2017 re-assessment of the number of Soviet
war dead stated that:
Our interest is not revisionism, but rather a re-evaluation of some
events of the war in light of newly discovered facts…Russia’s military
history must be liberated from the false dogmas and stratification
resulting from the ideological tenets of the Central Committee of the
CSPU.841
These authors wished for their work not to be charged with the label
‘revisionist’, for in Putin’s Russia, ‘revisionist’ has become a term of abuse
under which authors are accused of, “trying to reduce the magnitude of
the heroic deeds of Soviet soldiers and officers, diminish the merits of
military leaders, and, in the final analysis, devalue the Soviet victory
itself”.842 These objections to the term ‘revisionist’ must be taken into
account, but because the term is so widely used it will be used in this
thesis to describe the Russian-language criticism of the Soviet view of the
war.
Moreover there is a range of opinions among these critics of the Soviet
view of the war, although one main idea connects both moderates and
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radicals on this spectrum. Instead of a “Red Victory”, the revisionists
argued the case for a “Stolen Victory”. In other words, Moscow and the
Soviet state were saved in spite of the regime’s incompetence and
unpopularity because of the ordinary Soviet citizen’s capacity to fight and
endure, a characteristic cynically exploited by Stalin and his regime.
According to Tumarkin, the concept of a “Stolen Victory” - that is that the
regime stealing credit for the victory from the people - first became
prominent when the newspaper Komsomolskaia Pravda on 5 May 1990
published a conversation between a leading historian, Gennadi Bordiugov,
and a journalist on the upcoming 9 May celebrations under the heading of
“Stolen Victory” (ukradennaia pobeda).843 Bordiugov later summarised
the “Stolen Victory” concept for English-language readers:
During the war there were two interconnected but heterogeneous
active forces, the people and the system. In the first stage of the
war, the system was the leading but ineffective force. It was the
people who turned into the real leading force and produced talented
commanders from their ranks… But while the force of the people
brought about victory, the force of the system gripped the victory in
its iron vice.844
As Constantine Pleshakov, a historian who grew up in the Soviet Union
but is now an academic writer in the West, summed up the “Stolen
Victory” concept: “During the war Stalin’s regime proved staggeringly
inept at everything except crushing domestic dissent and using millions as
cannon fodder”.845 Rather than the regime, it was “millions of Uncle
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Vanyas” who died in unnecessary and wasteful operations, who saved
both Moscow and Stalin.846
From 1987, archival revelations told the story of a mismanaged and cruel
war fought by the Soviet authorities. According to R.W. Davies, the
turning point at an official level for frank discussion of the war was the
General Staff and Chief Political Administration of the Red Army’s 1987
decision to allow the publication of a candid 1966 interview between
Zhukov and the writer, Konstantin Siminov:
Since then the conduct of the Second World War has been discussed
with much greater frankness: the strange and often grim world
around Stalin, the making of military policy, and the policies
themselves.847
Documents detailing the decision on 12 September 1941 to form
“blocking detachments” (zagradotriady) were published in 1988.848 The
revisionist agenda was often set by newspaper articles, film-makers and
literary

figures

rather

than

historians

in

the

old

Soviet

military

establishment.849 The Soviet public, for example, learned about penal
detachments from the documentary film Shtrafniki and the ensuing
controversy over the role of coercion and excessive cost in bringing Stalin
his victory.850
The rigid respect and patriotic fervour of the Brezhnev era gave way in
the late 1980s and early 1990s to conflicts indicating the disillusionment especially of the young - with the hoary old clichés surrounding the defeat
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of fascism.851 According to Braithwaite, the list of ‘hallowed truths’ that
were disputed in the last years of the Gorbachëv era was a long one:
Why had Stalin failed to foresee the German attack? Was he himself
preparing to attack when Hitler stole a march on him? Why did the
Red Army perform so badly in the first days and months of the war,
despite the huge sacrifices, which the people had made to give it the
best equipment in the world? Could Hitler have captured Moscow and
won the war if he had not sent Guderian south into the Ukraine?
Could, above all, the Victory have been won without such an
appalling expenditure of blood? Were the millions of casualties –
many, many times what the German enemy had suffered-the
consequence of German efficiency or Soviet ruthlessness, brutality
and incompetence?852
It would be impossible given the constraints of this study to examine the
myriad historians and non-historians who have contributed to the
revisionist critique. Instead, five prominent revisionist accounts of 1941 –
Dmitriĭ Volkogonov, Boris Sokolov, Vladimir Beshanov, Mark Solonin, Iuriĭ
Zhuk, Lev Lopukhovsky – are summarised to show the range of views and
how these accounts are locked into battle with the Soviet view of the
war.853 As a consequence of the revisionist attack on the official Soviet
view, the revisionist wave that peaked in the 1990s did not really align
with the mainstream Western accounts of that era, which were locked into
battle with the Halder school and Cold War stereotypes about the Eastern
Front.
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Just like in the preceding Khrushchëv and Brezhnev eras, there was an
attempt in the Gorbachëv era to produce an “official” multi-volume history
that revised the Soviet view of the war. The leading military historians of
the Institute of Military History embarked upon an ambitious plan to
rewrite the history of the war through a new ten-volume History of the
Great Patriotic War dedicated to the Soviet people. 854 The project proved
so contentious that it was shelved by Defence Minister Dmitriĭ Yiazov just
before he took part in the August 1991 conservative coup against
Gorbachëv that hastened the Soviet collapse. The editor of the proposed
series was Dmitriĭ Volkogonov, the director of the Institute of Military
History, who had already written and published Triumph and Tragedy
(Triumf i Tragediia) in 1988, an archive-based account of Stalin, much of
which focused upon Stalin’s wartime record.855
In his account of Stalin, Volkogonov did not challenge the idea that the
Soviet Union was the innocent party in the outbreak of the war.
Volkogonov argued that during the 1930s, the Soviet Union was genuinely
committed to a policy of collective security against Nazi Germany. Stalin’s
signing of the Non-Aggression Pact was justified in the wake of Munich
and the obvious failure of collective security. Volkogonov also accepted as
justified Stalin’s suspicion that the West wanted Hitler to attack the Soviet
Union. The Soviet occupation of the new borderlands in Poland was
unfortunate but necessary, and was welcomed by most of the population
there given the certainty of a German invasion in the near future. The
Red Army performed poorly in the Winter War with Finland, confirming for
Stalin the reports of his generals that the Red Army was not ready for
war. Stalin’s obsession thereafter became appeasement of Hitler. Stalin’s
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mistake was, despite all of the evidence, to think that war could be
delayed for two or three years.856
Volkogonov criticised strongly Stalin’s failure to listen to warnings from
Soviet, British and U.S. intelligence. Stalin ignored the brazen incursion
into Soviet airspace by the Luftwaffe, and the suspiciously gracious terms
granted to the Soviet Union by Germany when finalising the new SovietGerman border. Stalin had placed himself at the helm of such a despotic
state that his subordinates were unwilling to question his assumptions:
The nature of Stalin’s miscalculations lay not only in his wrong
assessments, his wrong predictions or even the ill will of the
aggressor, though these were things were of course all present. His
unforgivable mistakes stemmed from his personal rule. It is hard to
blame the commissars or the Chief War Council, when their boss’s
image was that of the infallible and wise leader.
For Volkogonov, Stalin’s response to the start of war was typical of the
tyrant in that he simply sacked or executed those around him. By placing
so much power in himself, Stalin made his miscalculations of Hitler’s
intentions far worse than necessary. In the first phase of the war, Stalin
displayed military ineptitude and Civil War era tactical thinking; his
“impulsive and erratic, superficial and incompetent orders; his “harsh and
intolerant and often vicious” behaviour; and the atmosphere of fear and
lack of initiative from those around him.857
Volkogonov noted that a week before Operation Barbarossa, West Front
commander Pavlov requested permission to improve his defensive
position for fear of attack, but that the Kremlin denied his request.
Thereafter Stalin, the military amateur, was responsible for a series of
costly blunders. As for the loss of the South-West Front at Kiev, “Stalin
and his Staff were responsible for the tragedy”. According to Volkogonov,
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Stalin was out of touch with the realities of the front. He put out cruel
orders threatening the families of soldiers who did not stand and fight,
refused sensible requests for an orderly retreat, and was deluded in his
thinking that half-formed infantry and cavalry units could plug the gaps.
Volkogonov tended to steer a course that criticised Stalin, but still praised
the valour of the Soviet people. He noted the strength and unity of the
people of Moscow in their darkest hour despite Stalin’s inept leadership.
Volkogonov had no time for the Vlasov movement: “a mixed bag of
criminals

and

nationalists,

but

mainly

of

people

who

had

found

themselves in a hopeless situation”. In the dark days of October 1941
when it seemed to Stalin that all hope was lost: “it was the people who
saved him, the people who found the strength to stand firm”. Stalin was
indeed fortunate that, “the nation was prepared to sacrifice much if it was
for the salvation of the Motherland.858 Neither the weather nor Hitler’s
mistakes figured in Volkogonov’s summary of the outcome of the war. For
Volkogonov, it was the steadfastness and patriotism of the Soviet people
that compensated for Stalin’s horrendous errors. Here Volkogonov started
the most important trend observable in the revisionist account; the Soviet
people, motivated by patriotism and not by Communist ideology, won the
war despite the incredible mistakes of Stalin and the regime.
In retrospect, Volkogonov deepened the Khrushchëv-era criticism of
Stalin, much as Nekrich had tried to do decades before. Volkogonov did
not suggest that the Soviet Union was responsible for starting the war,
but many other historians and writers did. For the first time, the Soviet
public learned about the existence of the Nazi-Soviet Pact’s secret
protocols relating to new borders and later a deal of friendship and trade
with his supposed mortal enemy.859 It was argued that the secret
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protocols weakened Soviet defences, created a murderously hostile
population in newly acquired territories, and made the Red Army the
vanguard of a totalitarian system just as bad as Nazi Germany.860 Stalin’s
mistaken expectation that if a German invasion were to occur the war
would be fought on foreign soil was a grave error that cost the Soviet
Union millions of lives.861 Stalin had accurate and compelling information,
but refused to heed intelligence reports that a German invasion was
imminent.862
For many critics of the Soviet view of the war, even more compelling was
the evidence of Stalin’s aggressive intentions assembled in Suvorov’s
Icebreaker, first published in the West in 1988 and available in Russian
from 1991. Suvorov, following his defection from the Soviet Union, had
made the case as early as 1985 that Stalin saw 1941 as an opportunity to
launch the offensive war for which the Red Army had been preparing
since the 1920s. As described in Chapter Six, Icebreaker was a
fundamental attack on the most basic premise of the official Soviet view
of the war – that the Soviet Union was a peace-loving, innocent party
attacked by an unscrupulous opponent who exploited the advantages of
deception and surprise. Icebreaker had a print-run of some 320,000
copies when it first appeared, and was serialised in the newspaper
Nezavisimaia gazeta during the 1993 election campaign.863 As Hill has put
it, “Suvorov’s thesis had considerable appeal to revisionist historians in
post-Soviet Russia, who were more than willing to adopt an argument
running counter to the Soviet image of the Soviet Union desperately
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seeking to preserve peace”.864 New pieces of evidence – Stalin’s speech of
5 May to military graduates describing the Red Army as an attacking
force, a change in Soviet propaganda around the need for an aggressive
war, and an appraisal seemingly written by Vasilevskiĭ for Stalin before 15
May canvassing a pre-emptive strike against Hitler – were published in
newspapers and journals and embraced by revisionists as ‘smoking guns’
that confirmed Suvorov’s case.865
The second issue that has galvanised revisionist histories of the war in
Russia was the cost of the war. On 14 March 1946, Pravda reported Stalin
claiming that the Soviet Union suffered seven million losses in the war
against Nazi Germany. Khrushchëv dramatically increased the figure to
“more than twenty million”. In the Brezhnev era, the figure became
twenty-two million. In the Gorbachëv era a final figure of 26.6 million
dead was announced.866 A research team working within the post-Soviet
Russian military establishment using data collected by Soviet military
authorities during the war fixed the number of dead soldiers at
8,668,400.867 These numbers have long been, and continue to be,
questioned, even ridiculed.868 The scale of the casualties matter especially
to critics of the Soviet regime because, as one recent account put it,
arguments about

the

scale

of human casualties

are

“inseparably

associated with the measure of responsibility before the nation of the
USSR’s military and political leadership at that time”.869
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Volkogonov was part of the Soviet military establishment, but many of
the voices challenging the Soviet view of the war came from outside.
Among the first generation of ‘independent’ researchers specialising in
1941, arguably the most important was Boris Sokolov; he has been
described by one Western expert as having been responsible for “the
most notable… attack [on] the Soviet system and is values”.870 Sokolov
specialised in literature and anthropology before devoting his career to
rewriting the history of the Red Army and the Second World War.
Sokolov’s books and articles ranged from revisions of the tally of Soviet
losses and support for Icebreaker to a damning biography of Zhukov and
his methods.871
According to Sokolov, Stalin was an aggressive expansionist and was
twice thwarted in his plans to spread world Communism. Stalin planned to
attack Hitler as early as the summer of 1940, but his plans were sent into
disarray by the rapid fall of France. Stalin had hoped to invade west after
the Soviet-Finnish War concluded; veterans of the Finnish War were sent
south to bolster already large Soviet forces on the Western Front. After
the swift defeat of France and fearing the collapse of Britain, Stalin’s
offensive plans to use a drawn-out struggle in France were temporarily
shelved. Planning an attack in 1941, Stalin called up 800,000 reservists.
The annexation of the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina
gave him a platform to invade East Prussia and the Romanian oilfields.
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According to Sokolov, the Red Army was planning for only one type of
war, which was an offensive war against a German-led coalition. The
Katyn massacre was necessary because the Polish officers, intelligentsia
and propertied classes were the potential core of an anti-Soviet army
when the Red Army invaded westwards. Stalin ordered the creation of a
‘Polish’ division, to be completed by 1 July and manned by men of Polish
descent (or by those who could speak Polish) to assist in the invasion of
Poland. At the same time, Stalin approved the 15 May pre-emptive strike
plan proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevskiĭ, confirmation of which was the
ordering of troop movements consistent with an invasion that was
intended for the beginning of July.872 Even if Stalin had managed to
invade first, the war would have followed much the same course. The Red
Army would swiftly have been pushed back to Soviet territory and the
defeats would have followed much like actually happened.873 The Red
Army would have been no match for the Germans in the first phase of the
war. While it was true that the Red Army’s mechanised corps were less
than fully staffed and equipped, much more serious were poor training of
the personnel that were there, weak command and control in the
armoured formations, and German superiority in the air.874
For Sokolov, the Red Army clearly suffered from a series of defects
ranging from Stalin’s incompetence to more basic “cultural factors”. The
Red Army was impressive only on paper as events were to show. Stalin
and his military leaders were obsessed with creating the perception that it
was the biggest and the best. Creating more and more understrength
divisions was popular with the Red Army’s leadership because it created
command positions and ever-greater patronage networks. The problem
was that it also created a bloated structure incapable of a nimble
response to the German invasion. A Soviet mechanised corps had more
than one thousand tanks, which no Soviet commander was trained or
872
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equipped to command. There were not enough radio-sets and the drivermechanics could not maintain this armada so that most tanks were lost
trying to march to the battlefield. This “gigantomania” almost proved
fatal.875 If there had been a more streamlined defence - fewer Soviet
divisions of more or less the same size as the German division each
equipped with radio communication – the outcome might have been
different.876 Zhukov embodied Stalinist cruelty on a scale that led to the
cruel waste of cannon fodder.877 Zhukov was not just Stalin’s marshal but
a Stalinist marshal who had no pity for the victims of his decisions.
On the other hand, Sokolov was not of the view that only draconian
measures explained Red Army performance. What mattered were
favourable conditions for defence and the availability of weapons, tanks
and aircraft. In the right conditions, the average Red Army soldier was
indeed willing to fight. In a summary of the outcome of the Battle of
Moscow, Sokolov painted a complex picture of an interplay between the
weather and Soviet resistance. After the smashing of the Western,
Reserve, and Briansk Fronts in October, the Germans rushed towards an
encirclement of Moscow. The Soviet capital was “weakly defended”, but
the “miserable road conditions of the autumn rains” prevented the
Germans from quickly moving eastwards and gave the Red Army much
needed breathing space. In fact, the German offensive ground to a halt
on 31 October in part because of the mud.

Yet this was not the total

explanation. Ultimately “the courage of the city’s defenders, the approach
of reserves from the interior of the country, as well as German logistical
difficulties in the autumn and winter period thwarted Operation Typhoon”.
Sokolov made it clear that in his view “there was no way that mud alone
could have stopped the Germans prior to the freeze”. On 7 December
Bock complained to his diary that three things – the mud, the inadequate
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supply and unexpected resistance – were holding him up. Sokolov’s
commentary was that the first two could not have held up the Germans
by themselves.878
For Sokolov the weather was one of the factors, but not the most
important factor, in causing the German advance to halt at Moscow. In
the end, the Soviet victory occurred because of “the USSR’s supremacy in
human resources and territory, and the ability of the totalitarian system
to maintain under critical conditions the assistance from its Western
allies”.879 Sokolov credited Soviet resistance with slowing the Nazi
advance, albeit at great cost. Yet this could hardly be described as a Red
victory as asserted by the official Soviet victories given that Stalin’s goal
was to strike and defeat the Wehrmacht at the frontiers. It was no
surprise that the Germans had noticed endless hordes of Red Army
cannon fodder and civilian sacrifices because this was precisely Stalin’s
strategy for winning the war. Stalin was unconcerned for and in fact
despised the ‘little cogs’ in the Red Army and Soviet citizenry and his
disregard for human life showed in the statistics.
The contribution made by Vladimir Beshanov, a Belarussian former Soviet
naval professional, was to debunk the Soviet-era myth that not only was
there a surprise attack, but that the Red Army was outnumbered and
unprepared.880 Beshanov argued that the Red Army’s military arsenal,
especially its tank park, was unrivalled, but organisationally the Red Army
was hopeless in leadership and training. The Soviet Union had the best
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tanks in the world but they were used in the worst possible fashion.
Beshanov rejected the Soviet-era “myth” that the Wehrmacht was
overwhelmingly superior in tanks, aircraft and artillery. It was simply not
true that the tanks of the Red Army were primitive and prone to burst
into flames or that there were only enough rifles for one in three Red
Army soldiers supporting the tanks. It was the Germans who had to
improvise given that they were massively outmanned and outgunned.
According to Beshanov, the Germans were able to assemble a mere 3,800
tanks for Operation Barbarossa, two-thirds of which were classified as
light, while a quarter were out-dated. Meanwhile, the allegedly “peaceloving land of the Soviets” had amassed by 22 June 1941 25,500 tanks
including 1,861 units of the KV and T-34 variety that had no equal among
their contemporaries. While thirteen thousand machines were light tanks,
even they were well-armed and more than capable in battle. Nearly
sixteen thousand tanks were positioned on the western frontier, and while
2,500 of these needed repair this was a serious tank force unprecedented
in the world. In the first three weeks of the war twelve thousand Red
Army tanks had disappeared “like snow on a sunny day”. By December
1941 there were only 1,730 working tanks. Having failed to train and
prepare this first generation of tankists for the war against Nazi Germany,
Stalin found that success came through a completely different cohort who
had to learn how to fight while at war.881
According to Beshanov, in the course of 1941-1942, the Germans lost less
than 800,000 soldiers but the Red Army lost a staggering eight million.
For every dead Red Army solider, ten were captured or deserted in 1941.
Soviet forces lost twenty thousand tanks each year and a grand total of
more than ninety five thousand tanks. Nonetheless, the Red Army
succeeded in wrecking the German plan for a lightning war and, having
881
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stopped the opponent, created conditions for a transfer to the offensive.
German leaders in Berlin did not realise that the Red Army was capable of
such resistance because they failed to take into account that they were
not fighting a Western army. The commanders belonged to “the Stalinist
generation of commanders who had no understanding of individual
freedom and drove into battle millions of slaves who had even less rights
than they did”. For Beshanov, this was a case of:
Two worlds, two systems. In the American and British Armies,
commanders were obliged to care about the lives of their
subordinates… In the Red Army, the worst crime was the failure to
implement even an unimplementable or even criminal order of a
superior.882
Even more critical of the Soviet regime’s capacity to fight the war was
Mark Solonin, an aviation engineer turned historian, who argued that
while Suvorov was right about Stalin’s plan to attack Hitler, he was very
wrong about the alleged terrifying strength and preparedness the Red
Army.883 Solonin argued that Stalin was clearly planning an offensive
action westward. This was not because of the Red Army’s preference for
the offensive: all armies plan to attack and defend. What mattered was
Stalin’s aggressive intent. In the end, Stalin fell victim to a surprise attack
because his intelligence was poor and unreliable. For Solinin, the striking
feature of the first months was not the speed and extent of the German
advances and not the huge losses in the Red Army, but the “surprisingly
(implausibly low) losses by the enemy”. When advancing, Wehrmacht
losses were ten times less than the defending Red Army. By the first week
in July, it was a case of one German loss for every twenty-three Soviet
losses. Normally in war, it is the attacker that requires an advantage of at
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least three-to-one to achieve victory. In this case the outcome was as if
one side was fighting with European weapons and the other side was
fighting with spears.
There was no excuse that the Red Army was caught by surprise because
the Red Army had long been (incompetently) preparing for war. For
Solonin, the Red Army had not just a quantitative advantage in its
equipment, but a qualitative advantage as well. This advantage applied to
equipment such as tanks, anti-tank defences, artillery, and radio
communications. In fact, the Red Army had the best tanks, aircraft and
artillery in the world. The catastrophe of 1941 cannot be explained by
problems in operational skill, tactics, or quality and quantity of arms. If
they were determining factors, the Soviet Union’s victory would have
been “prompt and inevitable”. It could not have been the “incomplete
strategic deployment” that caused the problems because only about 1015 per cent of the Red Army was at the border. The worst defeats came
later at Kiev and Viaz’ma when the Red Army had no excuse in terms of a
perfidious attack.
It therefore must have been “the human factor” that was the reason for
defeat. In 1941, the Red Army was superior to the Germans in numbers
and armaments. According to Solonin, the collapse of the Red Army was
caused by mass non-compliance with orders, mass desertion, and mass
surrender.

The

Red

Army

had

enough

tanks

but

not

enough

motivation. While there was no mass anti-Stalinist uprising, no meetings
and no soldiers committees, Russia’s long-suffering silent majority finally
got to make a choice as Party officials tore up their party cards and ran
for the hills. For a few days, Russia was free of Communism until the
oppression of the Germans turned the people against the invaders. 884
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Iuriĭ Zhuk’s Neizvestnye stranitsy bitvy za Moskvu appeared in 2008 and
in many respects resembled Nagorski’s The Greatest Battle, which came
out the year before.885 Like Nagorski, Zhuk suggested that divisions
between Hitler and his generals were crucial to saving Moscow. Like other
revisionist accounts, Zhuk’s aim was to dispel the Soviet mythology
around the first six months of the war. Stalin’s ‘defensive’ war in 19391940 led to the invasion of Poland, Finland, Rumania, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia. The invasion force of at most 4.3 million was outnumbered
more than two to one by the ten million mobilised soldiers of the Red
Army; Germany’s 4,203 military aircraft amounted to two and half times
less than what was available to the Red Army’s western military districts;
Germany’s 3,844 tanks were vastly outnumbered by the Red Army’s tank
park of 25,932 machines. Despite Stalin’s obsession with war, many Red
Army soldiers went into battle untrained and without weapons.
Zhuk’s main target was Zhukov’s memoirs, which, according to Zhuk,
were

sadly

the

“cornerstone”

both

historiography. Zhukov’s reminiscences

of

Soviet

and

contemporary

claimed that the

Battle

of

Smolensk wore the Germans down and caused the crucial pause in the
German advance. Zhuk noted that, thanks to Zhukov’s falsifications, the
German decision-making process was still not well known to the Russian
public. What happened was that Hitler, who had never understood the
importance of the Soviet capital, overruled his generals who wanted to
push on directly to Moscow. This was just as well given the incompetence
of the Red Army’s command, which was addicted to mindless frontal
assaults that only wasted the advantages that the Soviet Union enjoyed in
numbers and armour. Zhuk, like Sokolov whom he often cited, viewed
Zhukov as callous and uncaring when it came to the losses suffered under
his command. For Zhuk, Zhukov “never gave special consideration to
such ‘trifles’ as the strength and means of the opponent”. His main
885
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concern was his fear of Stalin to whom he constantly boasted about
“brilliant victories” achieved through brutal and often pointless frontal
assaults.
Zhuk concluded by noting that “[n]evertheless we won. Only at the price
of colossal losses was the Red Army able to stop and then defeat the
Wehrmacht”. Soviet histories and the memoirs penned by the generals
then stole this victory from the people and attributed it to themselves.
This was no Soviet victory given that Stalin’s regime triumphed in the end
only because of its willingness to send millions of its citizens to their
deaths.886
Another ‘independent’ historian committed to challenging the Soviet view
of the war is former Soviet rocket artillery expert Lev Lopukhovsky.887
Lopukhovsky might be described as a moderate in Russia’s “history wars”.
He rejected the label of revisionism, nonetheless, Lopukhovsky’s themes
are the massive incompetence on the part of the Soviet political and
military leadership and the systematic hiding of the truth about the cost
of the war.
According to Lopukhovsky, the calamity of 1941 was “pre-programmed”
but not because Stalin was planning a pre-emptive strike. Instead, defeat
was inevitable because of the relative weakness of the Communist
political and economic system, mistakes made by Stalin and his generals,
the relative poverty and lack of education of the Soviet people, and the
botched mobilisation plans of the Red Army. Lopukhovsky has reassessed
the Krivosheev figures for the Red Army dead and concluded that they
886
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underestimated the casualties by nearly half. When the dead from battles
that were not acknowledged by Soviet historians and those who died
while making their way to the battlefield are included, the real figure was
closer to 14.6 million.888 This was testimony to how poorly the regime
used its admittedly limited resources.
In Lopukhovsky’s account of the Battle of Moscow, Hitler did not achieve
strategic surprise because his plans for an attack were already wellknown to Stalin and his Red Army. What the Wehrmacht achieved was
tactical and operational surprise by thwarting the Red Army’s plans to
cover the borders and then astonishing the Red Army with the speed at
which it concentrated forces on its preferred axes of attack and
implemented its goals of encircling and demoralising the Red Army piece
by piece. Lopukhovsky’s incredibly detailed account of the Viaz’ma battle
and its casualties emphasised that the heroic efforts of the Red Army
were undermined by a system of leadership that at every level prioritised
fear over initiative. The German commanders were superior because of
their independence and initiative and their fearlessness in reporting truths
to their superiors. In the view of Lopukhovsky, the German commanders
“didn’t fear Hitler in the same way our commanders feared Stalin”.
Initially the German armoured corps completely outclassed its Red Army
counterpart. The training of Red Army’s driver-mechanics was totally
inadequate. There was insufficient cooperation between tanks, and
between armour and the infantry, aviation and cavalry arms. In the early
stages, the Red Army infantry often conducted mass attacks in closed
ranks, which were easily repulsed by a well-trained opponent. Another
problem was that this was an army where “the majority of the
commanders had a greater fear of the high command than they did of the
enemy”. Information was never reported accurately for fear of reprisal. In
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August alone, the Red Army’s fronts received two million reinforcements
but these were poorly used.
Nonetheless, the Red Army prevented the German Army from achieving
its objectives: “The main result of two months of fighting, plainly, should
be considered the fact that the enemy was unable to achieve his aims of
destroying the Red Army quickly”. The predicament of the German Army
was dire; while Army Group Centre lost nearly 220,000 soldiers between
June and the end of September, there were only 151,000 replacements.
By 4 September less than half the number of tanks with which the
German Army invaded in June were still operational. Operation Typhoon
began successfully and then dramatically slowed in the second half of
October. Lopukhovsky doubted that the mud was to blame and noted that
the weather affected both sides. The real cause of the German failure to
achieve their goals was the remarkable heroism of parts of the Red Army,
the ‘phoenix-like’ capacity of the Red Army to renew itself, and the fact
that a more battle-hardened Red Army began to fight more effectively
having learned the bitter lessons of defeat in the first three months of the
war. In the end, it was the heroism of poorly-led soldiers and civilians
that saved Moscow.889
Conclusion
The ‘revisionist’ attack on the official Soviet view of the war that got
under way in the Gorbachëv era went much further than Khrushchëv’s
criticisms of Stalin. It brought into focus the question of the responsibility
for the war, the inept performance of the Soviet state and the Red Army
throughout 1941, and the lack of solidarity within the Soviet state in the
face of the German invasion. It is stating the obvious that judgements
about Soviet wartime leadership and the support from the Soviet people
were often connected to broader judgments about Communism and the
889
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Soviet Union. A feature of the Gorbachëv and Yeltsin eras was that
Russia’s history wars were fought out not just in academic histories, but
in newspaper articles and books written by critics of the Soviet
establishment. There was, as Tumarkin has put it, “a rich amalgam of
passion, regret, nostalgia, rage and remembrance”.890
Many revisionists embraced the Icebreaker thesis, but this was not the
defining feature of their critique. The criticism of the cult of the Great
Patriotic War introduced the concept of the “Stolen Victory”, the idea that
the regime sent millions to unnecessary deaths and then claimed the
victory as their own.891 Because of the regime’s incompetence, Ukraine,
Belarus, the Baltic States and significant parts of European Russia were
surrendered to the Nazis more or less without serious losses for the
Wehrmacht. This was a story of regime helplessness in the face of the
Nazi invaders. Because Stalin and his generals squandered their massive
tank and aircraft resources, poorly-trained and poorly-armed conscripts
then had to wear down the Germans at a cost of ten or more to one. The
regime only survived because Stalin was willing to resort to any measure
to stay in power. The ungrateful dictator then claimed that the success in
the war proved the superiority of the Communist system and vindicated
his leadership.
Such a view does not meet the criteria of a “Red victory” described in the
introduction to this thesis: the cost of the victory was too high for the
Soviet people. Instead, the concept of a “Stolen Victory”, which
dominates the revisionist literature was more akin to the accounts of
Seaton, Ziemke, and Nagorski. Importantly, however, where Seaton,
Ziemke and Nagorski tended to credit the Soviet victory to Hitler’s
mistakes or the weather, the revisionists were much more likely to credit
the salvation of Moscow to the Soviet people. Despite expectations that
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the collapse of Soviet Communism would lead to increased consensus
between English and Russian language accounts, the revisionist accounts
move in the opposite direction to the post-Cold War military histories
produced in the West described in Chapters Five and Six. The accounts of
the “Glantz era” tended towards the view that the regime had
considerable capacity and popular support, much to the surprise of the
German invaders.
The end of the Cold War did not immediately bring about an alignment
between

Western

and

Russian

historians

about

1941.

Revisionist

historians from Russia now find their works published in English, and their
views are widely available. On the other hand, the themes of Stalin’s
responsibility for the war, regime incapacity, and the excessive cost rarely
figure as core issues in the literature of the Western military historians
discussed earlier. Not surprisingly, critics of the revisionists argued that
the latter had trashed the reputation of Russia and its victory over the
Nazis. This ‘national-patriotic’ voice would become much more prominent
in the Putin era and is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Nine: The National-Patriots
The replacement of Boris Yeltsin by Vladimir Putin in 1999 began another
process of political change in Russia whose main features were an
emphasis on patriotism, nostalgia for the power and prestige of the Soviet
Union, the recreation of an “us and them” view of Russia’s international
relations and a new emphasis upon rebuilding Russia’s military power. In
the West, the debate over when and how the Soviet-German war was
decided is largely an academic one. There are few Western historians who
would suggest that diabolical political consequences will flow if the debate
is decided one way rather than the other. In Russia, this is not the case.
The ongoing controversy over 1941 and the horrendous Soviet losses is a
political contest where the stakes are extremely high. While revisionists
are of the view that if the fight to correct Soviet propaganda about the
war were to be lost, the door opens for Russia to return to Stalinism, the
“anti-Suvorov” or national-patriotic line favoured by Russia’s military
establishment insists that if Russia abandons the positive image of the
Great Patriotic War it might cease to exist as a state.
The Icebreaker controversy prompted a furious reaction from Russia’s
political and military establishment whose own modified version of the
Soviet view of the war is now in fierce competition with revisionist
accounts.

The

anti-revisionist

“national-patriots”,

as

Uldricks

has

described them, “enjoy the patronage of the government and its
educational system, the favor of most of the mass media, and the
allegiance of much of the general public”.892 The Putin administration has
taken the position that the criticism and revision of the Soviet Union’s
wartime record was part of a Western plot to weaken Russia.893 Putin on 4
December 2014 told Russia’s Federal Assembly that the bitter lessons of
892
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the start of the war have to be learnt so that the tragedy is not
repeated.894 During the Dmitriĭ Medvedev presidency, a “Presidential
Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify
History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests” came into existence from
2009 to 2012 with the explicit aim of combatting views that diminished
the Soviet Union’s role in the Second World War.895
Recently, the Russian parliament has passed a bill threatening gaol time
or sizeable fines for ‘rehabilitating Nazism’. Conservative defenders of the
bill have noted similar laws exist in France, Germany and Austria.
However, as Ivan Kurilla noted, where the law in those countries seeks to
penalise Holocaust denial, the new Russian law instead aims to prop up
and perpetuate the heroic version of the Great Patriotic War favoured by
the Putin administration.896 Furthermore, in response to supposed
fabrications regarding Russia’s martial past, the Russian Ministry of
Defence has recently expanded its use of ‘scientific companies’, military
style units whose sole job is to trawl the archives of the Ministry of
Defence to find evidence against perceived false attacks on Russia’s
history by revisionists and the West.897
At the same time, histories penned by Western authors are increasingly
translated into Russian and made available to the general Russian
readers. A search of www.ozon.ru, Russia’s leading online bookseller,
reveals translations available by authors such as Glantz, Beevor, Roberts,
Hastings, Overy, Keegan, Braithwaite and Jones. At times, Western works
have caused significant controversy in Russia for their apparent antiRussian assessments of the Great Patriotic War. In 2015, works by
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Beevor and Keegan were banned in various regions of the Russian
Federation for their accusations of Red Army atrocities in the Second
World War.898 This recent controversy is an extension of Russia/the Soviet
Union’s long running attitude to Western histories of the war. In Soviet
times, the general reading public did not have access to Western works,
but were assured in the official histories that Western historians parroted
the views of the former Nazi generals and deliberately falsified history to
satisfy their bourgeois agenda.899 In modern Russia, national-patriotic
historians argue that revisionist accounts of the period, including the
Icebreaker thesis, are part of a liberal and Western-inspired plot to
discredit Russia’s proudest historical event and threaten the very
existence of the modern Russian state.900
According to the national-patriots, the 1990s was an era when dilettantish
popular writers and commercial or unpatriotic motives combined to distort
the history of the war. In 1995, Elena Seniavskaia anticipated the
backlash against revisionism that would follow in the Putin era when she
argued that in much the same way that Soviet historians were
constrained

by

official

ideology,

historians

writing

during perestroika displayed a desire to criticise all things Stalin, and, by
extension, the entire Stalin-era generation who fought and died in the
Great Patriotic War.901 Seniavskaia took aim at revisionists as being non898
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professional historians, whose conclusions were driven by the “publicistic
boom, when judgements about complex historical phenomena were made
not by professionals, but often just incompetent people who played on the
emotions of the reading public”.
Seniavskaia’s psychological study of the wartime generation was critical of
the “thin layer of Communist ideology” that was “no less cruel and
oppressive” than Nazism, but argued that when the war came, the
wartime generation fought out of patriotism more than anything else:
“The ideas of the world revolution were discarded, and the concepts of
‘Motherland’ and ‘Fatherland’, which were previously anathema and not
seen in public, turned out to be decisive in the minds of the people”.
Despite the problems associated with the Soviet system, by saving itself,
the system saved Russia. The spiritual awakening of the wartime
generation in the years 1941-1945 was further developed after the war,
and directly influenced Khrushchëv’s attacks on Stalin’s cult of personality
in 1956: “the front-line generation can be called not only the 'generation
of victors', but also the 'Generation of the 20th Congress'".
According to Seniavskaia it was a tragedy for the heroic wartime
generation to see their efforts belittled, criticised, and forgotten in the
turbulent years of perestroika. The wartime generation did not speak with
one voice, and revisionists keen to discredit and condemn all things
Soviet should remember the debt owed to modern Russia by those who
fought Hitler’s armies. Senaivskaia noted that victory in the war
consolidated the brutal rule of Communism, but at the same it was this
generation that “saved their homeland and all mankind from the fascist
plague, which raised the country from the ruins and, in the final analysis,
made possible the establishment of those democratic values, from which
S. Seniavskiĭ and E. S. Seniavskaia, ‘Istoricheskiĭ pamiat’ o voine v postsovetskiĭ period’, in A. N.
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it is now subjected to ‘heavy’ criticism”. For Seniavskaia, it was important
to honour the wartime generation, not to belittle their role in Russia’s
history in the tide of revisionism:
We are all indebted to this generation, which, alas, has serious
reasons to believe that it betrayed their own children and
grandchildren. But both children and grandchildren should be aware
that without this Russia has no future. And in our difficult, dramatic
times the basis for moral - and state - the revival of Russia should be
a moral example of the front generation at moments of his higher
spiritual rise.902
Criticisms of revisionism as being a fad driven more by commercial factors
than genuine historical study are common. As one account put it:
The fabrication of modern counterfeiters, for example V. Rezun, are
published in a total circulation of more than eleven million copies,
and the Moskovskiĭ Komsomolets newspaper issues more than two
million copies daily. Meanwhile, the studies written by historians are
published in circulations of 500 to 3000 copies. That is 45-2000 times
less!903
It was for this reason that national-patriotic historians felt that they
required the direct support of the government to ensure that the nonsensationalist version of history, as they saw it, prevailed. They have had
some success in this area. The Russian public is evidently sceptical about
the Icebreaker thesis. Uldricks noted that only four per cent of
respondents in a 2008 public opinion poll thought that the U.S.S.R.
started the Second World War.904 In a 2009 poll, of the two thirds of
Russians who had heard of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, one quarter had
a negative view, and fifty-seven per cent saw nothing negative.905 There
is no evident decline in Stalin’s standing in opinion polls. A Levada poll in
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December 2015 found that the largest number of respondents (45%) took
the view that Stalin was “equal parts good and bad”. The second-largest
group of respondents suggested that Stalin was “more good than bad”
(25%) and the third largest group saw Stalin as “more bad than good”
(13%).906 Meanwhile, 34% (up from 28% in 2007) agreed with the
statement that, “whatever flaws and failures are attributed to Stalin, the
most important thing is that, under his leadership, Russia was victorious
in World War II”. At the same time 21% (down from 29% in 2007)
agreed with the statement that, “Stalin was a cruel, inhuman tyrant guilty
of the murder of millions of innocent people”. Only 13% (down from 17%
in 2007) agreed with the statement that, “Stalin's policies (purging the
military and his deal with Hitler) left the country unprepared for war in
1941 and led to devastating losses”.907 A 2017 Levada poll found that
Stalin was more than any other figure to be considered by Russians the
“most outstanding person” in world history.908
Sacralising the memory of the Great Patriotic War and drawing legitimacy
from it are as important to the present Putin administration as they were
to the Brezhnev regime.909 The dilemma for the

Putin/Medvedev

leadership has been how to associate modern Russia and the Putin
administration with the glorious victory in the Great Patriotic War while
not endorsing Stalinist repression.910 As Boris Dubin has put it, there are
two conflicting images of Stalin that Russian society is attempting to
reconcile: “[w]e find here a clash between two Stalins — Stalin the tyrant
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and Stalin the victor in the Great Patriotic War”.911 In equal numbers –
consistently about two thirds of those polled – contemporary Russian
public opinion accepts Stalin as a war hero while simultaneously holding
the view that he was a repressive tyrant. The memory of Stalin has
combined, “the image of Russia as a mighty power—strong, aggressive,
armed, glorious” and “an image of Russia as victim—long-suffering,
inexhaustibly patient, uncomplaining, eternally poor, willing to get used to
and bear any burden”.912
There are at least two views on whether the Putin administration is
deliberately rehabilitating Stalin for its own political purposes. According
to T. H. Nielson, Putin’s propagandists have ensured that Stalin has
become “the symbol of the entire Soviet era, which they portray as an era
of Russian greatness”.913 Thus, the repressions of the 1930s have been
worked into the narrative about the necessity of industrialisation, which in
turn was vital if the Soviet Union were to be victorious in its life-anddeath struggle with Nazi Germany.914 According to Thomas Sherlock,
while neo-Stalinist perspectives are circulating in Russia, there is no clear
trend towards re-Stalinisation in popular attitudes, and no real effort on
the part of the Putin administration to restore Stalin to centre stage in the
memory of the Second World War. Indeed, “evidence of a concerted and
sustained pro-Stalin campaign by the Kremlin is weak”.915 If Sherlock is
correct, we should expect to see neither de-Stalinisation, nor reStalinisation in the Putin era. Certainly, neo-Stalinists believe that there is
a government plot against them. They accuse Russia’s “ruling elite” of
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suppressing anti-Suvorov publications and ensuring that Suvorov’s books
receive wide attention.916
What is clear, however, is that the Putin administration has no interest in
supporting the revisionist version of the Great Patriotic War and a great
deal of interest in rejecting the Icebreaker thesis. Vladimir Medinskiĭ, a
long-standing figure in the Putin administration and Minister of Culture,
categorised

Suvorov

alongside

Russia’s

most

famous

conspiracy

theorists.917 Meanwhile, the accounts of 1941 produced from within
Russia’s military establishment speak with more or less one voice.
According to their national-patriotic account, the Soviet view of the war
was right in its essentials. The Soviet Union was the innocent party in the
outbreak of the war, Soviet political and military leaders made significant
blunders in preparing for the war but quickly learned from their mistakes,
the Soviet system as a whole showed incredible solidarity, and the victory
was achieved by the Red Army without significant assistance from the
mud and snow.
This national-patriotic reaction is nostalgic for the glories of the Soviet
past, seeking “to establish a heroic and useable past out of which a
resurgent, proud, nationalist Russia might be reborn”.918 The political and
cultural

experimentation

of

the

1920s,

Khrushchëv’s

‘Thaw’

and

Gorbachëv’s perestroika were historical dead-ends. By contrast, the Great
Patriotic War revealed the real nature of Russia.919 Losing sight of this
reality during the Gorbachëv and Yeltsin eras gave the West its victory.
The West wanted to destroy Russia because it envied Russia’s success as
a Great Power.920 The national-patriots’ aim is to undo the damage
916
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inflicted on the memory of war first by Khrushchëv and then by
Gorbachëv, whose perestroika created an era of “moral nihilism”.921
According to Elena Seniavskaia, the contrast between the moods of the
Russian people in the heroic era of the Great Patriotic War and the
psychological confusion of the Gorbachëv/Yeltsin periods was reflected in
the fact that while only about 15% of the Soviet population needed
professional counselling after the war, 70% were in need of such help in
the early 1990s.922
Typical of the national-patriotic reaction of Russia’s military establishment
to the menace of revisionism was a lead article in Voenno-istoricheskiĭ
zhurnal that appeared in 2010 over the signature of Colonel I.V. Ilievskiĭ.
Entitled ‘Against Lies and Falsifications’, Ilievskiĭ listed a series of reasons
why the Great Patriotic War mattered more to people than other
cataclysmic events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ilievskiĭ
noted that interest in the history of the Great Patriotic War was rising
despite the enormous amount of historical material that has now been
published. It was not just that the Great Patriotic War was an event of
world importance and a matter of great pride to Russians, but that the
war experience provided a basis for the future growth and development
for the peoples of the former Soviet Union. Ilievskiĭ noted the divisiveness
of the issues where instead of shades of grey the fault lines have moved
into stark relief. What was once a divide between a Soviet and an antiSoviet perspective was now a contest between national-patriots and
revisionists.923
Another example of the backlash against revisionism and of the ‘antiSuvorov’ movement is the first volume of the multi-volume Velikaia
Otechevstvennaia Voina, which appeared in 2011 under the editorship of
921
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V. A. Zolotarev, one of the Soviet Union’s and then Russia’s leading
military historians. A glowing preface over the signature of President
Medvedev suggests that the sentiments expressed in this volume are in
tune with government thinking about the memory of the war.924
According to Zolotarev, the agenda of Russia’s “liberals” and “revisionists”
was to weaken Russia’s place in the world. Revisionist rhetoric was
indistinguishable from the Nazi press of the war years, a point that is
made repeatedly in the national-patriotic literature.925 Zolotarev summed
up what he described as the revisionist ‘paradigm’ thus:
…everything is our fault. We, by ourselves, groomed and trained
Hitler. We waited until he tore Europe apart so that we could attack
the European states that were weakened by Hitler. We are not better
than the Nazis. In fact, we are far worse. We brought death and
slavery on the points of our bayonets. We would have conquered all
of Europe to establish Communist totalitarianism, but the Allies
prevented it. It is our fault, we are guilty in front of all of humanity,
and we must beg for forgiveness and repent.926
The “we” in this passage is the Russian people, who, in Zolotarev’s view,
are the direct descendants of the Soviet population. Zolotarev’s tone is
apocalyptic - Russia’s very existence is at stake:
The kinds of conclusions are we going to make … will determine
whether our children and grandchildren have a chance to be born and
live in a country called Russia. Whether they will read and write in
Russian, and whether they can make their own choices. Or whether
they will disappear as the Romans did when the German barbarians
came, as the Hellenistic Greeks did when the Turks came, whether
they will degrade as Native Americans, or simply disappear with no
trace as the once powerful Scythians and Sarmatians that once lived
on our land did.927
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According to Zolotarev, if Russia’s revisionists succeed, history will record
that Russia was an evil totalitarian force that destroyed the international
order with its aggression.928 While the “Western historical project” lays
claim to “eternal moral principles”, its real agenda is much more
practical.929 A victory for liberal “revisionism” will have devastating
geopolitical consequences for Russia, which will lose its claim to
“Kaliningrad, the Kuril’ Islands, Sakhalin, Kareliia, Vyborg, the Far East,
and the Caucasus”. Russia’s defeat will come not on the battlefield but
because of the attack on the memory of the Second World War, which has
caused a loss of self-belief in Russia.930
Zolotarev’s list of myths about 1941 that are peddled in the liberal press
and have – according to him - no factual basis, was a long one; the false
charges that Soviet conduct of the war produced an excessive cost; that
Zhukov was a heartless butcher of his men; that Stalin made a huge
mistake by not signing the Geneva convention; that Stalin had a nervous
breakdown at the outset of the war; that the Red Army had only one rifle
for every three soldiers; that the Red Army sent its out-dated cavalry into
battle against the German panzers; that penal battalions won the Red
victory; that blocking detachments shot countless retreating Red Army
soldiers; that the achievements of Panfilov and Kosmodem’ianskaia were
inventions of Soviet propaganda; that ten million Russians signed up to
fight for Hitler; that Vlasov and Kaminskiĭ were genuine Russian patriots;
that lend-lease played a decisive role in the Red victory.931
Another eminent figure from the Russian military establishment, Makhmut
Gareev, President of the Academy of Military Science, agreed that history
928
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matters to Russia’s future. He has urged Russians to pull together and not
criticise the Soviet past: “[w]e must abandon the recriminations over
trifles and focus on the main thing - defending real truth about the
war”.932 For Gareev, memory of the Second World War is the last
“foothold” of Russia’s much eroded patriotic movement.933 Russia’s
military history is in danger of falling victim to a foreign plot. Suvorov and
his fellow “counterfeiters” were only able to publish books “in their
millions” in Russia with the help of Western donations.934
Other national-patriotic historians from Russia’s military establishment
take a similar view. Boris Petrov, a retired colonel with many publications
and a leading position in the Institute of Military History, has urged his
fellow historians to achieve the objectives set down by the President of
the Russian Federation, which were to defend genuine history from
“falsification”.935 Alexeĭ Isaev, a prolific military historian who has devoted
a career to debunking alleged revisionist mythmaking, has described
Suvorov and his followers as dishonourable peddlers of historical
untruths: “They pour forth filth instead of constructive criticism … Their
pre-ordained answer to any question is simply that ‘the Stalinist regime is
guilty in everything’”.936
Where revisionist historians took their starting point as the Khrushchëv
‘Thaw’, national-patriotic historians take their cue from the Brezhnev era,
which attempted to reinsert Stalin into the narrative while still criticising
the military purge and praising the resistance of the government, army
and people. Ilievskiĭ described the twelve-volume Brezhnev-era Istoriia as
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a “significant, fundamental work that offered a wide panorama and
convincingly showed the key significance of the Great Patriotic War”. 937
Unlike their Soviet forebears, national-patriotic historians do not avoid or
skirt over the catastrophic beginning to the war. Petrov has described
how the Red Army for five and half months retreated 850-1200
kilometres; 1.5 million square kilometres of Soviet territory housing 78.5
million Soviet citizens fell under occupation in 1941. The price according
to Petrov was extraordinary – 124 Red Army divisions were smashed, 3.8
million Red Army soldiers fell into German captivity, seventeen thousand
aircraft, sixty thousand artillery pieces, twenty thousand tanks (including
3000 T-34 and KV models) were lost to the enemy. A country of 200
million found itself so desperately short of soldiers that one million
eighteen and nineteen year-olds were called into service in 1941. More
than 300,000 officers were killed, went missing in action or left the front
wounded, so many that despite the accelerated training programs, the
Red Army was still short 36,000 officers at the end of 1941. By the end of
1941, the number of divisions grew one and half times to 314 infantry
divisions but these were much reduced in size, that is, about half the size
of the equivalent German divisions. One hundred and twenty four
divisions had to be disbanded and 3.5 million Red Army soldiers sat in
German

prisoner-of-war

camps.

By

September

the

much-vaunted

mechanised corps had become five reduced tank divisions and scattered
tank brigades and battalions: the tank arm as a component of the Red
Army declined from twenty per cent to two per cent in the course of 1941
because the massive losses could not be made up by Soviet industry,
which produced only three thousand tanks in the second half of the year.
By December, the number of aircraft available had decreased three and a
half times. The Briansk and Kalinin ‘fronts’ (army groups) were only the
size of a single pre-war ‘army’. The Western Front comprised six armies
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defending Moscow in October but had two and a half times fewer soldiers,
six times less artillery and eight times less tanks and aircraft in
comparison to the pre-war South-West Front.938
There is no hiding the fact too that German encirclements netted huge
numbers of Red Army soldiers, many of whom must have surrendered
without putting up serious resistance. Oleg Rzheshevskiĭ, president of the
Russian Association of Second World War Historians, acknowledged that
the number of prisoners that the Germans reported to have captured at
each of the major ‘cauldrons’ was close enough to the mark: 328,000 at
Bialystok and Minsk; 310,000 at Smolensk; 103,000 at Uman’; 665,000
at Kiev; 663,000 at Viaz’ma and Briansk. He did consider some of the
figures as likely too high: the South-West Front at Kiev numbered only
667,000 and up to 150,000 of its soldiers escaped the encirclement.
Nonetheless, if the precise facts are in doubt, “it does not change the
general picture”.939 According to Zolotarev, the irretrievable losses and
hospitalised amounted to 4,473,820 individuals in the six months and
nine days of 1941.940 Breaking down this figure, 465,400 died of their
wounds on the battlefield; 101,500 died of their wounds in hospital;
235,300 died of illness and accidents and 2,335,500 were taken prisoner.
In other words fifty-two per cent of the Red Army’s losses were prisonersof-war. In 1941, the Red Army lost 142.4% of its serving individuals.941
There is general recognition that this was a military catastrophe without
precedent.
What is also agreed upon is that the Soviet Union was not responsible for
the outbreak of the war. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was both justified and
necessary. The “myth” of the Nazi-Soviet Pact as “a shameful page” in
938
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Russian history had to be rejected. England and France actively sowed the
seeds of a new war, hoping that Hitler would attack the U.S.S.R. In 19391941, a global war was under way.942 As Petrov has put it, when Hitler’s
invasion finally came, Western elites “finally achieved what they had so
passionately strived for over the previous twenty years”.943
Rzheshevskiĭ agreed that the Soviet leadership was right to be suspicious
of Western intentions. The British and United States’ governments were
clearly more sympathetic to Nazi Germany than to the Soviet Union. It
was not just that the lack of credible commitments from Britain and
France that made an anti-Hitler coalition impossible.944 Britain and France
actively colluded with the Nazis in order to encourage war between
Germany and the Soviet Union.945 The failure of the West to check Hitler’s
aggression forced the Soviet Union to make a deal with Germany.946 As
Medinskiĭ has put it, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was, “a homage to the
cynicism of realpolitik”.947 Medinskiĭ has noted that the view that Stalin
would have signed anything that would have given him more time to
prepare for the coming war, just as the West had done at Munich. Stalin
had just as much reason to be suspicious of Churchill as Hitler, and in
later forming an alliance with the Soviet Union the staunch antiCommunist Churchill was as much of a slave to Realpolitik as Stalin.948
Had the Soviet Union not created the buffer zone of the Baltic States and
Eastern Poland, Moscow and Leningrad would certainly have fallen in the
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subsequent German invasion.949 By proceeding cautiously, Stalin wisely
avoided making the mistake of the poorly prepared Russian offensive of
1914.950 Just as great an achievement was the signing of a treaty with
Tokyo, ensuring that Japan eventually attacked the U.S., thus creating
the geopolitical setting that made the wartime alliance possible.951
According to Ilievskiĭ, Stalin should be thanked for a series of successes
before and during the war that set up the eventual victory at Moscow.
Stalin successfully delayed an invasion planned for May until late June
1941, shrewdly avoided war on two fronts with his diplomatic successes
with Japan and Germany, oversaw the evacuation carried out so that the
Soviet Union lived to fight another day, along with his role in holding
Leningrad and Moscow.952 Western writers have often noted that Hitler
erred in not invading earlier in the spring of 1941. The delay in the
German offensive was attributed to the distraction of the Balkan
campaign and the swollen rivers of eastern Poland.953 National-patriotic
historians suggest that the delay was caused by the fact that Stalin had
taken dozens of countermeasures, including the mobilisation of reserves
and the transfer of divisions closer to the frontier.954
In fact, the victory of 1941 was only possible because of shrewd decisions
taken long before the war. The national-patriots reject the revisionist
claims that the Soviet regime foolishly helped to create the Nazi war
machine in the 1920s. Stalin’s actions in the pre-war period enhanced
rather than impeded the chances of the Soviet Union’s survival in the
looming war. The revisionists claim that the secret German-Soviet
949
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collaboration of the 1920s and early 1930s “forged the Nazi sword” - by
training German pilots and tankists - is absurd. Collaboration with the
capitalist West was vital to the modernisation of a backward peasant
Russia and the collaboration clearly worked in favour of the Soviet Union.
The Germans financed the tank park for the meagre return that thirty
German tankists received training.955
National-patriotic historians mostly scoff at suggestions that Stalin had a
divided society on the eve of the war. Forced collectivisation and fastpaced industrialisation were absolutely what was required for the survival
of the Soviet state. Economic modernisation created the preconditions
necessary for the Soviet Union to be able to withstand the German
invasion.956 Soviet rule in the 1920s and 1930s created a physically fit
and politically mobilised population able to perform well despite the
hardships of war. As for the idea that the Soviet Union was a prison
camp, the national-patriots counter that it was one of the few safe havens
from Nazi genocide.957
There

is mostly

agreement among

the

national-patriots with

the

Khrushchëv-era assertion that the purge harmed the Red Army, although
it is usually qualified with the claim that Khrushchëv greatly exaggerated
the impact. It is even possible that there were some “real or halfformulated” military plot (or plots) against Stalin.958 For Rzheshevskiĭ,
while the number ultimately repressed represented only seven per cent of
the

total

command

staff,

these

were

the

most

experienced

commanders.959 On the other hand, the Western/revisionist claim that the
purges wiped out more than half of the officers, including the best and
brightest, and left in their place an uneducated rump is mostly rejected.
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The widely quoted figure from the Khrushchëv era of forty thousand
purged officers failed to take into account that the vast majority of the
“purged” officers were not arrested and many found their way back into
the army. The officer corps as a whole was huge, comprising 450,000
individuals in June 1941.
The

national-patriotic

accounts

mostly

reject

the

Khrushchëv-era

accusation that Stalin surrounded himself with incompetent cronies from
the Red cavalry who had fought alongside Stalin during the Russian Civil
War of 1918-1920. While serving at Tsaritsyn in 1918, Stalin became the
political patron of the First Cavalry Army, which produced many of Stalin’s
favourite soldiers who took to the field in 1941. Isaev points out that the
problem was not too much cavalry but too little and when war broke out.
In 1939, the Red Army reduced its cavalry by two-thirds only to find that
Zhukov had to rapidly increase the number of cavalry divisions as a
temporary replacement for the destroyed mechanised corps in 1941.960
There is not much sympathy for Poland, Finland or the Baltic States in the
national-patriotic accounts. The Soviet Union had no alternative other
than to occupy eastern Poland because to allow Germany to occupy
eastern Poland would simply have brought the enemy closer to Soviet
territory. It had long been obvious that Nazi Germany and Finland would
become military allies, perhaps supported by Britain. The Finnish leader,
General Mannerheim, was an expansionist who had demanded new
conquests in eastern Karelia. The Western powers sent material and
manpower help to the Finns during the 1939-1940 conflict despite the fact
that Nazi Germany was supposedly the all-consuming enemy. In the end,
the Finnish war was a crushing Soviet victory.961
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On the other hand, the cost of the war against Finland and the ease with
which Germany had overcome France in 1940 convinced Stalin that time
was needed if the Red Army were to be ready for the looming war. The
Soviet political and military leadership hoped for another year of peace
while taking prudent precautions. Above all, it was important for Stalin to
appear to be on the side of peace at all times because the anti-Russian
West was likely to use any excuse to form a coalition against the Soviet
Union. Stalin’s judgement was affected by justified concern about
Western intentions; if Hitler could successfully claim that the U.S.S.R. was
the aggressor in the war, the United States, Britain and Germany might
reconcile their differences and unite against Soviet Communism.962
Stalin’s nightmare was the German and British empires in alliance against
an isolated Soviet Union.963
At one level, Icebreaker was a story of Soviet agency and strength. Stalin
and the Red Army were no longer the timid victims of an all-powerful
Hitler, but instead took their fate into their own hands. Mikhail Mel’tiukhov
is an example of an historian who is more sympathetic to Stalin and the
Soviet system, but who also embraced a version of the Icebreaker
hypothesis. For Mel’tiukhov, Stalin’s behaviour was the same as the
behaviour of other world leaders whose focus was the self-interest of their
country and regime in a hostile world. The Soviet leadership was
understandably and bitterly resentful at the territorial losses that followed
from the events of 1917. These losses put Russia back two hundred years
in terms of its standing as a great power and relegated it to regional,
rather than great power status. Combining the new ideology of “world
revolution” and traditional Russian foreign policy, the Soviet government’s
aim was a global reconfiguration of power in which the chief impediments
were Britain, France and their allies.
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Mel’tiukhov rejected the supposition that a weak Soviet Union simply
succumbed in the face of the German advance. From this perspective,
Icebreaker was an opportunity to reposition Stalin and the Red Army as
active players and not passive victims. Stalin had planned a crushing blow
against Hitler but delayed it amid confusion as to the aims of Hess’s flight
to Scotland. For Mel’tiukhov, if the Red Army had attacked on 12 June it
would have achieved complete surprise. The blow carried out by the
South-West and West Fronts acting in concert would have paralysed fiftyfive German divisions, more than half the total force, and made an
effective German counter-attack unlikely. Mel’tiukhov’s evidence that an
attack would have succeeded comes partly from the success of the Red
Army against the Germans after it recovered from the initial shock of the
early defeats. In the first half of October the Germans advanced at
sixteen kilometres a day. In the second half of October 1941, it was five
kilometres a day. By the end of November 1941, Germany was
experiencing a full-blown political-economic crisis. Mel’tiukhov’s Soviet
state was powerful enough to miss this opportunity and still defeat
Hitler.964
Mel’tiukhov’s position is eccentric among the national-patriots; they
mostly reject the Icebreaker thesis as having no factual basis. The new
weapons produced by the Soviet state were appropriate to the space and
transport networks of the country and could be used defensively or
aggressively as required. The tanks that were built in the Soviet Union
followed a similar pattern to tanks built elsewhere and were not
specifically designed to roll along the new German Autobahns. Similarly,
the bombers that the Soviet air force possessed were no different to other
military aircraft of the era and not specifically designed to attack
Germany. It was not true, as Suvorov claimed, that the Soviet Union built
its factories near the Western frontier; factories were also constructed in
964
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the Urals. The fact that the Soviet Union did not build long-range bombers
was in itself evidence that Stalin had no desire to warn off Hitler from an
attack.965 All the documentary evidence suggests that Hitler made his
decision to invade Russia in late 1940 in the context of the stalemate in
the war against Britain. While Stalin may have desired the expansion of
Communism, his caution was evident in policies such as ‘Socialism in One
Country’. The Red Army’s defeats in 1941 were brought about by an
incomplete mobilisation and concentration of the necessary forces to repel
an invasion. Stalin had rational reasons for believing, and not just hoping,
that the Germans could be held off with political measures.966
Stalin did not receive reliable and exact information regarding the German
attack that he chose to ignore, as the revisionists claimed. In the months
before 22 June 1941, numerous dates for the invasion emerged: 14 May,
21 May, 15 June and 22 June. As each day came and went, Stalin was
more confident that the invasion would not take place in 1941.967 In the
face of so many conflicting reports it is unsurprising that he did not heed
the advice that proved to be correct only with hindsight.968 Stalin shared
the view of much of the intelligence reaching Moscow that the predicted
attack would not come until Germany had concluded its campaigns in the
west.969 Even in June 1941, the number of German divisions in Western
and Eastern Europe was approximately the same; it was by no means
clear in which direction Hitler would strike.970 French intelligence failed to
adequately prepare democratic France for the May 1940 invasion and
965
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American intelligence failed to prevent Pearl Harbor.971 Why then,
according to the national-patriots, should Stalin be singled out as the
great fool of the Second World War?
For Zolotarev, “the miscalculations and mistakes of the leadership of the
country” were significant.972 The main problem was that the leadership
assumed that there would be an initial period of the war when the Soviet
state would have time to mobilise its resources as was the case in the
First World War. There was also “weak professional preparation” of many
commanders and of the reserves mobilised just as the war got under
way.973 The Red Army had to learn strategic defence in the battles of
1941. The opponent had an enormous superiority on the directions of his
advance while the Red Army’s defence lacked depth, was weakly
motorised and had poor

intelligence

about the

enemy’s plans.974

Nonetheless, the crisis was solved by plugging the gap with strategic
reserves, the renovation of retreating units and the transfer of units from
the interior of the country.975
The Germans by contrast had the crucial advantage of knowing where it
would mass its forces for an attack while the Red Army mistakenly
assumed that the initial border battles would last two or three weeks as
the Red Army prepared its own devastating counter-attack.976 The
problem, according to Isaev, was that the Red Army “was only able to
deploy 43% of its first-echelon divisions meaning that the Wehrmacht
enjoyed a superiority of three and even five-to-one at the decisive points
along the front”.977
According to Rzheshevskiĭ, the deficit along the German invasion route
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was seven to one, twelve Red Army divisions against eighty-four German
divisions at the points at which the Germans broke through on 22 June. It
was not the case that the Soviet state failed to mobilise; the problem was
that the mobilisation was incomplete. In April and May under cover of
training manoeuvres, the Red Army called up more than eight hundred
thousand soldiers, about one quarter of what was required for the
mobilisation plan.
For Rzheshevskiĭ, the Soviet belief that the crucial fighting was not going
to take place within the first two weeks of the war and that there would
only be relatively minor border skirmishes before the main attack came
was a grave error. As war approached, rapid mobilisation resulted in
impressive numbers on paper. On the other hand, the large numbers of
poorly trained and poorly armed men reaching the fast-moving front
actually hindered operations. The covering armies were not fully mobilised
because the Soviet leadership assumed that this could be done quickly in
response to an emerging crisis or the actual outbreak of war. While one
hundred and eight divisions were assigned to cover the frontier, only forty
were in position to repel the invader and these were neither properly
armed nor mobilised.978
For Petrov, the Red Army was a half-formed, essentially peacetime army
in 1941 and it showed. In the face of a well-organised and experienced
Wehrmacht, local Red Army commanders showed little initiative. 979 Only
as the Germans advanced did front and army commanders turn their
attention to crucial issues such as dwindling fuel and weapons supplies
much too late. According to Zolotarev, most units had too few soldiers,
not too few weapons. The ratio of guns to soldiers was more like three to
two. It was standard practice to arm units that were already en route to
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the front.980 The mistakes were that the Red Army had not trained for
working their way out of envelopments and dealing with a fast-moving
enemy operating deep inside Soviet territory in the opening weeks of the
war. Strategic defence had not been theorised or practiced by the pre-war
High Command. Up until September, every effort was made to counterattack because this was the only training that the Red Army had.981 Yet
the Red Army lacked just about everything needed for an effective
counter-attack; there was no radio network for communication.
For the national-patriots, it is folly to underestimate the novelty and
effectiveness of the blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg was effective everywhere against
countries that were not preparing for war in the same way that the
German military had done. The occupied territories gifted Germany
incredible resources and a skilled workforce. According to Isaev, the
Germans succeeded because they had strategic initiative and because
they had the mechanised corps that the Red Army would lack until
1943.982 In the opening battles, the Wehrmacht was simply too good for
the Red Army. For Isaev, the Red Army mobilised in three echelons with
poor communication between them and none of the echelons was strong
enough to resist the panzer groups. Isaev defended Stalin’s supposed
addiction to ordering ill-considered and costly counter-attacks by arguing
that that these actions did much to interrupt German plans.983 The
Germans kept moving forward, but the constant Soviet attacks severely
reduced their overall capability: a death by a thousand cuts. For Isaev,
the key was that there were formed or reformed the equivalent of 821
divisions (483 rifle, 73 tank, 31 motorised and 101 cavalry divisions plus
266 tank, rifle and ski brigades). This uninterrupted conveyor belt of new
units meant that the Soviet state was in a state of “permanent
980
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mobilisation”.984 It was just as well that the Red Army had more than
twenty thousand tanks and the Germans less than three thousand
because the Red Army simply lacked the capacity to repair them. Instead
of patching up old tanks, the Red Army had to send in echelon after
echelon of new mechanised units in the first few months of the war
because the Red Army was simply not prepared for war of this type.985
Even so, the Soviet state, army, and people resisted with a determination
that was not evident in France. Crucial was the work of Stalin and the
political and military elite who, through the State Committee of Defence
and the Stavka effectively mobilised the country for war. The revisionist
account emphasised massive Soviet numerical superiority in manpower,
tanks, aircraft and artillery. Not so, according to the national-patriots. It
was the Germans who had the advantage of numbers, battle experience
and professional training. Nonetheless, the bravery and self-sacrifice of
Soviet troops negated these hefty German advantages in the initial phase
of the war.986 According to Miagkov:
German numerical superiority and the professionalism of the German
soldiers and officers was offset by the resilience of Soviet fighters,
extraordinary measures undertaken by the Soviet government and
its leadership and the mobilisation of resources.987
By the end of July, the enemy had no choice but to transfer over to the
defence on the main Moscow direction in order to focus on the threat
posed to Bock’s flanks by the Red Army at Kiev.988 This was not a daft
strategic choice on the part of Hitler, but a military necessity. The
emphasis on Hitler’s blunders found in Western works is simply an
invention of former German generals keen to rescue their reputations
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post-war.989 Diverting forces to Kiev was a military necessity for the
German military and not evidence of delay, indecision and poor strategy
on the part of Hitler. Army Group Centre needed this time to recover.990
Ultimately, the resistance of the South-West Front at Kiev played a key
role in weakening the Germans and thus saving Moscow. 991 Hitler had to
divert south so as to neutralise an aggressive Soviet threat Bock’s
vulnerable southern flank; Kiev was where the Red Army had stationed its
best troops.992
Zolotarev was of the view that Stalin had sound reasons for rejecting
Zhukov’s advice to evacuate Kiev even though the failure to do so cost
the Red Army dearly.993 Stalin knew that the majority of Soviet
commanders were incapable of organising large scale retreats - the 6th
and 12th armies were destroyed that way at Uman when bungling their
retreat - and that there was no guarantee that the same thing would not
have been repeated at Kiev. To abandon Kiev was to self-liquidate a
threat to Army Group Centre’s flank, in which case the Germans would
have been free to continue their advance on Moscow already in late
August.994 Isaev agreed that the risk taken by Stalin that led to the
eventual encirclement and disaster at Kiev was justified as it delayed the
assault on Moscow, a city ultimately more important to the Soviet war
effort.995
Medinskiĭ agreed with Stahel and Luther that the Germans lost the war in
August 1941.996 The Germans only had one plan, blitzkrieg, and had no
plans for a war of attrition that lasted years rather than months. Already
at Smolensk, there was a changing of the guard when the Germans,
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according to Medinskiĭ, suffered nearly half a million casualties and their
tank divisions had losses of around half their tanks and crews.997 While
there would be many trials for the Soviet people and the war would only
be won at a huge cost, there was only going to be one outcome to the
war after the battles of Brest, Grodno, lida, El’nia, and Smolensk. These
were in the end Pyrrhic victories for the Wehrmacht whose only chance of
defeating the Red Army was the overwhelming surprise attack.
Even when the Germans were winning battles they were losing the war.
According to Zolotarev, between 22 June and the end of September, Army
Group Centre lost 229,000 killed, wounded and missing in action. In
October and November Army Group Centre lost more than 145,000 men.
In December, it would lose 103,000 men and could replace only forty per
cent of these.998 Zolotarev claims that Soviet and German losses were
more and more comparable over time. The Battle of Moscow for Soviet
and modern Russian authors extends up until April 1942, and for those
203 days, according to Zolotarev, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army
stood at 926,000 men compared to 615,000 killed wounded and missing
in action German soldiers.999 The message is that once the Red Army
rebalanced after the initial shock and awe, it was a match for the
allegedly more professional Wehrmacht, a fact reflected in the evening up
of the ratio of losses.
The collapse of the Red Army at Viaz’ma was more difficult to explain or
justify because the Red Army should not have been taken by surprise. For
Miagkov it was the numerical superiority of the German forces, the battle
experience of the German generals, the unexpectedness of the start of
the operation and the mistakes of the Soviet command that led to the
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tragedies at Viaz’ma and Briansk.1000 For Isaev, the Red Army’s
commanders were still consistently guessing wrong about where the
Germans were massing to attack. Petrov and Zolotarev directly attributed
the encirclements at Viaz’ma and Briansk to poor Soviet intelligence.1001
According to Zolotarev, Konev misread German plans in October and then
misled Stalin and the Stavka. Konev came to the conclusion that Bock
would drive at Moscow directly from the centre along the Viazma-Moscow
highway when it fact the Germans planned to strike north through Kalinin
and south through Briansk and Tula to effect yet another giant
encirclement of the Red Army. As a consequence, the Red Army
concentrated its forces directly to the west of Moscow only to find that its
weak flanks were soon overrun.1002 Nonetheless, the troops encircled at
Viaz’ma and Briansk were critical to the saving of Moscow. As Petrov has
put it, while the losses of Soviet troops at Viaz’ma were staggering, “this
catastrophic defeat did not break down their fighting spirit”.1003 When the
Germans renewed the attack on Moscow, it was into the face of growing
resistance. In November on the Tikhvin, Moscow and Rostov directions,
the Germans could only penetrate between one hundred and two hundred
kilometres. The constant factor in the turnaround in the war was the Red
Army’s stubborn resistance and selfless sacrifice.1004
There is general agreement that the Red Army learned from its mistakes.
It got better at the timely injection of new troops, the competent
management

of

those

troops

by

increasingly

battle-hardened

commanders, the use of methodical and effective propaganda, and, for
some, the inspirational leadership of Stalin.1005 The proof of Red Army
effectiveness was that from mid-November to the beginning of December,
the Germans lost 155,000 killed and wounded, 300 artillery pieces, 800
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tanks and 1,500 aircraft.1006 For the national-patriots, the choices were
complete military victory or defeat and submission to a barbarous and
genocidal opponent. Relying upon the Krivosheev figures, Gareev noted
that Red Army military losses were at a ratio of 1.3:1 with Germany over
the

whole

war,

and

that

Soviet

losses

appear

so

dramatically

disproportionate in 1941 because of the murder of millions of Soviet
prisoners of war by the Nazis.1007 The huge losses mostly occurred
between June and September 1941.
Zolotarev’s account of the Battle of Moscow attributed to Stalin only the
role of approving plans drawn up by the military professionals. It is
Zhukov who was the military genius who was able to concentrate in the
rear of the Western, Kalinin, and South-Western Fronts fresh divisions
arriving from the Far East, Siberia and Urals, which formed the First
Shock, Twenty-Sixth, Tenth and Sixty-First Armies. Sensing that the
enemy was retreating at the slightest pressure, Zhukov lured the
Germans forward and did not allow them to consolidate along new
defensive lines. It was a bold plan, “unique in world history”, because the
outnumbered defenders successfully launched a counter-attack against a
superior opponent. According to Zolotarev, the Red Army’s 1.1 million
men, 7,652 artillery pieces, 774 tanks and 1,000 aircraft were pitted
against Army Group Centre’s 1.7 million men, 13,500 artillery pieces,
1,170 tanks and 615 aircraft.1008
Zolotarev praised Zhukov for getting the logistics right: 5,500 railway
wagons arrived each day in Moscow with the necessary equipment, fuel,
ammunition, and food. Zhukov’s plan was, wisely, not to attempt deep
thrusts, but simply to crush the most forward German units and force
them back. Army Group Centre was stretched out over a front that
extended for one thousand kilometres. Soviet aviation and partisans
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attacked the German lines of communication. While the Germans froze to
death, the Red Army was much better prepared for winter war.1009
According to Miagkov, the tables were now turned on the Germans. In the
days preceding the Soviet counter-attack, Bock’s forces were stretched
too thinly in one echelon over one thousand kilometres.1010 German
intelligence completely failed to recognise the offensive capabilities of
Soviet forces and stubbornly held on to the belief that the collapse of the
Soviet front was imminent.1011 The Germans were only saved by Hitler’s
shrewd decision not to yield ground. Thanks to Hitler, the Wehrmacht
avoided a repeat of the slaughter of Napoleon’s Grande Armée.1012
According to the national-patriotic historians, this was not a war fought
with unnecessary cruelty and callous disregard of human lives. Blocking
detachments were not Stalin’s invention, and they were part of a Russian
military tradition dating back to Peter the Great.1013 Soviet blocking
detachments arrested only 3.7% of those they detained and an even
smaller proportion were sentenced to death. Furthermore, in this war the
Germans formed blocking detachments before the Soviets did. 1014 The
revisionist

obsession

with

blocking

detachments

was

simply

a

perpetuation of Nazi wartime propaganda, which claimed that Jewish
commissars forced Soviet soldiers to stay at the front. For Zolotarev at
least, there was no evidence at all that blocking detachments ever fired
on retreating Red Army soldiers.1015
For the national-patriots, there was no evidence that civilian opolchentsy
were ruthlessly sent to their deaths due to their lack of training.
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According to Isaev, the “one-gun-per-five volunteers” charged with
defending Moscow is a myth.1016 The majority of Moscow’s armed
defenders comprised reformed military units with previous experience of
the war.1017 Nor were Moscow’s defenders mainly prisoners of one kind or
another. Less than half a million individuals served in penal battalions
compared to more than thirty four million who served in the Red Army.
The proportion in penal battalions was a mere 1.24 per cent.1018 The
German armed forces also had penal battalions, and 120,000 Germans
passed through them.1019
The national-patriots do not avoid difficult and uncomfortable topics such
as collaboration with the Germans and the Moscow panic. Rzheshevskiĭ
acknowledged

that,

despite

attempts

by

Soviet

propagandists

to

whitewash history, it is now known that at least one million Soviet citizens
actively collaborated with the Germans.1020 Disaffection with Stalinist rule
in the years before the war and panic at the scale of the defeats of 1941
were clearly factors.1021 Nonetheless, the actual numbers of active
collaborators were relatively small when one considers the vast population
of the Soviet Union. It has to be viewed in the context of a population of
two hundred million, the vastly greater numbers of civilian partisans and
Red Army soldiers who chose to fight to the death rather than become
prisoners of the Nazis, and the level of coercion imposed on local Soviet
populations that led to so many working behind enemy lines for Hitler’s
armies.1022
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The national-patriots do not credit the frequently heard claim that it was
only when knowledge of the brutality of Nazi occupation became
widespread that Red Army soldiers were less likely to surrender or
welcome the Germans.1023 According to Zolotarev, Nazi propaganda was
of an order fundamentally different to Soviet propaganda, and the degree
of untruthfulness would have made Soviet commissars blush.1024 The
message of the Nazis was that Hitler was a liberator. The Germans hid
their obnoxious policies and behaviour as best they could during 1941.
Thus, the soldiers and civilians who fought back against the Nazis in 1941
did so before the full horror of the occupation regime was known.
Stalin remains a divisive figure for the national-patriots, just as he is a
divisive figure for society more broadly. There is certainly no blanket
rehabilitation of Stalin evident in the national-patriotic accounts studied
here. Medinskiĭ was critical of Stalin’s leadership in 1941, arguing that
given

Stalin’s

centralisation

of

power,

Stalin

alone

must

accept

responsibility when explaining the early defeats. However, Medinskiĭ
added that if Stalin’s conduct in 1941 is damned, so must the victories of
1943-1945 be at least partially credited to Stalin.1025 Gareev was sceptical
of the argument that the Red Army managed to win despite Stalin’s
leadership. Russia after all had lost the Crimean, Russo-Japanese and
First World Wars, so there was nothing obvious about Russian military
superiority. It must have been Stalin’s leadership that brought victory in
the Great Patriotic War.1026 Rzheshevskiĭ noted that at the centre of the
entire system stood Stalin and that inevitably he was part of the decisions
that led to the defeats and the victories.1027 According to Seniavskaia, the
increasingly anti-German Soviet propaganda simply confirmed the general
outlook of most ordinary soldiers and people: “The war immediately
1023
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became National and Patriotic … In these conditions, the interests of the
people, country and state were fundamentally the same”.1028
Petrov, by contrast, considered that too much power was concentrated in
Stalin’s hands – the military professionals were paralysed.1029 Timoshenko
and Zhukov were unable to impress upon Stalin the likelihood of a
German attack.1030 It was Stalin who then interfered to order pointless
counter-attacks and refused to allow the South-West Front to escape the
cauldron at Kiev. For Petrov, a revival took place after the early defeats
and “despite the deformities of Soviet society, the Red Army and the
nation deeply adhered to the idea of the defence of the Fatherland”.
Despite the heavy losses and forced retreat, the key to victory was that
patriots preserved faith in the inevitable victory over the aggressor.1031 In
other words, this was a victory primarily of professional soldiers and loyal
civilians.
On the other hand, it was clearly Soviet resistance and not a contingency
such as the weather that exercised the greatest influence over the
outcome of the Battle of Moscow.1032 According to Petrov, “[n]o matter
what the defeated Hitlerite ‘ubermenschen’ concoct, they were defeated
not by the mythical ‘General Mud’ and ‘General Frost’, but the generals of
the

Red

Army”.1033

Petrov

cited

meteorological

information

from

November to conclude that the average temperature for that month was
four to six degrees below zero Celsius; cold, but not devastatingly so. The
temperature did drop to minus twenty-eight from 5 to 6 December, but
this was when German offensive capabilities were already spent.1034
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Miagkov noted that while the Red Army recorded temperatures of minus
four to minus six in November while German sources cited the average
November temperature as minus fifteen to sixteen degrees. Furthermore,
in mid-November, the cold, but not severe, weather allowed the Germans
to move along the hardened ground and threaten the capital.1035
Ultimately, “[t]he reason for the collapse of the advance of Army Group
Centre was not the frost, but the growing resistance of the Red Army”. 1036
Miagkov argued that the only time that mud truly affected operations
around Moscow was when the Soviet counter-attack was brought to a halt
by the mud of spring 1942.1037
During

the

second

German offensive

in

mid-November

1941

the

conditions were excellent for offensive operations: solid ground, clear
skies and no snow.1038 With regard to the mud, Miagkov was happy to
concede that the rasputitsa was a factor that adversely affected German
plans, but argued that as a supposedly professional and modern army the
Germans should have been aware of climactic conditions they would face
in the field.1039 The Germans were delayed but the retreating Red Army
suffered even more because it had to abandon and destroy equipment
that could not be moved.1040 The mud was less of a factor than is usually
considered because German troops simply marched at night when frosts
hardened the soft ground.1041 The rasputitsa only served to complicate a
situation already made difficult by increased Soviet resistance.1042 Primary
documents from German sources make it clear that German troops were
more concerned about Soviet resistance than the mud.1043
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The national-patriotic accounts offered muted praise of the organisational
capabilities of the Communist Party during the war. During the panic of
October, the Moscow Central Committee continued to distribute warm
clothes and blankets to the people.1044 Party members were the first to
enter an engagement and the last to leave, “their gallantry inspired the
warriors to heroic deeds, they were the example”.1045 Rzheshevskiĭ noted
that enough warm clothing for ten million people was donated to the
Soviet government in 1941; three hundred million roubles were donated
to the war effort by the church despite religious persecution by Soviet
authorities in the previous decades; money was even donated by Soviet
citizens in areas occupied by the Germans and smuggled to the Soviet
authorities.1046
There was criticism from the national-patriots of Soviet hyperbole. The
accounts argued that overblown Soviet descriptions of near superhuman
feats by Red Army soldiers obscured the real and untold heroism of
millions of ordinary soldiers and provide ample fodder for revisionist
historians to discredit memory of the war as a whole.1047 For Isaev, the
Soviet version of the invasion that overwhelmingly numerically superior
well-trained, physically fit, young German soldiers, each armed with a
sub-machine gun, attacked en masse is not supported by the evidence,
and was a later invention to attempt to explain the enormous German
gains of 1941.1048 Similarly, the lionising of Panfilov’s ‘Twenty-Eight’ by
Soviet authorities constituted a distraction from the real bravery of
thousands of other troops who fought alongside them. 1049 Medinskiĭ noted
that it was of no benefit to the patriotic cause when members of the
‘Twenty-Eight’ thought to have been killed in the famous action were
found alive and well after the war; one soldier coming home to find that
1044

Petrov, 1941 Rabota nad oshibkami, p. 408.
ibid., p. 444.
1046
Rzheshevskiĭ, ‘Narod i voĭna’, pp. 223-224.
1047
Medinskiĭ, Voĭna, p. 244.
1048
Isaev, Anti-Suvorov, p. 43.
1049
Miagkov, ‘Na grani katastrofy. 22 iiunia – sentiabr’ 1941 goda’, pp. 147-148; Isaev, Kotly 41go, p. 256.
1045

296

his wife had remarried after hearing propaganda reports that he had been
killed in action.1050 The exaggerated achievement of the ‘Twenty-Eight’
resembled the hyperbole around the famous three hundred Spartans who
stood against Xerxes at Thermopylae; this was in fact a victory of a much
larger and diverse group of soldiers.1051
What is needed according to Miagkov is more recognition of the fact that
“the Russian land sent into battle genuine heroes” (istinnye bogatyri) who
did not run from the enemy.1052 Miagkov cited the example of Sergeant
Petr Stemasov who on 25 October 1941 at the village of SpassRukhovskoe earned a Gold Star by risking his life to put out a fire on two
transports loaded with ammunition and fuel, personally destroying two
tanks and then rescuing seventeen members of his regiment from
encirclement. The difference to the Soviet era is that archival references
are supplied, giving an opportunity for verification by independent
historians.1053
Arguing that despite the desertion, self-harm, panic and surrender in the
Red Army in 1941, Soviet soldiers for the most part fought bravely,
slowed the German advance, and through their sacrifice ultimately saved
Moscow, Gareev noted that: “It cannot be that Hitler's command and the
German troops were doing everything right, that they fought superbly and
suddenly failed. And that we did it all wrong, fought stupidly and suddenly
miraculously won”.1054 Many revisionists by contrast would argue that it
would be difficult to find a political and military leadership that could so
badly bungle the management of a war.
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Conclusion
The national-patriotic accounts of the present day are different to the
official Soviet view because it is no longer possible to hide from the
massive scale of the defeats that took place in June 1941. Why the
national-patriot view exists and is so strongly pushed in Russia can in part
be explained by the strength of the revisionist accounts that largely
preceded it. The national-patriotic view is reactionary in nature. The
national-patriotic

historians

feel

that

their

view,

which

for

them

corresponds with true Russian patriotism, is under siege from a hostile
West and an even more dangerous phalanx of Western-inspired Russian
revisionists. According to the national-patriots, the political climate in the
years leading up to and immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union
led to an increasingly polarised and acrimonious debate; revisionists were
willing to pursue and support any arguments that defamed and
delegitimised the Soviet government.
The convenient, catch-all opponent for the national-patriots is the
Icebreaker thesis, often personalised as the “anti-Suvorov” campaign. In
Russia, Icebreaker attracted significant support. To take a metaphor from
Operation Barbarossa, the revisionist blitzkrieg sent shockwaves through
the crumbling Soviet Union and fledgling Russian Federation of the late
1980s and 1990s.1055 National-patriots see themselves as the vanguard of
truth blunting and slowly reversing the sizeable gains made in the
revisionist attack. Importantly, the national-patriots also reject the
“stolen victory” concept that unites many critics of the Soviet view of the
war.
In terms of the question set at the start of this thesis, the revisionist
accounts mostly argue against the concept of a Red victory. For many
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revisionists, Stalin was planning to attack Hitler and was then hoist on his
own petard. Red Army leaders made countless errors and seemed no
better at waging war in 1942 when the Germans once more stormed
successfully across the southern steppe to Stalingrad. Support for the
Soviet system more or less collapsed at the start of the war and it was
only the unprecedented cruelty of a totalitarian regime that slowed the
German advance at massive cost. The national-patriots, by contrast,
emphasise the relative solidarity of the Soviet state in the face of the
invaders. There may have been one million collaborators, but compared
to the fighting elsewhere in Europe, the new element of 1941 was
effective Soviet resistance against the Nazi invaders. While Stalin remains
a controversial figure, the national-patriots describe a Soviet state and
Red Army that functioned effectively in the face of an unprecedented
military challenge. Ironically, the national-patriotic view seems closer to
recent Western accounts described in Chapter Five than their revisionist
rivals.
The revisionist critique has not disappeared from the discourse in Russia
under the weight of the national-patriot’s counter-attack. On the other
hand, the revisionists may well lose this Russian historikerstreit with the
national-patriots. The latter have the support of a political and military
establishment with a vested interest in debunking Icebreaker, confirming
Russia’s most notable achievement in world history, and using the Second
World War as an example of what can be achieved when there is
solidarity between the government and its people. It is clear that the
Putin administration, like the Soviet state, will encourage a version of
history based around the ideas that the Germans started the war, the
Soviet state and the Red Army actively and ultimately successfully
resisted, and that the vast majority of the population not only stayed
loyal to their homeland but fought the war with incredible skill and
bravery.
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Conclusion
The question asked at the start of this thesis was whether the changing
historiography in the West and in Russia around the events of 1941 was
now converging along the lines of the “Red victory” proposed by Citino.
The conclusions reached can be summarised as follows.
One: In the first half of the Cold War (1945-1965), very different
accounts of the war constituted dominant paradigms in the West and in
the Soviet Union. As nearly every account of the Western historiography
maintains, the Halder school became the dominant voice. The view
espoused by the German generals that dominated English-language
accounts of the war in the first half of the Cold War centred on the idea
that the Germans could have and should have captured Moscow before
the onset of the autumn rain and winter snow. That this goal was not
achieved reflected the fact that poor strategic choices were made by
Hitler, a military amateur who was nonetheless convinced that he was a
military genius. Hitler underestimated the importance of Moscow and
diverted his panzer groups to Leningrad and Kiev in August. Only in
October did the Wehrmacht move on Moscow and by then the combined
forces of the weather and the endless hordes of cannon fodder available
to Hitler stopped the Germans.
The classic Western accounts of Liddell Hart, Seaton and Ziemke focused
upon German mistakes, the weather and Russia’s geography, not the
counter-attacks of the Red Army or the capacity of the Soviet state.
Countless general and specialised accounts of the war left the reader with
the impression that only one side was fighting during 1941. The Red Army
slowed the progress of the Wehrmacht mainly by surrendering in huge
numbers or offering up its soldiers as a sacrifice in hopeless acts of
resistance. Underpinning the dominant German view were negative
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cultural stereotypes about the incapacity of the Soviet state and Red
Army.
Meanwhile, the Soviet view of the war told a very different story. The
Soviets argued that Hitler’s mistakes and the weather were used by
Western historians as propaganda weapons to diminish the Soviet
achievement at Moscow. The surprise attack, the battle-hardened
Wehrmacht and the huge resources of Axis-dominated Europe created a
“complex” military challenge for the Soviet state and Red Army. While
different periods in Soviet historiography accorded different levels of
blame and credit to Stalin and his generals, the outcome of the fight for
Moscow was determined by the actions of the Soviet government, army
and people. The Soviet view of the war was that 1941 was a hard-fought
Red victory that laid the foundation for ultimate defeat of Hitler.
Two: In the second half of the Cold War, the paradigms outlined above
broke down, albeit at different speeds and for different reasons. Whereas
early Cold War Western histories explicitly and implicitly prioritised Hitler’s
blunders and the weather, the arguments of the German generals largely
disappeared from the 1970s with very few historians following Liddell Hart
and Seaton in arguing that the Germans almost won the war in 1941.
Since Reinhardt and van Creveld, Western historians have mostly
described a “mission impossible” for the German Army given their lack of
resources and the geographical, meteorological and numerical challenges.
It is likely that this gradual decline of the influence of the Halder school
reflected broader contextual changes and not simply the new evidence
from the German archives made available in the 1960s. The 1960s, with
the war over for nearly two decades, was an era of historians revising the
standard stories of the war. In the West, Cold War “revisionism” grew in
importance among academic historians who questioned whether the
Soviet state was solely responsible for the breakdown of the wartime
alliance. The German generals came in for trenchant criticism from the
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likes of Clark, Reinhardt and van Creveld. For these historians, the
generals’ claim of a near miss at Moscow was not supported by the newly
available archival material from the 1960s; given Germany’s lack of
resources, the invasion of the Soviet Union was a fatal act of hubris on
the part of Hitler and his generals.
In the Soviet Union serious attacks on the Soviet view of the war were
impossible before the Gorbachëv era. When in the late 1980s Gorbachëv
did finally allow public criticism of Soviet historiography, it coincided with
the publication of Icebreaker in the West. Independent historians
challenged the monopoly of historians employed by the Soviet and later
the Russian military establishment. The revisionist critique challenged the
most basic assumption of the official Soviet view of the war: that this was
an unprovoked attack on a peace-loving Soviet Union. The revisionist
histories were equally brutal in their assessment of the competence of the
Soviet political and military leadership and cast doubt on the Soviet
shibboleth of a unified and uniformly patriotic Soviet state and Red Army.
The opening of the Soviet archives produced in Russia great interest in
the hitherto secret history, crimes and failings of the Soviet state and
army. The revisionists told a story of an aggressive Stalin, a weak and
incompetent Soviet state and army, and the saving of the capital thanks
to the patriotism and sacrifice of ordinary Soviet citizens. It was not the
case that revisionists in Russia simply adopted the story told by the
Halder school. Hitler’s mistakes and the weather figured much less than
the willingness of a cruel totalitarian regime to sacrifice its people. After
Moscow was saved by the millions of “Uncle Vanyas”, the regime used its
propaganda to steal the victory from the people and proclaim that the war
proved the superiority of the Communist system.
Three: Since the opening of the Soviet archives, Western historians have
mostly – but by no means universally – explicitly rejected the view of the
German generals and prioritised Soviet resistance in their accounts of
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1941. Rather than emphasising the contingency of Hitler’s decisions and
the influence of the weather, there is a trend towards an emphasis upon
the capacity of the Soviet state to resist, the casualties inflicted upon the
Germans in the forgotten battles, and the complexity of the motivations
of ordinary Soviet citizens whose resistance surprised the Germans. This
emphasis upon Soviet resistance as key is for the first time a feature of
the Western military histories describing the war from the German and
Soviet perspectives.
Comparing the footnotes and source-base of, for example, Glantz or
Stahel with Erickson or Seaton is a good guide to how much more
information is available since the opening of the Soviet archives. The
sheer volume of this information pointed to evidence of Soviet activity,
even if the mistakes and defeats and military disasters told a very
different story to Soviet propaganda. Archival material does not speak for
itself and so it is likely that broader historiographical changes have
influenced Western historians writing about 1941. Since the 1970s, the
‘revisionist’ paradigm in Soviet studies argued that Soviet society was
more complicated and multi-layered than a straightforward ‘totalitarian’
model might suggest. The Soviet system had strengths as well as
weaknesses for its “acid test” of war. Meanwhile, negative stereotyping of
Russians as servile hordes whose principal virtue was their mass rather
than fighting skill has all but disappeared. Essentialising still occurs, but
usually Russian resilience or some other positive quality is invoked to
explain battlefield performance. The mass surrenders of the summer are
more likely to be understood in terms of the loss of command and control
under conditions of encirclement.
In Russia, the quarter of a century that followed the collapse of the Soviet
state has witnessed a war between the revisionist critics of the Soviet
view of the war and the national-patriots who argue that the Soviet Union
was the innocent party in the outbreak of the war, that mistakes were
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made at the start of the war followed by a Red Army recovery, and that
the Soviet state, army and people deserve credit for the victory at
Moscow. The national-patriots rejected the Icebreaker thesis and any
suggestion that the Red Army surrendered en masse, or fought only
because of blocking detachments and commissars.
Viewed in these terms, an alignment is discernible between new
dominant, or at least emerging dominant, paradigms in the West and in
Russia. Western historians are much more critical of the Soviet regime
than the national-patriots. Nevertheless, there is considerable overlap
between Glantz and Citino on the one hand and Zolotarev and Isaev on
the other. Soviet resistance and not German error tipped the scales.
Four: As has often been noted in this thesis, the growth of a new
orthodoxy or consensus or the coming into existence of a new paradigm is
not the same thing as the definitive answer to a question. For example, it
is possible that a type of groupthink has been at work in the West over
the past twenty years brought about by the towering influence of Glantz
and Reinhardt, by perceptions that the history of 1941 was distorted by
Cold War politics, by dissatisfaction with the totalitarian model, and
declining admiration for the once “clean” Wehrmacht and its generals. If
the Putin regime were to come to an end at some point soon, it is possible
that there would be a burst of revisionist histories once more in Russia. It
is also possible that perceptions of Russia will be adversely affected by
Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 or Russia’s alleged interference in
the 2016 U.S. election and that a new generation of Western historians
will as a consequence look more negatively on Russia/the Soviet Union’s
role in 1941. It is already the case that new nationalist histories of the
war emerging in Ukraine are gaining in popularity and tell a different story
of the war to that preferred by Russian national-patriots.1056 Evidence is
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never complete and is always subject to interpretation. Revisionist
historians accuse the Soviet military establishment and national-patriotic
historians of deliberatly hiding the truth just as they did in the Stalin
era.1057 The greatest controversy of them all – Icebreaker - is far from
definitively resolved.
Five: To a remarkable degree, Western and Russian historians are still
arguing over paradigms that were established early in the Cold War.
While it is certainly the case that conferences, books and articles on 1941
now feature Russian-language and Western voices, it cannot really be
said that this collaboration has produced agreement on what needs to be
resolved about 1941. The Russian literature is still mainly debating the
issues central to the Soviet view of the war – the innocence or not of the
Soviet Union, the competence of the Soviet political and military
leadership, and whether the regime had any real support during the war.
Western historians writing after the opening of the Soviet archives dismiss
the Icebreaker thesis, are striving to put to rest the legacy of the Halder
school and to work out why the Soviet regime proved so resilient in the
face of the hitherto invincible German invaders.
What can be concluded is that a change has occurred from what was the
case during the Cold War. Across the globe, the reader of military
histories about 1941 is likely to get the impression that, while many
factors were involved in the German failure to capture Moscow, Soviet
resistance mattered the most. In the West, respect for the viewpoint of
the German generals and the idea that Operations Barbarossa and
Typhoon were military successes but political failures are no longer
fashionable. In Russia, debate over the war has continued to rage,
although the national-patriots have clearly strengthened their position
during the Putin era.
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There was nothing inevitable about these developments. The end of the
Cold War meant that new information and new interpretations were freely
shared between scholars and popular writers in the West and in Russia.
However, the new information was never in itself decisive. In Russia, the
debate about 1941 still swirls around the truth or otherwise of the original
Soviet paradigm. The issues that divide national-patriots and revisionists
are who started the war, was it mainly brutal coercion that saved the
Soviet state, and what was the true cost of the war. While the nationalpatriots see a victory of the Soviet state and people working in unison,
revisionists describe a stolen victory and a regime that survived in spite of
its own incompetence and unpopularity.
In the West, as we have seen, one of the distinct themes of the last two
decades has been the attempt to kill off the Halder school once and for
all. Rather than a missed opportunity, the trend in the West has been to
view the German blitzkrieg as superficially impressive but clearly
insufficient to overcome a resilient Soviet state and army. The new
historiography has harnessed material from Soviet archives, together with
German archives and other primary materials to paint a picture of a war
that was essentially decided in the summer of 1941 when the German
invasion was launched with what proved to be woefully insufficient
resources. A minority of Western accounts consider that Hitler’s meddling
or the mud and snow mattered most, but they are clearly outnumbered
by accounts that insufficient German resources in the face of determined
Soviet resistance mattered most.
In the West, the Halder school has been attacked by the pincer
movement of historians working on the Soviet and German sides of the
war arguing that resources and Soviet resistance were the crucial factors.
In Russia, a bitter debate continues, but a re-energised Russian military
establishment with the backing of the Putin administration has fought
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back against the Icebreaker and “Stolen Victory” concepts, whose
popularity peaked in the 1990s. It is at the very least possible that, on
present trends, an alignment is occurring between accounts of 1941 that
predominate in the English and Russian-speaking worlds. In other words,
1941 has metamorphosed, or is in the process of metamorphising, as
Citino has suggested, from a German defeat into a Red victory.
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